ROBERT ENNIS SANDERS, APPELLANT,
v.
LILLIAN A. SANDERS, APPELLEE
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In a dissolution of marriage, the Florida appellate court partially reversed the trial court's award of the marital home to the wife as her special property, finding instead that only her $3,000 down payment contribution entitled her to a special equity of that amount, with the remainder to be held as tenants in common. The court affirmed the alimony and attorney fee awards.
The court held that the wife had a special equity only to the extent of her $3,000 down payment contribution, not the full value of the home. The remainder of the property was purchased through the joint efforts of the parties and should be held as tenants in common. The alimony and attorney fee awards were affirmed as supported by evidence of the wife's need and the husband's ability to pay.
[1] A special equity in marital property may be awarded to a spouse who contributes non-marital funds to the purchase or improvement of the property.
[2] A trial court may award permanent alimony when one spouse demonstrates need and the other spouse has the ability to pay.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Based upon the logic expressed in Ball and Merrill, we conclude that the record sustains the finding of the trial judge with reference to a special equity on the part of the wife but only to the extent of $3,000. The remainder was paid by the joint efforts of the parties.”
Establishes that special equity is limited to the amount of documented nonmarital contribution, with remainder treated as marital property
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe wife owned a residential home before marriage, sold it, and contributed $3,000 from the proceeds toward the down payment on a marital home held in…
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MELVIN, Judge.
Appellant/husband seeks to overturn the final judgment of dissolution of marriage as to the provisions that: (1) Awarded to appellee/wife, as a special equity, the full and complete ownership of the marital premises, together with all of the furniture, fixtures and furnishings therein; (2) awarded to the wife the sum of $50 per week, as and for permanent alimony; and (3) required the appellant to pay wife’s attorney a fee in the sum of $1,000.
Prior to the marriage of the parties, the wife owned a residential house. She sold the house after the marriage, and from the sale proceeds paid $3,000 toward the down payment on the marital home, title to which was received and held by them in their joint names as an estate by the entirety. That the wife made such $3,000 payment is not disputed.
The husband asserts that he paid from an inheritance received by him from his mother’s estate the sum of $4,700 toward the improvement and furnishings of the new marital home. This contention is in sharp dispute. The wife testified that she knew nothing as to what her husband had done with his inheritance but that no part of it went into the purchase, improvements or furnishings of the marital home. The trial court apparently accepted as true the testimony of the wife, rejecting that of the husband. That concludes the question of any special contribution by him.
If the wife had furnished all of the purchase money for the marital home, then the ruling of the trial court would have harmonized with Ball v. Ball, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1976); and Merrill v. Merrill, 357 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), Opinion filed April 28, 1978, not yet reported.
Based upon the logic expressed in Ball and Merrill, we conclude that the record sustains the finding of the trial judge with reference to a special equity on the part of the wife but only to the extent of $3,000. The remainder was paid by the joint efforts of the parties.
The record reflects testimony that Lillian A. Sanders is in need of permanent alimony because of the condition of her health. There is ample evidence that Robert Ennis Sanders is able to pay the sum of $50 per week as permanent alimony. The record also reflects that Robert Ennis Sanders has the financial ability to pay the attorney fees and costs as awarded. Lillian A. Sanders is without such ability.
The trial court erred in directing the husband to convey his interest in the marital home to the wife. The judgment appealed from is reversed and remanded with directions that paragraph two of the final judgment directing the husband to convey all of his right, title and interest into the marital home and personal property located therein be stricken. Under applicable law the parties are vested with title to said property as tenants in common. The trial court is directed to enter its judgment finding a special equity in favor of the wife in the sum of $3,000.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
SMITH, Acting C. J., and ERVIN, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Sumner Landay v. Landay, 429 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1983)…uld follow an “all” approach, but found that a gift was made). Others have adopted a “vested interest” approach finding a special equity to the extent of the contribution only. Evers v. Evers, 374 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Sanders v. Sanders, 362 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). Still another court has awarded a percentage ownership based on the amount of the contribution only. Malkemes v. Malkemes, 357 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), overruled, Landay v. Landay, 400 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). Ball d…
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In re the Marriage of Laurel J. Ising Marsh v. Marsh, 399 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)…e. g., Leonard v. Leonard, 389 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (houseboat); Holbrook v. Holbrook, 383 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Hart v. Hart, 377 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Laws v. Laws, 364 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Sanders v. Sanders, 362 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). . See, e. g., Wright v. Wright, 388 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Smith v. Smith, 382 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Marti v. Marti, 377 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), dismissed, 383 So. 2d 1198 (Fla.1980) (savings account…
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Maxwell Roy Forehand v. Forehand, 363 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)…puted that the husband contributed $5,117.83 for these improvements. Based on the record, we conclude the trial court did err by not recognizing the husband’s proven special equity in the marital home to the extent of $5,117.83. Sanders v. Sanders, 362 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), Opinion filed June 6, 1978. Further, the final judgment fails to provide that the $6,000 mortgage on the marital home, now titled solely in the wife’s name, should be the wife’s sole obligation. Accordingly, the cause is revers…
Authorities Cited
- Shannon v. State, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1976)
- Merrill v. Merrill, 357 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)