S. W. P., A JUVENILE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Juvenile's adjudication for unlawfully receiving stolen property was reversed because the evidence proved only theft, not receipt of stolen goods, and one cannot be convicted of receiving stolen property when they are the principal to the theft.
A person who steals property or is a principal to the theft cannot be convicted of receiving, retaining, disposing of, or aiding in the concealment of stolen property.
[1] One who steals property or is a principal to the theft cannot be convicted of receiving, retaining, disposing of, or aiding in the concealment of stolen property.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA juvenile was charged with both unlawfully receiving a stolen motorcycle and larceny of the same motorcycle. After the State elected to proceed on th…
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PER CURIAM.
Respondent juvenile appeals an adjudication of delinquency for unlawfully receiving stolen property.
A petition for delinquency was filed charging the respondent with unlawfully receiving, retaining, disposing of or aiding in the concealment of stolen property, a motorcycle. Section 812.031, Florida Statutes (1975). The petition was later amended to include the charge of larceny of the same motorcycle. Section 812.021, Florida Statutes (1975).
Upon the close of the State’s case, respondent’s counsel moved that the State be required to elect between the two charges. The judge reserved ruling and at the close of all the evidence required the State to make an election. The State elected to proceed on the unlawful receipt of stolen property charge. Respondent’s counsel then moved for judgment of acquittal. The judge denied the motion and adjudicated the respondent delinquent. We reverse.
There does not appear of record competent substantial evidence to support the adjudication of delinquency for unlawful receipt of stolen goods. Rather, the testimony and the inferences to be drawn at best went toward proving the theft of the motorcycle. The established law is that one who steals property or is a principal to the theft cannot be convicted of receiving, retaining, disposing or aiding in the concealment of stolen property. See Ketelsen v. State, 211 So. 2d 853 (Fla.3d DCA 1968); Thomas v. State, 216 So. 2d 25 (Fla.3d DCA 1968); E. C. v. State, 280 So. 2d 492 (Fla.3d DCA 1973); McWhirter v. State, 325 So. 2d 463 (Fla.1st DCA 1976); C. M. I. and A. R. v. State, 335 So. 2d 868 (Fla.3d DCA 1976).
Reversed.
PEARSON, Judge
(dissenting).
Juvenile proceedings are not criminal in nature1 and, therefore, the juvenile in the present case was delinquent if either charge was proved.2 Where the evidence at the conclusion of the case establishes delinquency pursuant to the sufficiently clear wording in the petition of delinquency,3 the finding of delinquency ought not be reversed upon a holding that the wrong kind of delinquency was proved, unless some prejudice to the juvenile in the defense of the charge can be found in the record. I would, therefore, affirm.
. See § 39.10(5), Fla.Stat. (1975); and Richardson v. State ex rel. Milton, 219 So. 2d 77, 80 (Fla.3d DCA 1969). But see Fla.R.Juv.P. 8.180(a).
. See Fla.R.Juv.P. 8.110(c)(1).
. See In Interest of V. D., 245 So. 2d 273 (Fla.4th DCA 1971).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Coleen Anita Ketelsen v. State, 211 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Richardson v. State of Fla. ex rel. Richard Douglas Milton, 219 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)
- Whitfield v. State, 216 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)
- In the Interest v. D., 245 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)
- Emmitt v. McWHIRTER, 325 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
- E. C. v. State, 280 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
- Berman Leasing Co. v. Miami Auto Radiator, Inc., 280 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
- C. M. I. and A. R. v. State, 335 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)