EDGAR BULLARD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Edgar Bullard appealed his conviction for receiving stolen property, challenging the admissibility of his confession on grounds that it was coerced by police promises not to prosecute. The court reversed because the trial judge failed to make a specific finding of voluntariness on the record as required by established precedent, instead merely overruling the objection and submitting the issue to the jury.
The court held that the trial judge's methodology for determining voluntariness was deficient because he failed to make a specific finding of voluntariness on the record with unmistakable clarity, instead merely stating 'Overrule the objection' and leaving the matter to the jury. The court also held that alleged promises by police not to prosecute constitute coercion comparable to threats to 'throw the book at' the defendant.
[1] A trial judge must make a specific finding of voluntariness on the record before a confession may be presented to the jury.
[2] A trial judge's statement of "Motion denied" is insufficient to satisfy the requirement of a specific finding of voluntariness for a confession.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a jury may not hear a confession, until the trial judge has made a determination that it was voluntarily given, such determination to appear upon the record with unmistakable clarity”
Establishes the legal standard for confession admissibility requiring an on-the-record finding of voluntariness before jury consideration
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBullard was arrested as a prime suspect for burglary of a clothing store and was interrogated by police officers. He gave a confession in which he adm…
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LETTS, Judge.
This is an appeal from an adjudication of guilt for receiving stolen property. We find one point has merit and reverse.
Upon his arrest as a prime suspect for burglary of a clothing store, the accused was interrogated by police officers and gave a confession which he now claims was “coerced” by promises that he would not be prosecuted. We do not decide here whether the confession was, in fact, coerced. The problem presented, is the method adopted by the trial judge to determine the voluntariness of the confession which methodology was contrary to the requirements laid down by the Supreme Courts of the United States and Florida.
By way of Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 87 S.Ct. 639, 17 L.Ed.2d 593 (1967) the United States Supreme Court determined that a jury may not hear a confession, until the trial judge has made a determination that it was voluntarily given, such determination to appear upon the record with unmistakable clarity. Thereafter, the Florida Supreme Court, applying Sims, held it was not enough for the trial judge, after holding a hearing, to determine admissibility, by simply saying: “Motion denied”. Instead, the trial judge must make a specific finding of voluntariness. McDole v. State, 283 So. 2d 553 (Fla.1973). It may appear that by the very act of denying the motion, the trial judge must have so found. We agree that such appears logical, but cannot ignore mandates from our superiors.
In the instant ease at the close of the hearing on the confession, the trial judge remarked,
“All right, I’ll leave it to the jury. Overrule the objection”.
As dictated by existing case law, this is not a “specific finding” of voluntariness and as such it was insufficient.
We have entertained some qualms as to whether promises of relief constitute coercion, as such, comparable to the police brutality present in the McDole case. Indeed, in Wilson v. State, 304 So. 2d 119 (Fla.1974) our Supreme Court limited the McDole rule (requiring a specific finding of voluntariness) to those cases in which coercion, as distinct from other forms of involuntariness, is alleged. However, we hold that the alleged confession here was the product of coercion. There can be little valid distinction between:
“Confess, or we’ll throw the book at you”
and
“Confess, and we will not prosecute you”.
In either event, the confession is extracted as a direct result of promises, which any defendant might well believe the police capable of delivering on.1
The State also argues that we are not confronted here with a confession, but, in fact, a denial of guilt. We would point out, however, that his stated denial of guilt was as to the actual burglary only. In the same statement, the defendant freely admitted he “bought” the clothes out of the trunk of another man’s car and that that man had confirmed that the clothes were stolen. The charge here involved receiving and concealing stolen property and the statement was therefore, highly inculpatory — in essence a confession.
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL.
DOWNEY and CROSS, JJ., concur. . We are discussing here, actual promises of relief as distinct from offers by the police to do whatever they can.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Anton Kevin Peterson v. State, 382 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1980)…. 2d 642 (Fla.3d DCA 1975); Walker v. State, 311 So. 2d 768 (Fla.3d DCA 1975); Graham v. State, 292 So. 2d 373 (Fla.3d DCA 1974); Smith v. State, 288 So. 2d 522 (Fla.3d DCA 1974); Knight v. State, 373 So. 2d 52 (Fla.4th DCA 1979); Bul-lard v. State, 358 So. 2d 48 (Fla.4th DCA 1978); Greene v. State, 351 So. 2d 1031 (Fla.4th DCA 1976). . Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 87 S.Ct. 639, 17 L.Ed.2d 593 (1967).…
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Simpson v. State, 562 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…evidence as to voluntariness. The judge might have been referring to the fact that a jury may still find a confession to have been involuntary and disregard it, despite a judge’s finding that it was voluntary. Id. at 554. See also Bullard v. State, 358 So. 2d 48, 49 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (where the district court found that the trial judge did not make an adequate finding of voluntariness where he had said “All right, I’ll leave it to the jury.”). Even though McDole has been modified so as not to require a tr…
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Kimble v. State, 372 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)…cDole v. State, 283 So. 2d 553 (Fla.1973). However, such a denial is sufficiently specific when the defendant does not allege coercion. Wilson v. State, 304 So. 2d 119 (Fla.1974); Green v. State, 363 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Bullard v. State, 358 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Hester v. State, 357 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). In the case at bar appellant made no allegation of coercion before the trial court. On this record then, the denial of his motion to suppress constituted a sufficiently clear f…
Authorities Cited
- Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538 (U.S. 1967)
- McDOLE v. State, 283 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1973)
- Wilson v. State, 304 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1974)