DORA MAE BREEDLOVE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Dora Mae Breedlove was convicted of assault and battery after being tried for second degree murder. The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed because the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress statements made during police interrogation that violated Miranda rights through continued questioning despite her repeated invocation of the right to remain silent and have counsel present.
The court reversed and held that the statements were inadmissible because they were obtained in violation of Miranda rights. The appellant was in custody within the meaning of Miranda, repeatedly asserted her right to remain silent and have counsel present, and her emotional state precluded a knowing and intelligent waiver of her Fifth Amendment rights.
[1] Custodial interrogation under Miranda includes questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of their…
[2] Continued readings of Miranda rights to an accused may constitute undue harassment.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Custodial interrogation [within the meaning of the Miranda decision] means questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”
Establishes that custodial interrogation exists when freedom of action is significantly deprived, not just through direct physical restraint
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant Breedlove made statements to police at her home during her arrest. Although she was not formally taken into custody, she would have been det…
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HASTINGS, ALCEE L., Associate Judge.
The appellant was charged with second degree murder, tried by jury and found guilty of the lesser included offense of assault and battery. This appeal comes from an order in the Circuit Court, Orange County, denying a motion to suppress statements made by appellant to the police.
The sole question on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress statements made by the appellant at the time of her arrest. It appears from the record that although the appellant was not taken into custody, her Miranda
rights were read four times in approximately an hour and she would have been detained if she started to leave. Testimony of deputies discloses that although perhaps not a direct physical restraint, such action falls within the prohibition of the Miranda rule. According to the court in United States v. Montos, 421 F. 2d 215 (5th Cir. 1970): “Custodial interrogation [within the meaning of the Miranda decision] means questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” (at 222).
We are compelled to reject the State’s contention that the statement given at the appellant’s home was admissible because it was not the product of custodial interrogation or a result of coercion. It is settled that continued readings of Miranda rights to the accused may constitute undue harassment. In State v. Prosser, 235 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970), the court affirmed the granting of a motion to suppress statements made to the police when evidence showed defendant wished to remain silent or consult with an attorney. Quoting Miranda with approval the court stated: “interrogation must cease if, after warnings have been given, the defendant ‘indicates in any manner that he wishes to remain silent or that he wishes to consult with an attorney’ ” (at 742).
In the instant case, appellant repeatedly asserted her right not to make a statement without the presence of an attorney. The court, in Rivera Nunez v. State, 227 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969), observed “any showing of coercion or compulsion on the part of those having the accused in custody or any showing that the accused did not knowingly and intelligently waive such rights would have the effect of tainting the statements subsequently obtained” (at 325).
In Jones v. State, 346 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), statements obtained from a defendant after indicating a wish to remain silent were deemed inadmissible even though not a product of direct interrogation. The record indicates that after the appellant refused to make a statement for the third time, an officer continued to interrogate her. Our appellate courts have repeatedly condemned such practice. In Nunez, supra, quoting State v. Bishop, 272 N.C. 283, 158 S.E. 2d 511 (1968), “the vice sought to be removed is the evil of continued, incessant harassment by interrogation which results in breaking the will of the suspect, thereby making his statement involuntary.”
The record shows that the emotional state of the accused was such as to effectively preclude a knowing and voluntary waiver of her Fifth Amendment rights.
At trial an officer testified the appellant “ . . . was crying and very upset.” Another officer arriving approximately one hour later, testified: “she was very hysterical . . . she was crying and we had to calm her down.” In the case at bar, the appellant’s emotional confusion raises serious doubts as to whether her statements were knowingly and intelligently made. In Singleton v. State, 344 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), the court reversed a conviction when the record showed the accused was confused and indecisive at the time she made inculpatory statements. Clearly, the State failed to meet the heavy burden imposed on it under Miranda. It is for this reason we must reverse the decision below.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
LETTS and BERANEK, JJ., concur. . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Bowen v. State, 404 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)…e police. In light of the relative positions of the police and the suspect in an interrogation situation, Florida cases have recognized that relatively little pressure by the police may overcome a suspect’s will to remain silent. Breedlove v. State, 364 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Jones v. State, 346 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Webber v. State, 305 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Jones demonstrates that courts carefully scrutinize the actions of interrogating officers where a defendant has asserted his…
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Reaves v. State, 458 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…ioning of a person in custody must cease when he asserts his right to remain silent, the defendant relied on Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975); Bowen v. State, 404 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Breedlove v. State, 364 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), and Jones v. State, 346 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), all of which speak to the same proposition. . Statements which have been found to be involuntary because they have been obtained through coercive tactics, false promises, a…1 / 2
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Rickard v. State, 508 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)…ever slight. Brewer v. State, 386 So. 2d 232 (Fla.1980); Brockelbank v. State, 407 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). An accused’s emotional condition when giving such statements may have an important bearing on their volun-tariness. Breedlove v. State, 364 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), cert. denied, 374 So. 2d 101 (Fla.1979). Here, the trial judge declined to allow the defendant to present testimony of her mental condition. We think this was error because courts have long recognized that coercion to induce con…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966)
- United States v. Montos, 421 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1970)
- Nunez v. State, 227 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969)
- Singleton v. State, 344 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- Jones v. State, 346 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)
- Daniels v. State, 235 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970)
- State v. Prosser, 235 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970)