MORRIS K. ANDERSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Morris K. Anderson challenged his designation as a sexual predator on due process grounds, arguing the statute lacked adequate procedural safeguards. The Florida appellate court affirmed the denial of his postconviction relief motion, holding that such constitutional challenges to sexual predator designations cannot be raised through postconviction relief procedures.
A sexual predator designation cannot be challenged through a postconviction relief motion under Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.800 or 3.850. Such claims must be preserved by contemporaneous objection or timely Rule 3.800(b) motion at the time of designation, not raised later through postconviction relief.
[1] A claim that a sexual predator designation violates due process due to a lack of procedural safeguards cannot be raised in a motion for postconviction relief under Florid…
[2] Procedural due process does not require a hearing to prove a defendant's actual dangerousness before designating them as a sexual predator.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“This line of reasoning is in conflict with the Third District's opinion in Espindola v. State, 855 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2003) (holding that the absence of a provision allowing for a hearing to determine whether a defendant presents a danger to the public sufficient to require registration and public notification violates procedural due process).”
Establishes the conflict between district courts on whether due process requires a hearing on dangerousness before sexual predator designation.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAnderson was designated a sexual predator under Florida law. He filed a motion for postconviction relief challenging the designation as violating his …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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[*431] STRINGER, Judge.
Morris K. Anderson challenges the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief. He alleges that his designation as a sexual predator violates his right to due process because the statute under which he was so designated fails to provide procedural safeguards. We affirm.
In its brief order denying Anderson’s motion, the trial court cited to Milks v. State, 848 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), and Givens v. State, 851 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). In both Milks and Givens, this court held that procedural due process did not require a hearing to prove a defendant’s actual dangerousness before designating him as a sexual predator. This line of reasoning is in conflict with the Third District’s opinion in Espindola v. State, 855 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2003) (holding that the absence of a provision allowing for a hearing to determine whether a defendant presents a danger to the public sufficient to require registration and public notification violates procedural due process).
However, Milks, Givens, and Es-pindola are appeals of final orders declaring the defendants “sexual predators.” The order on appeal here is the denial of a motion for postconvietion relief, and such a claim may not be raised pursuant to either Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800 or 3.850. See Angell v. State, 712 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). But see Kidd v. State, 855 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Nicholson v. State, 846 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (holding that a claim of error regarding a sexual predator designation “must be preserved by contemporaneous objection or a timely Rule 3.800(b) motion”).
As in Angelí, our affirmance is without prejudice to Anderson’s right to pursue any available civil remedies. See Angell, 712 So. 2d at 1132; see also Jackson v. State, 801 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
Affirmed.
FULMER and WALLACE, JJ., Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Ferman Carlos Espindola v. State, 855 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)
- Milks v. State, 848 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
- Geis v. Chira, 712 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
- Moreland Nicholson v. State, 846 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)
- Kidd v. State, 855 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)
- Givens v. State, 851 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
- LEE v. State, 801 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)