STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
TOMMY LEE WILLIAMS, APPELLEE
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The State appealed a trial court's suppression of the defendant's confession on the ground that the police officer made an implied promise of leniency. The appellate court reversed, holding that the officer's statement that he would inform the parole commission of the defendant's cooperation did not constitute an implied promise of leniency that would render the confession involuntary.
The officer's statement did not constitute an implied promise of leniency. The officer expressly stated he could make no promises, and merely saying he would advise the parole officer of the defendant's cooperation if contacted cannot reasonably be inferred as a promise of leniency, distinguishing this case from Fillinger v. State where an actual promise of leniency consideration was made.
[1] A confession is not rendered involuntary by an officer's statement that the officer will inform a parole commission of the defendant's cooperation if contacted, absent an…
[2] An officer's statement that the officer can only tell the truth about a defendant's cooperation to parole officials does not constitute an implied promise of leniency tha…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The officer expressly stated he could make no promises to the defendant. A promise of leniency could not be inferred from the officer's statement that he would advise the parole officer of the defendant's cooperation if contacted by 'the parole people.'”
This establishes the court's key holding that the officer's statement did not constitute an implied promise of leniency because he explicitly denied making promises and merely stated he would report the facts truthfully.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant was arrested and advised of his Miranda rights, which he waived. During interrogation about forged checks, he initially denied involveme…
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BOYER, Judge.
The trial court granted the appellee’s (hereafter, defendant) motion to suppress certain inculpatory statements. The State appeals.
The testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress revealed that prior to any questioning the defendant was fully advised of his constitutional rights and he signed a waiver of those rights. He was then questioned concerning his knowledge of certain forged checks, which allegedly reflected his name as the payee and the endorser. Initially, he denied any involvement with, or knowledge of, the forged checks.
After the police officer advised the defendant to tell the truth in light of the overwhelming existing and potential incriminating evidence, he informed the officer that he was afraid of the consequences of any admission of guilt because he was currently on parole. The officer testified that he then informed the defendant that if contacted by the parole commission, the only thing he could do was tell the truth concerning the defendant’s cooperation or lack of it in the investigation. He denied making any promises to the defendant concerning his parole and denied making any promises concerning any recommendations on behalf of the defendant. The defendant subsequently confessed. The trial court found the officer’s statement constituted an implied promise under Fillinger v. State, 349 So. 2d 714 (Fla.2d DCA 1977) and thus the confession was not given freely and voluntarily.
In Fillinger v. State, supra, the officer promised that if the defendant cooperated in the case, he would advise the State Attorney and that her cooperation would be considered in the case. In addition, the officer stated her cooperation would be considered in setting her bond. From those statements, a promise of leniency was inferred. We need not here decide whether, under the same circumstances, we would go so far as did our sister court in the Fillinger case, because the facts sub judice are materially different.
We do not find that the officer’s statement in this case constituted an implied promise of leniency which would vitiate the otherwise voluntary confession. The officer expressly stated he could make no promises to the defendant. A promise of leniency could not be inferred from the officer’s statement that he would advise the parole officer of the defendant’s cooperation if contacted by “the parole people.” (See State v. Mullin, 286 So. 2d 36 (Fla.3d DCA 1973).)
Accordingly, the learned trial judge erred when he entered the order of suppression here appealed.
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent herewith.
McCORD, C. J., and MELVIN, J., concur.
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Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 2005)…ntary. See Maqueira v. State, 588 So. 2d 221, 223 (Fla.1991) (“The fact that a police officer agrees to make one’s cooperation known to prosecuting authorities and to the court does not render a confession involuntary.”); see also State v. Williams, 358 So. 2d 1094, 1094-95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (determining that the officer informing the defendant that if contacted by the parole commission, the -only thing the officer could do was tell the truth concerning the defendant’s cooperation or lack of it in the invest…
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Bova v. State, 392 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)…ent to render a confession involuntary.” United States v. Curtis, 562 F. 2d 1153, 1154 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910, 99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256 (1978). Accord, United States v. Hart, 619 F. 2d 325 (4th Cir. 1980); State v. Williams, 358 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); State v. Mullin, 286 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). II Defendant’s next point is much more troublesome; he alleges that his right to assistance of counsel was impermissibly impaired. The background to this charge lies in the fa…
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Smith v. State, 422 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…mise to notify parole authorities, or the prosecutor, or the court, of the accused’s cooperation under questioning. Bova v. State, 392 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), modified on other grounds, 410 So. 2d 1343 (Fla.1982); see also State v. Williams, 358 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); but see Fillinger v. State, 349 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), cert. den., 374 So. 2d 101 (Fla.1979). Here the record as a whole does not compel a finding that appellant’s confession was involuntary. No other error appears. AF…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Fillinger v. State, 349 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)
- State v. Mullin, 286 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)