THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
JOSE PAJON, APPELLEE
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The State of Florida appealed the trial court's dismissal of a cocaine possession count in an information, arguing the charge was sufficiently pleaded despite the defendant's claim of fatal ambiguity. The court reversed, holding that the information adequately stated the crime and followed statutory language.
An information states a crime sufficiently to withstand a motion to dismiss if it follows the statutory language and alleges all essential elements of the crime, contains a plain and definite statement of essential facts, and does not mislead or embarrass the defendant or expose him to double jeopardy. The court held the information met these requirements and any non-fatal ambiguity could be cured by a statement of particulars.
[1] An information states a crime sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss if it follows the language of the statute, alleges all essential elements, and provides a plain,…
[2] Ambiguous or vague language in an information, if non-fatal, can be cured by a statement of particulars upon timely motion by the defendant.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“an information states a crime sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss if it (a) follows the language of the statute which the defendant is charged with violating and alleges all the essential elements of the crime charged, and (b) contains a plain, concise and definite statement of the essential facts constituting the crime charged so that the defendant is neither misled or embarrassed in the preparation of his defense nor exposed after conviction or acquittal to substantial danger of a new prosecution for the same crime.”
Establishes the legal standard for adequate pleading in an information and distinguishes between fatal and non-fatal defects.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJose Pajón and a co-defendant were charged in a two-count information with unlawfully and feloniously possessing cocaine in violation of Florida Statu…
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HUBBART, Judge.
This is an appeal by the state from an order of the trial court dismissing one count of an information in a criminal prosecution. We have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal, § 924.07(1), Fla.Stat. (1977).
The defendant Jose Pajón and a co-defendant [not a party to this appeal] were charged in the first count of a two count information -filed before the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, as follows:
“JANET RENO, State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, prosecuting for the State of Florida, in the County of Dade, under oath, information makes that JOSE ENRIQUE PAJON and RAUNEL RAMOS on the 25th day of October, 1978, in the County and State aforesaid, did unlawfully and feloniously have in their actual or constructive possession a controlled substance, to-wit: COCAINE, in violation of Section 893.13 Florida Statutes, contrary to the form of the Statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida.”
Upon the defendant Pajon’s timely motion, the trial court dismissed the above count of the information for failure to state a crime in that a fatal ambiguity was created by the use of the word “their” in the subject count. We cannot agree and reverse.
It is the established law of this state that an information states a crime sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss if it (a) follows the language of the statute which the defendant is charged with violating and alleges all the essential elements of the crime charged, and (b) contains a plain, concise and definite statement of the essential facts constituting the crime charged so that the defendant is neither misled or embarrassed in the preparation of his defense nor exposed after conviction or acquittal to substantial danger of a new prosecution for the same crime. Beyond that, there is no requirement that the information set forth the state’s proof in the case. To the extent that the information contains some ambiguous or vague language of a non-fatal nature, such can adequately be cured by the filing of a statement of particulars upon timely motion by the defendant. Martinez v. State, 368 So. 2d 338 (Fla.1978); State v. Bruno, 107 So. 2d 9 (Fla.1958); Fountain v. State, 163 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.140(b), (d)(1), (n), (o).
The information in the instant case sufficiently meets these minimal requirements to withstand a motion to dismiss. It follows the language of the statute which the defendant is charged with violating and alleges all the essential elements of the subject crime. § 893.13(1)(e), Pla.Stat. (1977). It also contains for pleading purposes the essential facts constituting the crime charged. It does not in any way mislead or embarrass the defendant in the preparation of his defense nor expose him after conviction or acquittal to substantial danger of a new prosecution for the same crime. Indeed, the defendant makes no serious contention to the contrary. To the extent that there may exist a certain ambiguity or vagueness in the language used in the information, it is our view that such could amply be cured by the filing of a statement of particulars upon timely motion by the defendant.
The order of dismissal under review is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court with directions to reinstate count I of the subject information.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Chicone v. State, 684 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1996)…ing that the State did not have to specifically allege in its information that Chicone knew the substance he possessed was cocaine, or that he knew the object he possessed was drug paraphernalia. Chicone, 658 So. 2d at 1009; see also State v. Pajon, 374 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Sufficiency of Standard Jury Instructions We must also determine whether the jury instructions on guilty knowledge [*745] were sufficient. A defendant has the right to have a court correctly and intelligently instruct the jury…
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State v. DiGUILLIO, 413 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)…each of the defendants on notice as to the acts proscribed by section 849.25. Where, as here, an information refers to a statute and tracks its language, it is generally held sufficient. Martinez v. State, 368 So. 2d 338 (Fla.1979); State v. Pajon, 374 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. OTT and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur. . Section 849.25(1) provides: The term “bookmaking” means the act of taking or receiving any bet or wager upon…
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State v. Troutman, 490 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)…view, an otherwise valid information cannot be rendered defective by facts contained in affidavits, depositions, testimony, pretrial discovery, or other pleadings filed in the cause. See State v. Dilworth, 397 So. 2d 292 (Fla.1981); State v. Pajon, 374 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Fla.R. Crim.P. 3.140(o). Reversed and remanded.…
Authorities Cited
- Martinez v. State, 368 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1978)
- State v. Bruno, 107 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1958)
- Thompson v. State, 163 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964)
- Fountain v. State, 163 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)