CHARLOTTE ASPHALT, INC., A CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
CAPE CAVE CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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Charlotte Asphalt, Inc. appealed the trial court's grant of a directed verdict in favor of Cape Cave Corporation in a lien foreclosure action. The trial court erroneously concluded that testimony showed a partnership, rather than the corporation, supplied the asphalt. The appellate court reversed, finding the documentary evidence and testimony could reasonably support Charlotte Asphalt's corporate status at the time of supply.
The directed verdict was improper. The record as a whole could be reasonably interpreted to conclude that Charlotte Asphalt was incorporated at the time it supplied the asphalt, and the trial court should have denied the defendant's motion when any reasonable interpretation of the evidence supported the plaintiff's claim.
[1] In a nonjury trial, a defendant's motion for a directed verdict is governed by the same principles as a motion for involuntary dismissal, requiring the evidence to be eva…
[2] A court must deny a defendant's motion for dismissal or directed verdict if any reasonable interpretation of the evidence supports the plaintiff's claim.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The evidence must be evaluated in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and any reasonable doubt must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor.”
Establishes the standard of review for directed verdict motions favoring the plaintiff
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCharlotte Asphalt, Inc. filed a claim of lien and suit to foreclose for asphalt allegedly supplied to Cape Cave Corporation's Rotonda West development…
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SCHEB, Chief Judge.
Appellant sued to foreclose a claim of lien for asphalt allegedly supplied for roads in appellee’s Rotonda West development.1 At the close of appellant’s case in a non jury trial, appellee moved for a directed verdict on the ground that the testimony showed that a partnership rather than the appellant corporation supplied the asphalt, The trial court granted the motion and entered judgment for the appellee. This appeal ensued.
Appellant filed its claim of lien and suit to foreclose in its corporate capacity. Ap-pellee did not challenge appellant’s corporate existence. At trial appellant introduced invoices which showed that Charlotte Asphalt, Inc. made deliveries of the asphalt to appellee’s general contractor, Lateo Utilities, Inc. Appellant also introduced the deposition of Mr. Joel Jankowitz, appellee’s president, in which he acknowledged that Lateo had furnished an affidavit to appellee showing that Charlotte Asphalt, Inc. had supplied asphalt for the roads in its development.
Trial testimony introduced some confusion on appellant’s status when appellant’s vice president, Mr. Thomas Willis, testified. Although Mr. Willis mentioned that he was a “partner” in Charlotte Asphalt in 1974 and 1975 when the asphalt was supplied, he did identify the corporate invoices and the claim of lien filed by appellant as documents supporting appellant’s claim. Subsequently, the corporation’s president, Dr. Fred Swing, also stated that he was a partner in Charlotte Asphalt; however, the record reveals that Dr. Swing did not understand questions about his company’s formal organization. Nevertheless, Dr. Swing did state that while Charlotte Asphalt had originally been a partnership, that it was later incorporated.
The trial court granted appellee’s motion for directed verdict. Because this was a nonjury trial, the appellee’s motion should have been one for involuntary dismissal under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(b); however, both types of motions are governed by the same principles. Hartnett v. Fowler, 94 So. 2d 724 (Fla.1957); Memorial Park, Inc. v. Spinelli, 342 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). The evidence must be evaluated in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and any reasonable doubt must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor. Professional Computer Management, Inc. v. Tampa Wholesale Liquor, 374 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Baro v. Southeast First National Bank, 363 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). If any reasonable interpretation of the evidence supports the plaintiff’s claim, the court must deny the defendant’s motion. Courtney v. American Oil Co., 220 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969).
The misunderstanding concerning corporate entity expressed by Mr. Willis and Dr. Swing is common among principals in small businesses. Considering the documentary evidence and moral testimony, the record as a whole can be reasonably interpreted to conclude that Charlotte Asphalt was incorporated at the times that it supplied the asphalt.
We note that appellant filed this suit on November 5, 1975. Now, more than six years later, the case has still not been heard on its merits. We do not ascribe this delay to any party, counsel or the court. The fact is, however, that to merit public confidence, courts must expeditiously resolve disputes. We, therefore, recommend to the trial court that this litigation be expedited to a prompt conclusion.
We vacate the final judgment for appel-lee and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CAMPBELL and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur. . On a prior appeal we affirmed the trial court’s order striking Cape Cave’s defenses of payment of the claim asserted by Charlotte Asphalt because of its president’s failure to comply with orders directing him to produce documents in support of that defense. However, on the ground that the trial court went too far in imposing sanctions, we reversed the court’s order striking Cape Cave’s other defenses and its entry of a default judgment against Cape Cave. Cape Cave Corp. v. Charlotte Asphalt, Inc., 384 So. 2d 1300 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
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Reinhart v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. & State of Fla. Dep't of Transp., 422 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)…nagement, Inc. v. Tampa Wholesale Liquor Co., 374 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). If any reasonable interpretation of the evidence supports the plaintiff’s claim, the court must deny the defendant’s motion. Charlotte Asphalt, Inc. v. Cape Cave Corp., 406 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). We think this is particularly important in Florida where the doctrine of comparative negligence applies. Contrary to the trial court’s conclusion that appellant was relying only on prior accidents, there was additional sufficient…
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Holt v. Calchas, LLC, 155 So. 3d 499 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)…eadings is withdrawn from the jury’s consideration when the evidence establishes without conflict that the moving party is entitled to judgment on the issue as a matter of law.") (emphasis added); see also Charlotte Asphalt, Inc. v. Cape Cave Corp., 406 So. 2d 1234, 1236 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (citing Hartnett v. Fowler, 94 So. 2d 724 (Fla.1957)) (explaining that motions for directed verdict in jury cases or involuntary dismissal in nonjury cases are governed by the same principles). Payment History Hearsay Objec…
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Colson v. State Farm Bank, 183 So. 3d 1038 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)…s that the Wolkoffs moved for judgment on the pleadings. The court treated the motion as one for involuntary dismissal. See Salauddin v. Bank of Am., N.A., 150 So. 3d 1189, 1190 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (citing Charlotte Asphalt, Inc. v. Cape Cave Corp., 406 So. 2d 1234, 1236 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (explaining that motions for directed verdict and motions for involuntary dismissal at a nonjury trial are governed by the same principles)). It is only by virtue of a motion to dismiss or motion for directed verdict that th…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Hartnett v. Fowler, 94 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1957)
- Mem'l Park, Inc. v. Spinelli, 342 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)
- Prof'l Computer Mgmt., Inc. v. Tampa Wholesale Liquor Co., Inc., 374 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Baro v. Se. First Nat'l Bank OF Miami Springs, 363 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- Courtney v. The Am. OIL Co., 220 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968)
- Commercial Constr. Co. v. Fla. Bond & Mortg. Co., 220 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969)
- Cape Cave Corp. v. Charlotte Asphalt, Inc., 384 So. 2d 1300 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)