RICHARD HAGAR SILKEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the portion of the sentence requiring additional prison time in lieu of paying a fine is void and must be stricken.
Appellant was convicted of a third-degree felony and sentenced to five years in prison plus a $5,000 fine, with an additional year in prison if the fi…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant was charged with and convicted of a third degree felony. He was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to five years in prison and also to pay a $5,000 fine. The sentence provided that in lieu of payment of the $5,000 fine, appellant was to serve an additional (sixth) year in prison. This sentence is excessive.
One convicted of a third degree felony may be lawfully sentenced to a maximum of five years in prison, Section 775.082(3)(d), Florida Statutes (1975), and in addition be assessed up to a $5,000 fine, Section 775.-083(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1975). However, the portion of the present sentence requiring appellant to serve a sixth year in prison upon failure to pay the fine is excessive because there exists no statutory authority for the imposition of such a sentence. In order to collect the fine imposed, the state is relegated to those remedies provided by law for the collection of judgments as in other cases.
Accordingly, we hold that that portion of the sentence requiring appellant to serve a sixth year in prison in lieu of payment of the fine is void and is hereby stricken, without the necessity of bringing appellant before the trial court for resentencing. See Chaires v. State, 265 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972). In all other respects, the judgment and sentence appealed is affirmed.
GRIMES, Acting C. J., and SCHEB and DANAHY, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Peyton v. State, 383 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…the trial court was not empowered to place the defendant on probation for more than one year. The trial court’s judgment placing Peyton on probation for a term of three years was, however, unlawful only to the extent of the excess. Silkey v. State, 356 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Moore v. State, 324 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); McBride v. State, 311 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Chaires v. State, 265 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972); Brown v. State, 264 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972). The judgment was e…
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Nash v. State, 434 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)…Brown to this case. Regardless of the ultimate disbursement of the proceeds of the fine, such fine is expressly authorized under section 775.083(1)(c) as a penalty in addition to the prison term for the crime which he committed. See Silkey v. State, 356 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). Certainly, he must concede that the fact that he is indigent does not preclude imposition of a fine as part of the sentence. Cf. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970) (“[N]othing ... precludes a…
Authorities Cited
- Chaires v. State, 265 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)