THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
MICHAEL MULLIN, APPELLEE
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Florida appealed the trial court's suppression of a defendant's confession, arguing that the officer's statement that he would inform the court and jury of the defendant's cooperation was not an inducement or threat that would vitiate the confession's voluntariness. The appellate court reversed the suppression order, holding that the officer's statement did not constitute a promise of leniency or an implied threat.
The officer's statement did not constitute an improper inducement or threat that would vitiate the defendant's voluntary confession. The officer's express disclaimer that he could not promise anything, coupled with his statement that he would merely inform the court and jury of cooperation, only meant they might exercise leniency if they chose, but did not amount to a promise of leniency.
[1] A confession is not rendered inadmissible by an officer's statement that the defendant's cooperation would be made known to the court and jury, as this does not constitut…
[2] A defendant's reasonable assumption that cooperation might lead to leniency does not, in itself, render a confession involuntary.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The officer expressly informed the defendant he could not promise him anything. The further statement by the officer that he would let the judge and the jury know the defendant had co-operated in the case did not amount to a promise of leniency, but only that his co-operation would be made known.”
Establishes the court's rationale distinguishing between a promise of leniency and a mere statement that cooperation would be communicated to the court and jury.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn officer obtained a confession from the defendant after informing him that he could not promise him anything but would tell the court and jury that …
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PER CURIAM.
In this criminal proceeding the court granted a motion of the defendant and suppressed his confession. The state appealed.
On the motion to suppress it was disclosed that at the time the confession was obtained an officer informed the defendant that he could not promise him anything but would tell the court and the jury that he co-operated in the case. The trial court found the confession “arose out of that inducement,” and that such inducement “carries with it an implied threat that the defendant would be penalized if he did not co-operate.” We are unable to agree with the trial court that the statement made by the officer to the defendant represented such an inducement or threat to the defendant as to vitiate his otherwise voluntary confession.
The officer expressly informed the defendant he could not promise him anything. The further statement by the officer that he would let the judge and the jury know the defendant had co-operated in the case did not amount to a promise of leniency, but only that his co-operation would be made known. All the defendant reasonably could assume therefrom was that the court or jury being so advised might exercise leniency in his case if they so chose.
In Paramore v. State, Fla.1969, 229 So. 2d 855, 858, the Supreme Court said:
“A confession of guilt freely and voluntarily made is not rendered inadmissible because it appears to be induced by deception practiced by the officers, Denmark v. State, 95 Fla. 757, 116 So. 757 (1928), or by the accused being told it would be easier on him if he told the truth, Ebert v. State, 140 So. 2d 63 (Fla.App.2d Dist.1962), or by an officer’s statement that only by confessing could the defendant escape the death penalty. Milton v. Cochran, 147 So. 2d 137 (Fla.1962). In the case sub judice there was no misrepresentation and the appellant was adequately warned as to his constitutional rights. * * * ”
On the authority of that statement of the applicable law in Paramore v. State, supra, and the decisions cited therein, we hold the motion to suppress should have been denied, and that it was error to order suppression of the confession in this case.
Accordingly the order appealed from is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
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Sonnie Boy Oats, Jr. v. State, 446 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1984)…in Brewer v. State, 386 So. 2d 232 (Fla.1980). In addition, Oats’ own testimony that he recalled one of the interrogating officers saying to him that they, as police officers, couldn’t promise him anything vitiates his argument. See State v. Mullin, 286 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). Appellant next asserts that he was denied a right to a fair and impartial trial by the court’s failure to sequester the jury. This argument is clearly without merit. It is within the discretion of the trial judge whether or not…
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Bova v. State, 392 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)…v. Curtis, 562 F. 2d 1153, 1154 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910, 99 S.Ct. 279, 58 L.Ed.2d 256 (1978). Accord, United States v. Hart, 619 F. 2d 325 (4th Cir. 1980); State v. Williams, 358 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); State v. Mullin, 286 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). II Defendant’s next point is much more troublesome; he alleges that his right to assistance of counsel was impermissibly impaired. The background to this charge lies in the fact that defendant took the stand in his own behalf a…
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Mullin v. State, 307 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Sanelco, Inc. v. Roger Wells & the Fla. Indus. Comm'n, 229 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1969)
- Milton v. Cochran, 147 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1962)
- State v. Chase, 95 Fla. 757 (Fla. 1928)
- Denmark v. State, 116 So. 757 (Fla. 1928)
- Ebert v. State, 140 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)