ARVITA M. BLAND, APPELLANT,
v.
MICHAEL BLAND, APPELLEE
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Wife appealed a trial court order dissolving her marriage and distributing assets while reserving jurisdiction over her alimony claim. The appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that an order dissolving a marriage while reserving jurisdiction over interrelated issues like alimony is not a final or appealable order.
The trial court's order is not a final judgment or an appealable non-final order because it dissolves the marriage and determines some issues while reserving jurisdiction over the interrelated issue of alimony. An order addressing an issue interrelated with an unresolved issue in the case is not final and thus not immediately appealable.
[1] An order dissolving a marriage and reserving jurisdiction over the issue of alimony is not a final, appealable order.
[2] An order that determines some issues in a case but reserves jurisdiction as to other related issues is not a partial final judgment for purposes of immediate appeal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“an order that dissolves a marriage and determines some issues but reserves jurisdiction as to other issues, is not a partial final judgment for the purposes of appeal”
Establishes the controlling legal standard that distinguishes between appealable and non-appealable orders in dissolution cases
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAfter a three-year marriage, Husband filed for dissolution in October 2004, and Wife filed a counter-petition requesting dissolution and alimony. A no…
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GRIFFIN, J.
Arvita M. Bland [“Wife”] has appealed the trial court’s order dissolving her marriage to Michael Bland [“Husband”], resolving equitable distribution and personal property issues but reserving jurisdiction to hear evidence and determine Wife’s claim for alimony. Because this is not an appealable order, we lack jurisdiction of this appeal and dismiss it.
After a three-year marriage, Husband filed a Petition for Dissolution of Marriage on October 1, 2004, and Wife filed a Verified Counter-Petition for Dissolution of Marriage and Other Relief. In her counter-petition, Wife included a request for alimony. On April 5, 2006, a non-jury trial was held in the case. On December 7, 2006, the trial court entered a “Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage,” which dissolved the marriage, found that the real property was the sole non-marital property of Husband, restored Wife’s previous name, and equitably distributed the couple’s personal property. Additionally, the order included the following language:
5. WIFE’S CLAIM FOR ALIMONY. The Court retains specific jurisdiction for either party to present additional evidence and argument on the issue of the Wife’s claim for alimony.
On January 26, 2007, Wife appealed the trial court’s December 7, 2006 order, complaining that the findings contained in the trial court’s order were inadequate and that the trial court erred in its classification and distribution of the parties’ assets.
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(1) provides that district courts of appeal have the authority to review appeals from “final orders of trial courts, not directly reviewable by the supreme court or a circuit court” and “non-final orders of circuit courts as prescribed by rule 9.130.” Partial final judgments are reviewable either on appeal from the partial final judg ment or on appeal from the final judgment in the entire case. Fla. R.App. P. 9.110(k).
Here, despite its title, the appealed order is not a final judgment disposing of the entire case, nor is it an appealable non-final order specified in Rule 9.130(3). The issue remaining is whether the appealed order is a “partial final judgment.” For purposes of Rule 9.110(k), the term “partial final judgment” refers to orders that make a “final adjudication of a separate and distinct portion of a case” or “a judgment that ‘totally disposes of an entire case as to any party’ but not all of the parties in the case.” Philip J. Padovano, FLORIDA Appellate PRACTICE § 21.5 (2007 ed.); Shepardson v. Shepardson, 820 So. 2d 360, 361 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).
The case law indicates that an order that dissolves a marriage and reserves jurisdiction to determine all other issues is a partial final judgment for purposes of Rule 9.110(k). See Galbut v. Garfinkl, 340 So. 2d 470 (Fla.1976); Shepardson, 820 So. 2d at 361; Barnett v. Barnett, 743 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); but see Klein v. Klein, 551 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). However, an order that dissolves a marriage and determines some issues but reserves jurisdiction as to other issues, is not a partial final judgment for the purposes of appeal. See Hoffman v. O’Connor, 802 So. 2d 1197, 1197-98 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (Although the Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage appears final as to the issues addressed, the reservation of jurisdiction over related claims necessarily renders the order nonfinal.).
The issues of alimony and equitable distribution certainly involve “the same parties, the same transaction, and the same underlying factual background.” Philip J. Padovano, FLORIDA Appellate PRACTICE § 21.5; see also §§ 61.075(1), 61.08, Fla. Stat. (2006). They are also inter-related because one can directly affect the other. See, e.g., Simon v. Simon, 542 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). Because the appealed order addresses an issue that is interrelated with an unresolved issue in the case, it is not final and, thus, not immediately appealable. Accordingly, Wife’s appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Appeal DISMISSED.
ORFINGER and EVANDER, JJ„ concur.
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Shlimbaum v. Shlimbaum, 394 So. 3d 1157 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024)…t dissolution caselaw frequently uses the term “partial final judgment” when discussing judgments dissolving a marriage but reserving jurisdiction as to some or all related issues of financial support and equitable distribution. See Bland v. Bland, 971 So. 2d 210, 212 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). From time to time, such appeals are dismissed as premature. See id.; El Gohary v. El Gohary, 76 So. 3d 355 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); Klein v. Klein, 551 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). 5 Because the parties do not argue the is…
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Haritos v. Theodora Haritos, 193 So. 3d 1050 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)…se no final judgment had ever been entered. The June 2013 final judgment of dissolution was a partial final judgment insofar as the marital status of the parties was concerned. See Galbut v. Garfinkl, 340 So. 2d 470, 473 (Fla.1976); Bland v. Bland, 971 So. 2d 210, 212 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); Shepardson v. Shepardson, 820 So. 2d 360, 361 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). But the judgment was not final as to other issues, such as equitable distribution and child support, which the trial court clearly intended to determine at…
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Marjan D. McGUIRE v. McGUIRE, 42 So. 3d 932 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010)…nt final order.” Philip J. Padovano, Florida Appellate Practice § 22.15, at 429 (2d ed. 1997). Because the appealed order addresses an issue where additional judicial labor is contemplated, the order lacks the requisite finality. See Bland v. Bland, 971 So. 2d 210, 212 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); Grafman v. Grafman, 488 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).1 Under these circumstances, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. APPEAL DISMISSED. ORFINGER and TORPY, JJ., concur. . Former Husband conte…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Hoffman v. Christi Louise O'Connor, 802 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)
- Klein v. Klein, 551 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
- Lenora Jackson v. State, 340 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1976)
- Galbut v. Garfinkl, 340 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1976)
- Jones v. State, 820 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
- Barnett v. Barnett, 743 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- Shepardson v. Shepardson, 820 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)
- Simon v. Simon, 542 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)