ORESTES MARTELL, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Orestes Martell appealed an order denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), claiming the trial court failed to order a presentence investigation. The court affirmed, holding that Rule 3.800(a) applies only to sentences that are illegal as a matter of law, not to procedural errors in the sentencing process.
Rule 3.800(a) is not the proper vehicle to challenge a court's failure to order a presentence investigation. A failure to order a presentence investigation involves a procedural error resulting in an "unlawful" sentence, not an "illegal" sentence, and must be raised on direct appeal or by a timely motion for post-conviction relief under Rule 3.850.
[1] Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) is intended to provide relief for a narrow category of cases in which the sentence imposes a penalty that is not authorized by…
[2] A claim that a trial court failed to order a presentence investigation is a challenge to an unlawful sentence, not an illegal sentence, and must be raised on direct appea…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Rule 3.800(a) is intended to provide relief for a narrow category of cases in which the sentence imposes a penalty that is simply not authorized by law. It is concerned primarily with whether the terms and conditions of the punishment for a particular offense are permissible as a matter of law. It is not a vehicle designed to re-examine whether the procedure employed to impose the punishment comported with statutory law and due process.”
Establishes the limited scope of Rule 3.800(a) remedies—only substantive illegality, not procedural errors.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMartell received a sentence pursuant to a plea bargain. He moved to correct the sentence, arguing it was illegal because the trial court failed to ord…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Florida Rule Of Criminal Procedure 3.800(A) Construction cases and more on FLexlaw
GERSTEN, Judge.
Appellant, Orestes Martell (the “defendant”), appeals an order denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure, Rule 3.800(a). We affirm.
According to the defendant, the sentence he received pursuant to a plea bargain is illegal because the trial court failed to order a presentence investigation as required under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure, Rule 3.710. However, this is not the type of complaint Rule 3.800(a) was designed to remedy.
Rule 3.800(a) provides that “[a] court may at any time correct an illegal sentence imposed by it or an incorrect calculation made by it in a sentencing guidelines score-sheet.” Application of the Rule is reserved for a narrow class of eases in which the sentence imposed can definitively be categorized ‘illegal’ as a matter of law. As explained by Judge Altenbernd in Judge v. State, 596 So. 2d 73, 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)(emphasis added), rev. denied, 613 So. 2d 5 (Fla.1992):
Rule 3.800(a) is intended to provide relief for a narrow category of cases in which the sentence imposes a penalty that is simply not authorized by law. It is concerned primarily with whether the terms and conditions of the punishment for a particular offense are permissible as a matter of law. It is not a vehicle designed to re-examine whether the procedure employed to impose the punishment comported tmth statutory law and due process.
Accordingly, we hold that Rule 3.800(a) is not the proper means to challenge a court’s failure to order a presentence investigation. This is so because a claim that the trial court failed to order a presentence investigation involves a fact-based post-conviction challenge to an “unlawful” sentence — not an “illegal” sentence. See Nowlin v. State, 639 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Brown v. State, 633 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)(Altenbernd, J., dissenting). These types of sentencing errors must either be raised on direct appeal or by a timely motion for post-conviction relief under Rule 3.850. See Young v. State, 616 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Pegues v. State, 361 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Johnson v. State, 355 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
Finally, we recognize that a court has the authority to convert a 3.800(a) action into a 3.850 proceeding in the interest of justice. DeSantis v. State, 400 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). However, the defendant’s conviction became final more than two years ago and he cannot now utilize Rule 3.800(a) as a means of circumventing the strict timing requirements imposed by Rule 3.850. See Alexander v. State, 571 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). We commend the trial court’s well reasoned and detailed order which we affirm in all respects.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (16 total)
-
Lewis v. State, 926 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…4 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). However, where an appellant makes a fact-based challenge to the lawfulness of his conviction, the appellant’s claim is not cognizable in a rule 3.800(a) motion and should be raised in a rule 3.850 motion. See Martell v. State, 676 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Yates v. State, 556 So. 2d 501, 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Wiley v. State, 604 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (citing Ferenc v. State, 563 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Gandy v. State, 560 So. 2d 1363, 1364 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Sta…
-
Tivan Johnson v. State (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)…e County, Cristina Miranda, Judge. Tivan Johnson, in proper person. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Sandra Lipman, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before SCALES, HENDON, and MILLER, JJ. PER CURIAM. 2 Affirmed. See Martell v. State, 676 So. 2d 1030, 1031 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Judge v. State, 596 So. 2d 73, 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (“[Rule 3.800(a)] is not a vehicle designed to re-examine whether the procedure employed to impose the punishment comported with statutory…
-
Rivas v. State, 43 So. 3d 154 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)…2005. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(b). The motion was filed after the expiration of the two-year time limit for filing a rule 3.850 motion, and is not entitled to any exception to the two-year time limit. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(b); Martell v. State, 676 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (stating that Rule 3.800 cannot be used to circumvent the strict time requirements of rule 3.850; fact-based challenges that sentences were unlawful must be raised on direct appeal or in rule 3.850 motion and not by way of rule 3.…
Previewing 3 of 16 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (11 total)
- Judge v. State, 596 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
- Young v. State, 616 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)
- Nowlin v. State, 639 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- DeSANTIS v. State, 400 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Cueto v. State, 633 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- Brown v. State, 633 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- Johnson v. State, 355 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- Browne v. Monumental Props. OF Fla., Inc., 361 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- Pegues v. State, 361 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- Alexander v. State, 571 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)