EDGAR LEE KIMBLE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1979-07-13
No. 78-885
GRIMES, C. J., concurs., BOARDMAN, J., concurs specially.
372 So. 2d 1014 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1979) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

Edgar Lee Kimble appeals his manslaughter conviction, claiming the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress a confession without making an explicit finding of voluntariness. The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that when a defendant fails to allege coercion, a simple denial of a suppression motion constitutes a sufficiently clear finding of voluntariness.


Holding

The trial court did not err. When a defendant does not allege coercion, a simple denial of a motion to suppress constitutes a sufficiently clear finding of voluntariness to permit the confession to go to the jury. Additionally, appointed counsel need not be notified of interrogation when the defendant has received full Miranda warnings and waived counsel's attendance.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court's denial of a motion to suppress a confession is a sufficiently specific finding of voluntariness when the defendant does not allege coercion.

[2] A trial court's conclusion that a confession is voluntary must appear in the record with unmistakable clarity.

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Key Quotes

“The judge's conclusion that the confession was voluntary must appear in the record with unmistakable clarity.”

Establishes the standard for findings of voluntariness when coercion is alleged

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Facts & Procedural History

Kimble was convicted of manslaughter. He moved to suppress his confession, but the trial court denied the motion. The trial judge based its conclusion…

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Opinion of the Court
DANAHY, Judge.

DANAHY, Judge.

Kimble appeals his conviction for manslaughter, alleging that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress a confession without making a specific finding of voluntariness. We affirm.

The record before us shows the trial judge, based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession, concluded that the confession was voluntary. We find there is sufficient evidence to support that conclusion. The judge’s conclusion that the confession was voluntary must appear in the record with unmistakable clarity. Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 87 S.Ct. 639, 17 L.Ed.2d 593 (1967). Appellant correctly says that the mere denial of a motion to suppress is not a sufficiently specific finding of voluntariness, when coercion is alleged, to permit a confession to go to the jury. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964); McDole v. State, 283 So. 2d 553 (Fla.1973). However, such a denial is sufficiently specific when the defendant does not allege coercion. Wilson v. State, 304 So. 2d 119 (Fla.1974); Green v. State, 363 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Bullard v. State, 358 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Hester v. State, 357 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). In the case at bar appellant made no allegation of coercion before the trial court. On this record then, the denial of his motion to suppress constituted a sufficiently clear finding of voluntariness to permit the jury to hear the issue.

Appellant argues further that his appointed counsel must be notified of his interrogation, despite appellant’s waiver of counsel’s attendance after full Miranda warnings were given. We find that contention without merit. State v. Brown, 261 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972).

Affirmed.

GRIMES, C. J., concurs.

BOARDMAN, J., concurs specially.

Concurrence
BOARDMAN, Judge,

[*1016] BOARDMAN, Judge,

concurring specially.

For the reasons set forth in Peterson v. State, 372 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) I concur in the result only.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Anton Kevin Peterson v. State, 382 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1980)
    …ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, SUNDBERG and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur. . Peterson v. State, 372 So. 2d 1017 (Fla.2d DCA 1979). . In certifying its question, the second district noted the probable existence of conflict between its decision and Kimble v. State, 372 So. 2d 1014 (Fla.2d DCA 1979); McCloud v. Wainwright, 359 So. 2d 10 (Fla.4th DCA 1978), and Melero v. State, 306 So. 2d 603 (Fla.3d DCA 1975). We have jurisdiction. Art. V., § 3(b)(3), Fla.Const. The district court has cited only three cases which conflict with…

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