SUMTER COUNTY, FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
H. E. DAVIS, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1978-03-22
No. 77-1408
GRIMES, Acting C. J., and SCHEB, J., concur.
356 So. 2d 899 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1978) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

Sumter County appealed a trial court's denial of its motion to dismiss a complaint for declaratory relief challenging the validity of two zoning ordinances. The appellate court reversed, holding that the plaintiff lacked standing because the complaint failed to allege that any of his rights had been invaded or affected by the ordinances.


Holding

A plaintiff lacks standing to seek declaratory relief where the complaint fails to demonstrate that the plaintiff has a direct interest in the declaration and that his rights have been invaded or affected by the ordinance at issue. The trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss because the complaint did not satisfy the essential requirement of standing.


Headnotes

[1] A complaint for declaratory relief must allege facts demonstrating that the plaintiff has a judicially cognizable, bona fide, and direct interest in the result sought by…

[2] A plaintiff seeking declaratory relief must show a right or need to receive the declaration requested.

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Key Quotes

“a right or need on the part of the complaining party to receive the declaration requested”

Establishes the essential requirement for standing in declaratory relief actions

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Facts & Procedural History

H.E. Davis, who owned real property in unincorporated Sumter County, filed a complaint for declaratory relief alleging that Sumter County had unlawful…

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Opinion of the Court
OTT, Judge.

OTT, Judge.

In this appeal the appellant complains of an order of the trial court denying its motion to dismiss the appellee’s complaint. We agree and therefore reverse.

The plaintiff/appellee filed a complaint for declaratory relief. After the necessary party identifications and jurisdictional allegations, the complaint charged that the appellant (Sumter County) had unlawfully enacted two zoning ordinances which were not in compliance with certain statutory formalities prescribed in Chapter 163, Florida Statutes (1976).

The only fact alleged in the complaint concerning the status of the appellee was that he “is the owner of certain real property located in the unincorporated area of Sumter County.” There is no suggestion anywhere in the complaint that any right of the appellee has been invaded or affected by the ordinance. The complaint is therefore lacking in an essential requirement for standing to secure declaratory relief, namely, “a right or need on the part of the complaining party to receive the declaration requested.” Reid v. Kirk, 245 So. 2d 877, 879 (Fla.1st DCA 1971). See McNevin v. Baker, 170 So. 2d 66 (Fla.2d DCA 1964).

In Florida State Board of Dispensing Opticians v. Bayne, 204 So. 2d 34, 37 (Fla.2d DCA 1967) the court held:

In an action for declaratory relief, the complaining party must demonstrate that it has a judicially cognizable, bona fide, and direct interest in the result sought by the action.

In addition, the dispute must be justiciable in the sense that it be based upon some definite assertion of right. 9A Fla.Jur., Declaratory Actions § 13 (1972). In Smith v. City of Pinellas Park, 336 So. 2d 1255 (Fla.2d DCA 1976) the court held that plaintiffs had no standing to seek a declaratory judgment attacking the validity of an ordinance where no justiciable controversy existed. The court held that plaintiffs/appellants “have no real, immediate legal interest in such a declaration nor a present bona fide practical need therefor.” 336 So. 2d at 1256. Cf., Williams v. Howard, 329 So. 2d 277 (Fla.1976).

Judge Pierce, writing for the majority in Bayne, held:

The test of the sufficiency of a complaint for declaratory judgment is not whether the plaintiff will succeed in obtaining such a declaratory decree of rights in accordance with his theory, but whether he is entitled to a declaration of rights at all. 204 So. 2d at 36.

Having failed to meet one of the essential requirements of standing to seek or secure declaratory relief the motion to dismiss the complaint should have been granted. The order of the trial court denying the motion to dismiss is therefore reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.

GRIMES, Acting C. J., and SCHEB, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Mel Mendelson v. City OF Miami Beach, 386 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
    …pecificity in what way the plaintiffs have or will be injured by the zoning ordinances which it attacks and, accordingly fails to state a cause of action for either a declaratory decree as to the validity of such ordinances, Sumpter County v. Davis, 356 So. 2d 899 (Fla.2d DCA 1978); see May v. Holley, 57 So. 2d 636, 639 (Fla.1952), or for inverse condemnation, Mailman Development Corp. v. City of Hollywood, 286 So. 2d 614 (Fla.4th DCA 1973), (b) the complaint was properly dismissed with prejudice as the plain…

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