RANDOLPH PEYTON, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Randolph Peyton appealed a probation violation judgment and one-year prison sentence, arguing that a trial court order correcting his excessive three-year probation term to one year constituted a finding that he had not violated probation. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court's separate rulings on probation violations and sentence correction were not conflicting and that the written judgment imposing prison time expressly confirmed the probation violation finding.
The court held that no conflict existed between the trial court's findings because the minutes and subsequent written orders reflected two separate rulings: one finding probation violations and revoking probation, and another correcting the probationary term. The written judgment imposing prison time expressly recited that Peyton violated his probation and that it was revoked on August 25, 1978, confirming the violation finding.
[1] A term of probation cannot exceed the maximum term of imprisonment provided by statute for the offense.
[2] An unlawful probationary term is only invalid to the extent of the excess beyond the statutory maximum.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Since a term of probation cannot exceed the maximum term of imprisonment provided by statute, Swift v. State, 362 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Mays v. State, 349 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), it is clear that the trial court was not empowered to place the defendant on probation for more than one year.”
Establishes the legal principle that a probation term cannot exceed the maximum prison sentence for the offense.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn March 11, 1977, Peyton was adjudged guilty of battery, withheld sentencing, and placed on probation for three years—exceeding the one-year maximum …
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DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge.
This is an appeal by Randolph Peyton, the defendant below, from a judgment that Peyton had violated the conditions of his probation and a prison sentence of one year imposed thereon. We affirm.
On March 11, 1977, the trial court adjudged Peyton guilty of battery, withheld imposition of sentence and placed him on probation for a period of three years. This three-year term of probation was in excess of that allowed by law. Section 784.03, Florida Statutes (1975), provides that the offense of battery is a misdemeanor in the first degree. A misdemeanor in the first degree is punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding one year. § 775.-082(4)(a), Fla.Stat. (1975). Since a term of probation cannot exceed the maximum term of imprisonment provided by statute, Swift v. State, 362 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Mays v. State, 349 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), it is clear that the trial court was not empowered to place the defendant on probation for more than one year. The trial court’s judgment placing Peyton on probation for a term of three years was, however, unlawful only to the extent of the excess. Silkey v. State, 356 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Moore v. State, 324 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); McBride v. State, 311 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Chaires v. State, 265 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972); Brown v. State, 264 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972). The judgment was effective to place Peyton on probation for one year. On February 14, 1978, within this first year of probation, Peyton was charged with violations of the conditions of probation. A hearing on these charges was held on August 25, 1978.1 On the same day, a hearing was held on Peyton’s motion to correct the three-year term of probation. The concurrence of these proceedings along with the entry of still another order served to create the confusion which became the fodder for Peyton’s appeal.
The deputy clerk’s minutes for August 25, 1978, reflect that the trial court found that the probation conditions were violated and revoked probation. These minutes also reflect that Peyton’s motion for correction of sentence was granted. On September 5, 1978, the trial court entered a written order on the motion for correction of sentence. This order vacated the three-year probationary term and placed Peyton on probation for one year beginning August 25, 1978.2 The order also contained the perfunctory recital that the defendant “has not violated the conditions of his probation.” 3 Peyton argues that this language constituted the court’s ruling on the hearing respecting probation violations and that the written order superseded any conflicting court minutes.
We agree that where there is conflict between a deputy clerk’s minutes and a later order of the court, the order prevails. Watt v. State, 323 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). However, there is no conflict here. The deputy clerk’s minutes clearly reflect two separate rulings by the court. Moreover, the trial court’s written judg.ment and sentence, entered at the time the court imposed the one-year prison sentence for the probation violation, expressly recites that Peyton violated his probation and that the court had revoked it on August 25,1978.
Affirmed.
. When an affidavit and warrant charging probation violations issue within the probationary term, there is no jurisdictional impediment to holding a hearing thereon after the expiration of such term. Carpenter v. State, 355 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Brooker v. State, 207 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968).
. Since the defendant had completed service of the maximum term of probation on March 11, 1978, the trial court’s order of September 5 violated the principles announced above and was a nullity.
. As counsel for the State understated at the later sentencing hearing, “perhaps the form of the order on August 25, 1978, leaves something to be desired.”
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Bennie Jess, Jr. v. State, 384 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…the condition of probation requiring the submission of monthly reports was made in an affidavit which was never withdrawn by the state and which had been filed on December 9, 1977, shortly before the end of the probationary period. Peyton v. State, 383 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Maycock v. State, 281 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). Contrary to the appellant’s contention, we regard as irrelevant the fact that the identical allegation was also contained in an affidavit which was untimely filed on September 1…
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Frederick v. State, 405 So. 2d 1344 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…ding that (1) the defendant’s two-year probationary term in Case No. 76-2390 expired well before the violations of probation occurred and rendered the judgment and sentence imposed on the defendant for such violations a nullity, see Peyton v. State, 383 So. 2d 737, 738 n.2 (Fla.3d DCA 1980); (2) the trial court’s subsequent sua spohte order which purported to modify the defendant’s probationary term, which the defendant had begun serving, by postponing its effective date (a) unlawfully subjected the defendant…
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Watson v. State, 633 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)…ors in their orders and judgments even after the term expires. Boggs v. Wainwright, 223 So. 2d 316 (Fla.1969). However, where there is a conflict between the deputy clerk’s minutes and a later order of the court, the order prevails. Peyton v. State, 383 So. 2d 737, 739 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). In this case there is insufficient record evidence to conclude that the court’s written order suspending entry of sentence was a clerical error. Watt v. State, 323 So. 2d 621, 622 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). The trial court indica…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (13 total)
- Moore v. State, 324 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
- Mays v. State, 349 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)
- White v. State, 355 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- Carpenter v. State, 355 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- Brown v. State, 264 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)
- Maerkle v. State, 362 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- Swift v. State, 362 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- Chaires v. State, 265 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)
- McBRIDE v. State, 311 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
- Watt v. State, 323 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)