GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, A FOREIGN CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
BARRY BURAK, APPELLEE
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GEICO's uninsured motorist policy provision defining "uninsured automobile" to include vehicles whose insurers become insolvent at any time (without temporal limitation) constitutes an authorized expansion of the statutory minimum coverage under Florida law. The court upheld the trial court's ruling that this broader language provides coverage even when the tortfeasor's insurer becomes insolvent more than one year after the accident.
GEICO's policy provision is a statutorily authorized expansion of minimum UM coverage that provides insolvency protection whenever the tortfeasor's company becomes insolvent, even if that date is more than one year after the accident. When two provisions of an insurance policy address the same subject matter, the provision affording greater coverage prevails.
[1] An insurance policy provision affording uninsured motorist insolvency protection that is more favorable to the insured than the statutory minimum will be upheld.
[2] An insurance policy may expand uninsured motorist coverage beyond statutory requirements by removing time limitations for the tortfeasor's insurer insolvency.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent any insurer from affording insolvency protection under terms and conditions more favorable to its insureds than is provided hereunder”
This statutory language establishes that insurers may expand coverage beyond the minimum one-year requirement specified in the statute.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBarry Burak held an uninsured motorist insurance policy issued by GEICO. The policy's definition of "uninsured automobile" included automobiles "with …
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SCHWARTZ, Judge.
The uninsured motorist provisions of the appellant-GEICO’s insurance policy defined “uninsured automobile” as including an automobile
“[W]ith respect to which there is a[n] insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident but the company writing the same is or becomes insolvent . ” [emphasis supplied]
The trial court ruled that the emphasized language, which places no limitation as to the time within which the tortfeasor’s insurer must become insolvent, constitutes a statutorily authorized expansion of the UM coverage required by Section 627.727(3), Florida Statutes (1973)1 which provides:
An insurer’s insolvency protection shall be applicable only to accidents occurring during a policy period in which its insured’s uninsured motorist coverage is in effect when the liability insurer of the tortfeasor becomes insolvent within 1 year after such an accident. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent any insurer from affording insolvency protection under terms and conditions more favorable to its insureds than is provided hereunder, [emphasis supplied]
We agree with this determination. As we have held in several recent per curiam decisions involving identical provisions, Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Morales, 371 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 369 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., Ltd. v. Builes, 370 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), GEICO’s policy affords UM insolvency protection whenever the tortfeasor’s company becomes insolvent, even if that date is more than one year after the accident. See also Moore v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 277 So. 2d 839, 842 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973), cert. denied, 291 So. 2d 204 (Fla.1974); compare Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Mirth, 333 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). The judgment under review, which embodies this conclusion,2 is therefore
Affirmed.
. This subsection has been renumbered as 627.-727(4), Fla.Stat. (1977).
. The trial judge also correctly held that the policy’s expanded coverage on this issue was not affected by what was merely a superfluous and immaterial “Florida exception” to the UM coverage which stated:
“Part IV — The term ‘uninsured automobile’ includes an automobile with respect to which there is a bodily injury liability insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident but the company writing the same becomes insolvent within one year after such accident.”
It is axiomatic that when, as here, two provisions of an insurance policy deal with the same subject matter, the one affording greater coverage will prevail. E. g. Rucks v. Old Republic Life Ins. Co., 345 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Oliver v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), cert. denied, 322 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1975).
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Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Levine & P'rs, P.A., 848 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)…of the policy to which the endorsement was attached.1 Compare Dyer v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 276 So. 2d 6 [*1188] (Fla.1973)(conflict with same insuring agreement must be resolved in favor of insured); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Burak, 373 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)(same). Finally, the clause has no effect on the applicable statute of limitations for bringing suit on the policy and therefore is not barred by section 95.03, Florida Statutes (2001)(“Any provision in a contract fixing the perio…
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Blue Cross & Blue Shield OF Fla., Inc. v. Cassady, 496 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)…9); Travelers Ins. Co. v. C.J. Gayfer’s & Co., 366 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Tropical Park, Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar., 357 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1978). The same rule applies to conflicting provisions. Government Emp. Ins. Co. v. Burak, 373 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1979). However, where the terms are clear and unambiguous or only one logical interpretation consistent with the intent of the parties exists, the court must give the policy that meaning. Ward v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 364 So.…
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Ind. Ins. Co. v. Miguelarcaina, 648 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)…and any ambiguity must be construed strictly against Indiana, we find that the trial court properly concluded that the endorsement was ineffective to exclude the coverage provided elsewhere in the policy. See Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Burak, 373 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Southern Am. Fire Ins. Co. v. Rinzler, 324 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) (deductible which in policy endorsement applied only to “extended coverage perils” cannot be applied by implication to the primary fire coverage extended b…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (12 total)
- Moore v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 277 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
- Caves v. State, 322 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1975)
- World Ins. Co. v. Wright, 322 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1975)
- Travelers Indem. Co. v. Morales, 371 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Rucks v. Old Republic Life Ins. Co., 345 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)
- Oliver v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. Mirth, 333 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Pacemaker Corp. v. Bare, 291 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1974)
- Barnhill v. State, 291 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1974)
- Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., Ltd. v. Valeriano Builes and Leticia Builes and Maria Araque and Beatriz Araque, 370 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)