DANNY DEMAR JOHNSON, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Johnson appealed his conviction and sentence, challenging the trial judge's refusal to consider a mandated pre-sentence investigation report. The court held that a judge's prior announcement to disregard such a report violates Florida statute and criminal procedure rules, rendering the sentence illegal, and that a defendant's subsequent waiver does not cure this defect.
A trial judge's prior announcement that he will impose the same sentence regardless of the pre-sentence investigation report violates Florida Statutes Section 921.231 and Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.710, rendering the sentence illegal. A defendant's waiver of the investigation after such an announcement does not waive the illegality of the resulting sentence.
[1] A trial judge's announcement that a sentence will be imposed regardless of the results of a mandatory pre-sentence investigation report violates statutory and rule requir…
[2] A defendant's waiver of a pre-sentence investigation report after the trial judge declares an intent to disregard it does not cure the illegality of the sentence.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a trial judge's announcement, prior to sentencing and submission of the presentence investigation report, that ". . . the Court is going to impose the same sentence regardless of the result of the presentence investigation" is a clear violation of the statute and rule, rendering the sentence illegal”
Establishes the core holding that a judge cannot predetermine sentence without considering the mandatory pre-sentence investigation
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJohnson was charged with two counts of attempted first degree murder and two counts of attempted second degree murder. A jury convicted him of lesser …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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PEARSON, Judge.
The single point to be determined on this appeal is whether a trial judge may refuse to consider a pre-sentence investigation report mandated by Section 921.231, Florida Statutes (1975), and Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.710. We hold that a trial judge’s announcement, prior to sentencing and submission of the presentenee investigation report, that “. . . the Court is going to impose the same sentence regardless of the result of the presentence investigation” is a clear violation of the statute and rule, rendering the sentence illegal. We further hold that a defendant’s waiver of presentence investigation after the announcement by the trial judge that he will disregard the report is not a waiver of the illegality of the sentence.
Johnson was charged by information with two counts of attempted first degree murder and two counts of attempted second degree murder. He entered not guilty pleas and was tried before a jury.
At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned with a verdict of (1) guilty of the reckless display of a firearm as a lesser included offense under the charges of attempted first degree murder, (2) guilty of aggravated battery as a lesser included offense under one charge of attempted second degree murder and (3) not guilty of the other charge of attempted second degree murder. Johnson, a first time offender, made a timely request for a presentence investigation. When the trial court announced that it would impose the same sentence regardless of the results of the presentence report, Johnson chose to be sentenced without the presentenee investigation report. The trial court sentenced him to fifteen years imprisonment on the aggravated battery charge with a minimum three years to be served before becoming eligible for parole. Johnson was also sentenced to two consecutive one year terms on the charges of the reckless display of a firearm. He now takes this belated appeal.
A reading of the language of the statute and rule reveals a clear intention that first offenders should have the benefit of a pre-sentence investigation and that trial judges should consider the report prior to sentencing. Therefore, a trial judge is not empowered to frustrate such intention by a prior announcement that he will not follow the statute and rule. See Nordone v. State, 307 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Angel v. State, 305 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); and Harden v. State, 290 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). See also Neal v. Bryant, 149 So. 2d 529 (Fla.1962).
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed and the cause is remanded with directions to the trial court to order the preparation of a presentence investigation according to the statute and to consider the report prior to sentencing.
Reversed and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Orestes Martell v. State, 676 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)…entencing errors must either be raised on direct appeal or by a timely motion for post-conviction relief under Rule 3.850. See Young v. State, 616 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Pegues v. State, 361 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Johnson v. State, 355 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). Finally, we recognize that a court has the authority to convert a 3.800(a) action into a 3.850 proceeding in the interest of justice. DeSantis v. State, 400 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). However, the defendant’s conviction bec…
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Comparato v. State, 419 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…o one found guilty of possession of methaqualones, the trial court erred in sentencing Ortiz for that offense without a presentence investigation report and consideration of same. Angel v. State, 305 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Johnson v. State, 355 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1978). Section 775.083(l)(a-g), Florida Statutes, sets forth the maximum fine which may be imposed for designated crimes and non-criminal violations. Subdivision (f) permits imposition of a fine higher in amount than as provided in su…
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Tascano v. State, 363 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)…in case law. See In the Interest of S.R. v. State, 346 So. 2d 1018 (Fla.1977); Holloway v. State, 342 So. 2d 966 (Fla.1977); City of Orlando v. County of Orange, 276 So. 2d 41 (Fla.1973); Neal v. Bryant, 149 So. 2d 529 (Fla.1962); Johnson v. State, 355 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1978); In the Interest of J.W.H. v. State, 345 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1977); White v. Means, 280 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1973); Florida Tallow Corporation v. Bryan, 237 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1970); United Bonding Insura…
Authorities Cited
- Neal v. Farris Bryant, 149 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1962)
- Harden v. State, 290 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- Tyre Andre Jermaine Angel v. State, 305 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- Nordone v. State, 307 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)