SARAH PATRICK, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERT EUGENE PATRICK, APPELLEE
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In a divorce appeal, the Florida First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of the wife's request for special equity in the husband's grocery business and permanent alimony, but reversed the requirement that the husband maintain life insurance with the wife as beneficiary and struck down an overly restrictive visitation condition prohibiting the child from visiting the father's home when other people were present.
The court affirmed the denial of special equity and permanent alimony as a proper exercise of discretion given the other awards to the wife and her ability to earn income. The court reversed the life insurance requirement, holding it inappropriate absent an award of permanent alimony. The court reversed the visitation restriction as overbroad and impermissible.
[1] A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a special equity in a business and permanent alimony when the requesting party receives other substantial financial…
[2] A requirement that a party maintain life insurance for the benefit of an ex-spouse after death is improper absent a justification for alimony after death, especially when…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“There is nothing in the record to justify an award of alimony after death, and therefore it was error to require the husband to maintain life insurance on his life for the benefit of wife to provide support for her in the event of and after the husband's death.”
Establishes that life insurance requirements are improper absent permanent alimony; key holding on the husband's cross-appeal
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSarah and Robert Patrick were divorcing. The trial court awarded the wife child support, rehabilitative alimony, the parties' mobile home free of encu…
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PER CURIAM.
Wife appeals the trial court’s refusal to grant her a special equity in a grocery business owned by husband; she also appeals the court’s denial of her request for permanent alimony. Husband cross-appeals the court’s requirement that he maintain a $5,000 life insurance policy on himself with the wife as beneficiary. He contends in addition that the court erred in restricting his visitation rights with the parties’ minor child to the condition that no other person be in his home while the child is with him there. We affirm on the two points raised by wife and reverse on the points raised by husband’s cross-appeal.
A review of the record makes it clear that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to award wife a special equity and permanent alimony. In addition to child support and rehabilitative alimony awards, she was given the parties’ mobile home free of encumbrances, a lump sum award, and attorney’s fees. There was testimony that she had recently obtained a real estate license and could with some additional education make a living in that occupation. Viewed as a whole, there was no error in the trial court’s adjustment of the equities between the parties.
There was error, however, in the requirement that husband keep a life insurance policy in force with wife as beneficiary. As this court held recently in Watterson v. Watterson, 353 So. 2d 1185, 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977): “There is nothing in the record to justify an award of alimony after death, and therefore it was error to require the husband to maintain life insurance on his life for the benefit of wife to provide support for her in the event of and after the husband’s death.” See also Todd v. Todd, 311 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) and Putman v. Putman, 154 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963). This type of a requirement is particularly inappropriate where, as here, permanent alimony is not awarded in the judgment. Roberts v. Roberts, 283 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973).
Finally, we reverse the court’s restriction of husband’s visitation privileges with his child. As written the appealed provision would prohibit the child from visiting husband’s home when doctors, preachers, cousins, or even grandparents were present. The limitation is clearly overbroad and must be stricken.
The judgment is therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part. Wife’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees is denied.
MILLS, Acting C. J., and ERVIN and MELVIN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Gregg v. Gregg, 474 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…imony after death. See Beaman v. Beaman, 393 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Weinschel v. Weinschel, 379 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 390 [*268] So. 2d 827 (Fla.1980); Dutton v. Dutton, 379 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Patrick v. Patrick, 358 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Watterson v. Watterson, 353 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Todd v. Todd, 311 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 321 So. 2d 558 (Fla.1975). Despite the implication arising from the holdings in these cases, all the insuran…
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Gavronsky v. Gavronsky, 403 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)…d to practice in Duval County (thereby prohibiting treatment by an out-of-state physician), and the further requirement that no one other than appellant, his mother and sister, and the children, be present during visitation. Cf., Patrick v. Patrick, 358 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). The order appealed is accordingly reversed as to the entirety of the visitation [*628] restrictions imposed, and otherwise affirmed. The cause is hereby remanded for such further proceedings as may be warranted, which may incl…
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Draper v. Draper, 403 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)…2d 446 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979). The restriction is also overbroad in that it prohibits Mr. Stapleton from visiting the home even when the children are not [*990] present. Such visits could have no adverse effect on the children. See Patrick v. Patrick, 358 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). The welfare of the children is the court’s prime consideration in a child custody proceeding. If, after an award of custody, a custodial parent engages in conduct or associations that adversely affect the minor children, the co…
Authorities Cited
- Putman v. Putman, 154 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963)
- Howard Banks v. Simpson, 283 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)
- Roberts v. Nona Lee Roberts, 283 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)
- Todd v. Todd, 311 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)
- Peerless Realty Co. & Jack Sakson v. Fla. Real Est. Comm'n ex rel. C. J. Feidel & Harold L. Clark, 353 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)
- Watterson v. Earline O. Watterson, 353 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)