ABLE FRANKLIN GREEN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant's confession was voluntary was sufficiently clear from the record and supported by the evidence.
[1] A trial judge must make an initial determination of the voluntariness of a confession when a defendant alleges that threats or promises induced it.
[2] A specific finding of voluntariness is required when a defendant alleges that threats or promises have induced his confession.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was convicted of robbery while carrying a firearm and appealed, arguing his confession was involuntary due to alleged threats and promises b…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant appeals a conviction of robbery while carrying a firearm. He contends that the trial court erred in failing to rule with unmistakable clarity that his confession was voluntarily given. Appellee argues that the judge’s conclusion of voluntariness appears from the record with unmistakable plarity. We agree with appellee and affirm.
At the pre-trial hearing on the motion to suppress, the appellant claimed the following: an officer had pulled a gun and had threatened to kill him if he didn’t confess; the officer promised him that if he confessed, this robbery charge and a prior charge would be dropped; after the arrest, his request to call his mother was denied; he stated to the officer that he did not want to make a statement; and he had received privileges as a result of the confession, but the privileges ceased when, at another defendant’s trial, he had failed to give testimony consistent with his confession.
The officer involved testified to the following: no threats were made; no promises to drop charges were made; nor did he recall appellant’s request to call his mother. Appellant’s confession stated that he had an eleventh grade education and that he understood his Miranda rights.
A colloquy ensued between defense counsel and the trial judge. Counsel argued that an implied threat made a confession involuntary. The trial judge responded:
I don’t question that, counselor. You’re talking about a one-on-one situation here. He says that he was threatened. He says he didn’t make any threats at all to him. Now, if you produce a witness in front of me that says that they were present and that he was threatened by the police, then the threat becomes credible and it becomes one that certainly I could take into consideration, but you’re asking me to accept his word over the officer’s word, where there is a conflict here and him saying that he was threatened and him saying that he wasn’t threatened, that he was explained all of his rights; he was given no threats whatsoever. That’s a jury matter, for the jury to weigh and consider his testimony, as well the officer’s testimony, as to the sufficiency of that confession.
The trial judge also addressed the issue of the alleged promises by stating:
Promise; what promise was made to him, that he could testify, as the officer said, in the McLaughlin case, that the charges would be dropped against him if he confessed. That runs contrary to all police— he couldn’t drop the charges once they were made any way. That would be up to the state attorney’s office to do that.
The colloquy ended with the following:
The Court: There never would be a confession or a — or the results of an investigation or lineup if a defendant was able to come into court and say that he did this only because of a promise that was made to him that he wouldn’t be tried on the charges made. You couldn’t convict any criminal in the United States if that were the law and if he were permitted to do that. You produce before me a witness that says that he made that promise and that — and the confession was induced only upon that basis and I’ll dismiss the charge right now. I’ll grant him a directed verdict if the only evidence is that confession that’s going to sustain a conviction, but I’m not going to do it simply upon his statement that he comes in here and says that this officer promised him if he would give the confession that he would drop the charges. It doesn’t make sense to me; is not logical. It doesn’t meet with any police criteria that I’ve ever heard of and for me to accept the credibility of that is a one-on-one situation and say that I believe this man and I disbelieve this officer, and that’s — that’s a matter for you to argue before the jury as to whether or not the confession was tainted by a promise and should not be regarded by the jury.
Mr. Woolfork: Is that Your Honor’s ruling?
The Court: Yes, sir. The law is clear that a trial judge must make an initial determination of the voluntariness of a confession. A specific finding of voluntariness is required when a defendant alleges that threats or promises have induced his confession. A specific finding of voluntariness cannot be inferred from an unexplained denial of a motion to suppress. McDole v. State, 283 So. 2d 553, 554 (Fla.1973). No specific finding need be made where such coercion is not alleged. Wilson v. State, 304 So. 2d 119 (Fla.1974).
The judge’s conclusion that the confession was voluntary appeared from the record with unmistakable clarity as evidenced by the above quoted portions of the record. See Trolinger v. State, 300 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2d D.C.A.1974). Further, the trial court’s finding was amply supported by the evidence. The trial court was not required to credit the uncorroborated testimony of the appellant and discredit the testimony of the officer. Foreman v. State, 213 So. 2d 754, 755 (Fla. 1st D.C.A.1968). Appellant’s second contention, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, is without merit. The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
SMITH, Acting C. J., ERVIN, J., and MITCHELL, HENRY CLAY, Jr., Associate Judge, concur.
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Citator
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Anton Kevin Peterson v. State, 382 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1980)…rt could have listed several more. A survey of cases concerning the voluntariness of confessions demonstrates the confusion generated by McDole v. State, 283 So. 2d 553 (Fla.1973), and Wilson v. State, 304 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1974). See Green v. State, 363 So. 2d 188 (Fla.lst DCA 1978); Pitts v. State, 335 So. 2d 367 (Fla.lst DCA 1976); Leigh v. State, 312 So. 2d 464 (Fla.lst DCA 1975); Husk v. State, 305 So. 2d 19 (Fla.lst DCA 1974); Bunch v. State, 303 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Trolinger v. State, 300 So…
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Anton Kevin Peterson v. State, 372 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)…it unnecessary to relinquish jurisdiction to the trial court for a specific finding and/or ruling on this issue of voluntariness. See also Bunch v. State, 303 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), cert. denied, 314 So. 2d 778 (Fla.1975); Green v. State, 363 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). In the instant case, the issue before the trial court on the motion to suppress was clearly and explicitly stated at least three times prior to and during the proffer. Furthermore, the trial judge’s understanding of his duty to…
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Kimble v. State, 372 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)…378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964); McDole v. State, 283 So. 2d 553 (Fla.1973). However, such a denial is sufficiently specific when the defendant does not allege coercion. Wilson v. State, 304 So. 2d 119 (Fla.1974); Green v. State, 363 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Bullard v. State, 358 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Hester v. State, 357 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). In the case at bar appellant made no allegation of coercion before the trial court. On this record then, the denial of his…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- McDOLE v. State, 283 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1973)
- Wilson v. State, 304 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1974)
- Trolinger v. State, 300 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
- Foreman v. State, 213 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)