NORMA BARO, APPELLANT,
v.
SOUTHEAST FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MIAMI SPRINGS, SOUTHEAST FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MIAMI, ETC., APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this defamation appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed a directed verdict entered in favor of a bank defendant, holding that the question of qualified privilege was an affirmative defense that could not be resolved at the close of the plaintiff's case and must be submitted to the jury.
The court held that the trial court erred in directing a verdict against appellant at the close of her case. The question of the existence of a qualified privilege was an affirmative defense that could not be determined at the close of the plaintiff's case and was a matter for the jury to resolve, not the trial court to decide by directed verdict.
[1] A directed verdict granted at the close of a plaintiff's case must be reviewed by viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
[2] If there is any evidence in the record to support a verdict for the plaintiff, the entry of a directed verdict is improper.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because the instant case is an appeal from a directed verdict rendered at the close of the plaintiff's (appellant) case, we must view the testimony and other evidence in a light most favorable to appellant as a nonmoving party. If there was any evidence in the record to support a verdict for appellant, the entry of the directed verdict was improper.”
Establishes the standard of review for directed verdicts entered at the close of plaintiff's case—evidence must be viewed in plaintiff's favor and directed verdict is improper if any evidence supports plaintiff's case.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceNorma Baro filed an amended complaint against Southeast First National Bank of Miami Springs and related defendants seeking damages for libel and defa…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Qualified Privilege cases and more on FLexlaw
KEHOE, Judge.
Appellant, plaintiff below, brings this appeal from a final judgment entered by the trial court pursuant to a directed verdict granted at the close of her case. We reverse.
Appellant filed an amended complaint seeking money damages against appellees for libel and defamation. Appellees answered and asserted, among other things, the affirmative defense of privilege. Thereafter, the cause came on for a jury trial. At the close of appellant’s case, the trial court, without specifying the grounds therefor, granted appellees’ motion for a directed verdict. Pursuant to the trial court’s direction, the jury returned a verdict for appellees and then the court entered a final judgment in favor of appellees. From this final judgment, appellant appeals.
Our review of the record indicates that the only reasonable hypothesis upon which the trial court could have granted appellees’ motion for a directed verdict was that a qualified privilege barred appellant’s action. Because the instant case is an appeal from a directed verdict rendered at the close of the plaintiff’s (appellant) case, we must view the testimony and other evidence in a light most favorable to appellant as a nonmoving party. If there was any evidence in the record to support a verdict for appellant, the entry of the directed verdict was improper. See, e. g., Teare v. Local Union No. 295, 98 So. 2d 79 (Fla.1957); and Frank Coulson, Inc.-Buick v. Trumbull, 328 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). Applying this principle to the instant case, we believe that the trial court erred in directing a verdict against appellant at the close of her case. We feel that the question of the existence of a qualified privilege was one which could not be determined at the close of appellant’s case, but rather that the existence of any privilege was a matter to be established as an affirmative defense. Of course, this opinion should not be construed as commenting on the merits of such a defense. Accordingly, the final judgment appealed is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
Because of this determination, it is not necessary for us to reach the other points raised by appellant on appeal.
Reversed and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Prof'l Computer Mgmt., Inc. v. Tampa Wholesale Liquor Co., Inc., 374 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)…whatsoever that could in law support a verdict for the plaintiff, (citations omitted) If there is any evidence in the record to support a verdict for appellant, the entry of the directed verdict is improper. Baro v. Southeast First Nat. Bank, etc., 363 So. 2d 397 (Fla.3d DCA 1978). [*629] It is clear that there were factual questions in this case which should have gone to the jury. Testimony showed that although there were mistakes made in PCM’s reports to TWL, the number of errors was small compared to the…
-
Charlotte Asphalt, Inc. v. Cape Cave Corp., 406 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)…he light most favorable to the plaintiff, and any reasonable doubt must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor. Professional Computer Management, Inc. v. Tampa Wholesale Liquor, 374 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Baro v. Southeast First National Bank, 363 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). If any reasonable interpretation of the evidence supports the plaintiff’s claim, the court must deny the defendant’s motion. Courtney v. American Oil Co., 220 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969). The misunderstanding concerning corpo…
-
Rabren v. V.W. Straigis, 498 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)…endant claims, the allegedly defamatory statements which are the subject of this suit concerned the pending federal lawsuit and were, therefore, privileged. We disagree. Privilege is an affirmative defense. See Baro v. Southeast First National Bank, 363 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). Defendant asserted no such defense in any of his pleadings. Nor does it appear that a privilege defense was tried by implied consent. See Smith v. Mogelvang, 432 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Defendant’s second contention is th…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Teare v. Local Union NO. 295, 98 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 1957)
- Coulson v. Florine E. Trumbull, 328 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)