ST. CLOUD UTILITIES, AN AGENCY BOARD OR COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF ST. CLOUD, FLORIDA, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
ERICK S. MOORE, A MINOR BY AND THROUGH HIS NATURAL FATHER AND LEGAL GUARDIAN, JACK H. MOORE, JACK H. MOORE, INDIVIDUALLY, ARTHUR L. CASSEL D/B/A CASSEL'S GARAGE, JAMES M. MILLER AND DAVID MILLIRON, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
St. Cloud Utilities appeals a trial judge's ruling that interest on a modified judgment should commence from the original jury verdict date rather than from the date the amended judgment was entered. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reverses, holding that interest should accrue from the date of the original final judgment, not the verdict or the amended judgment.
Interest commences from the date the original final judgment was entered, not from the verdict date or the amended judgment date. Because the appellate reversal required only a modification (reapportionment) of an existing judgment for the same amount rather than entry of a new money judgment, Fla.App. Rule 3.15(a) does not apply to make the verdict date controlling.
[1] Interest on a judgment modified by an appellate decision commences from the date of the original final judgment when the appellate court's mandate requires only a modific…
[2] A trial court's act of reapportioning damages after an appellate remand, when no further judicial labor is required and the act is purely ministerial, does not establish…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The required mandate from this court was but a modification of an existing money judgment for the same amount by way of reapportionment among the several defendants.”
Establishes that the appellate mandate constituted only a modification, not entry of a new judgment, making Fla.App. Rule 3.15(a) inapplicable.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA jury rendered a verdict in a tort case involving multiple defendants. The trial judge took several months before entering a final judgment based on …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Interest On Judgments cases and more on FLexlaw
LETTS, Judge.
This appeal is from a trial judge’s ruling that interest on a judgment modified by appellate decision commences from the date of the original jury verdict pursuant to Fla.App. Rule 3.15(a). We reverse.
This case comes to us for the second time. Previously, in reversing the trial judge, we held that the doctrine of comparative negligence does not alter the rule that joint tort feasors are each jointly and severally liable for all damages recoverable by a plaintiff. 337 So. 2d 982, cert. den. 337 So. 2d 809 (Fla.1976).
Accordingly, we earlier remanded the case for the sole purpose of having the trial judge reapportion the damages which he did by way of an amended final judgment.
Apparently, after the original jury verdict, before the first appeal, the judge took several months to decide how to apportion the damages prior to entering the final judgment previously reversed.
As a result, there are three possible dates on which the interest was to commence accruing under Section 55.03 Florida Statutes (1975). They are:
1. The date of the original verdict.
2. Several months later on the occasion of the original final judgment being entered.
3. The date of the amended final judgment.
We commence by eliminating the third alternative. No further judicial labor was required and the act mandated was purely ministerial. Kulhanjian v. Moomjian, 105 So. 2d 783 (Fla.1958).
As to the two alternatives remaining, we are of the opinion that the interest should run from the date of the original judgment entered. The required mandate from this court was but a modification1 of an existing money judgment for the same amount by way of reapportionment among the several defendants. See Gilmore v. Morrison, 341 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 4 DCA 1976).
The appellees argue that the controlling date should be that of the verdict in the light of Fla.App. Rule 3.15(a), which provides:
3.15(a). Issuance of Mandate. Unless the Court, by special order, shall otherwise direct, the clerk, upon the expiration of 15 days from the decision or order, shall issue such mandate or process as may be directed by the Court. When a judgment of reversal is entered which requires the entry of a money judgment on a verdict the mandate shall be deemed to require such money judgment to be entered as of the date of the verdict.
We distinguish, because our previous reversal in this case did not require the entry of a money judgment for the simple reason that one for the exact same sum had already been entered2 and, in effect, only a modification of that existing judgment was required.
In so holding we would comment that if the trial judge had originally correctly apportioned the damages, interest would most certainly only have commenced to accrue upon the entry of the original final judgment. It would be less than just to now punish the appellant for the judge’s error. REVERSED AND REMANDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS OPINION.
CROSS and MOORE, JJ., concur. . We concede the wording in our opinion of reversal employs the word “reversed” and directs the entry of a new judgment. Nonetheless, we adopt the same explanation to be found in Smith v. Goodpasture, 189 So. 2d 265, 267 (Fla. 4 DCA 1966): “. the mandate and the opinion taken together, although employing the word ‘reversed’ amount to reversal only in respect to the amount of the award and amounts to an affirmance in all other respects. Thus, interest is allowed on the judgment as reduced from the original date of the judgment.”
. Less credits for sums paid in the meantime.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Norval M. GUY v. Kight, 431 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)…odified on appeal, rather than reversed, and the only action necessary by the trial court is compliance with the mandate. In other words, no further judicial labor is required and the act mandated is purely ministerial. St. Cloud Utilities v. Moore, 355 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Gilmore v. Morrison, 341 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). We agree with the trial court’s order finding that the opinion and order of this court, remanding the case for trial on the settlement issue, constituted more than a mere…
-
McNITT v. Osborne, 371 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…ture, 189 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966); see Stone v. Jeffres, 208 So. 2d 827 (Fla.1968); Skinner v. Ochiltree, 148 Fla. 705, 5 So. 2d 605 (1942); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Watkins, 99 Fla. 395, 126 So. 489 (1930); St. Cloud Utilities v. Moore, 355 So. 2d 446, 448 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Gilmore v. Morrison, 341 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); City of Miami Beach v. Jacobs, 341 So. 2d 236, 238 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 945 (Fla.1977) (“interest . . . would accrue from the time of the entr…
-
Nursefinders OF ST. Petersburg, Inc. v. Dolan, 619 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)…rney’s fees incurred in collecting part of the final judgment. It is not apparent from this record why the trial, court chose to discontinue the accrual of interest on a judgment requiring no further judicial labor. See St. Cloud Utilities v. Moore, 355 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the amended final judgment limiting post-judgment interest and remand for further proceedings. LEHAN, C.J., and DANAHY and FRANK, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gilmore v. Morrison, 341 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- Erick S. Moore v. ST. Cloud Utils., 337 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
- Kulhanjian v. Moomjian, 105 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1958)
- Smith v. Goodpasture, 189 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966)