SIDNEY ADLER, APPELLANT,
v.
ETTA MAE ADLER AND JOAN BERK, APPELLEES
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Sidney Adler appeals from a trial court's orders and final judgment in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. The appellate court affirms the trial court's decision to allow Joan Berk to intervene and attack a property conveyance, but reverses the award of attorney's fees to Berk's attorney because no statutory authority or party agreement supported such an award.
The court affirmed that the trial court properly allowed Berk's intervention in the interest of justice. The court lacked jurisdiction to review the award of attorney's fees to Berk because that order was not timely appealed. The court reversed the award of attorney's fees to Berk's attorney because such fees were not authorized by statute or by agreement of the parties.
[1] A trial court has discretion to permit intervention in the interest of justice, even if the technical question of whether the main action was pending at the time of inter…
[2] A trial court does not abuse its discretion by allowing intervention when the facts support doing so in the interest of justice.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court had the discretion to permit intervention in the interest of justice between the parties. Under the facts of this case, as reflected by the record, this discretion was not abused and the intervention was proper.”
Establishes that trial courts have discretion to allow intervention when it serves the interests of justice and that Adler's challenge to Berk's intervention lacked merit.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn a dissolution of marriage proceeding, Appellant Sidney Adler conveyed property to Judith Martinez. Appellee Joan Berk sought to intervene in the ac…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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KEHOE, Judge.
Appellant, respondent below in a dissolution of marriage proceeding, brings this appeal from several orders and a final judgment entered by the trial court. In regard to these orders and judgment, appellant raises three points on appeal. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Appellant, in his first point on appeal, contends that the trial court erred by permitting appellee Joan Berk to intervene as a party to the action and by allowing her to attack a conveyance of property by appellant to Judith Martinez as being fraudulent. In our opinion this point is without merit and the trial court properly allowed appellee to intervene. Regardless of the answer to the technical question of whether the main action in this cause was pending before the trial court at the time intervention was ordered, the trial court had the discretion to permit intervention in the interest of justice between the parties. Under the facts of this case, as reflected by the record, this discretion was not abused and the intervention was proper. See, e. g., Dickinson v. Segal, 219 So. 2d 435 (Fla.1969); and Wicker v. Board of Public Instruction of Dade County, 106 So. 2d 550 (Fla.1958).
Appellant in his second point on appeal contends that the trial court erred in entering the order dated December 2, 1976, awarding attorney’s fees to appellee Berk and in impressing a charging lien against property already conveyed by appellant. In our opinion, this was a final order; therefore, because it was not timely appealed, we are without jurisdiction to consider this point. See, e. g., Hillsboro Plantation v. Plunkett, 55 So. 2d 534 (Fla.1952); and Kucera v. Kucera, 330 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
Appellant in his third point on appeal contends that the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to Jerold Feuer, attorney for the intervenor, and taxing the fees against him. In our opinion, the trial court did err in awarding these attorney’s fees. It is axiomatic that attorney’s fees cannot be properly awarded unless authorized by agreement of the parties or imposed statutorily. Based on the facts as reflected by the record in this case, the attorney’s fees were not within any statutory entitlement and the parties did not agree to this payment. Accordingly, the attorney’s fees were improperly awarded. See, e. g., Fisher v. Fisher, 318 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975; and Scott v. Scott, 303 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974).
Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
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Am. Home Assurance Co. v. City OF OPA Locka, 368 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…we recede from that language. For we know of no basis, in the absence of statute or agreement, for an award of attorney’s fees for either the trial or appellate prosecution of an action for indemnity, any more than any other. E. g., Adler v. Adler, 365 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).…
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Alvin E. Tobin, M. A., P. A. v. Lefkowitz, 367 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…rom is therefore affirmed. The trial court erred, however, in taxing a sum for the plaintiff’s attorney’s fee as costs against the appellants-defend-' ants, since there is no statutory or contractual basis for such an award. E. g., Adler, v. Adler, 365 So. 2d 411 (Fla.3d DCA, 1978). An exception to the rule which ordinarily precludes the recovery of attorney’s fees exists when as in Cooper v. Fulton, 158 So. 2d 759 (Fla.3d DCA 1963) cert. disch. 165 So. 2d 161 (Fla.1964), one partner secures an accounting fr…
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Edwards v. Lida Torres Edwards, 529 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…prior contrary ruling on appel-lee’s motion to dismiss, we are compelled to dismiss the former husband’s appeal from the final judgment awarding attorney’s fees to the former wife because the appeal therefrom was untimely filed. See Adler v. Adler, 365 So. 2d 411, 412 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Simkins v. Simkins, 249 So. 2d 444, 445-46 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971); cf. Clearwater Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Sampson, 336 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla.1976); Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Bandes, 510 So. 2d 315, 316 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Ku…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Dickinson v. Segal, 219 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1969)
- Hillsboro Plantation v. Plunkett, 55 So.2d 534 (Fla. 1951)
- Cyrus French Wicker v. The Bd. OF Pub. Instruction OF Dade Cnty., 106 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 1958)
- Kucera v. Kucera, 330 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
- Fisher v. Fisher, 318 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)
- Goodall Rubber Co. v. E. Cement Corp., 303 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)
- Scott v. Scott, 303 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)