WILLIE FERGUSON AND RICHARD BOWE, APPELLANTS,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1975-10-17
No. 74-1024
WALDEN, C. J., and DOWNEY, J., concur.
321 So. 2d 139 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1975) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Holding

The court held that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain the grand larceny conviction of appellant Ferguson, but sufficient for appellant Bowe.


Facts & Procedural History

Bowe took suits from a store and fled to a car driven by Ferguson. Ferguson could not start the car, and Bowe fled. Ferguson remained until arrested.…

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Opinion of the Court
OWEN, Judge.

OWEN, Judge.

Appellants, Ferguson and Bowe, were jointly charged, tried and convicted of grand larceny. No error is shown as to appellant Bowe and his conviction is affirmed. The evidence is legally insufficient to sustain the conviction of appellant Ferguson and his judgment and sentence are reversed.

Succinctly stated, the State’s evidence established only the following: a store detective for the J. C. Penney Company saw a man (subsequently identified as Bowe) come into the store, take two men’s suits off a rack in the men’s department, and walk out the door. The detective followed Bowe, heard him shout “Get the car started’’, and saw him jump into an automobile. Ferguson, seated in the driver’s seat of the automobile, apparently could not get it started, whereupon Bowe jumped out and ran back into the store where he dropped the suits and fled. Ferguson made no attempt to flee, remaining in the car at the request of the store detective until subsequently arrested by city police officers. Bowe was not apprehended until some time later. For reasons which we explained in Lockett v. State, 262 So. 2d 253 (Fla.App. 4th 1972), the State cannot convict Ferguson of grand larceny on no more evidence than this. He should have been charged, if at all, as an accessory after the fact under Fla.Stat. § 776.03 (1973).

The judgment and sentence as to appellant Ferguson are severally reversed and upon remand he shall be discharged. The judgment and sentence as to appellant Bowe are severally affirmed.

Reversed as to Ferguson; affirmed as to Bowe.

WALDEN, C. J., and DOWNEY, J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Gains v. State, 417 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
    …s to exclude a reasonable hypothesis of innocence and is thus inadequate to convict Joseph Williams as an aider and abettor to the armed robberies. He should have been charged, if at all, as an accessory after-the-fact. See, e.g., Ferguson v. State, 321 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). Since the evidence was not sufficient, his convictions for the armed robberies are reversed. Moreover, because the retrial of a defendant whose conviction has been reversed for insufficiency of the evidence would violate the dou…
  • COX v. State, 394 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
    …. This circumstantial evidence, while consistent with guilt, is not wholly inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence and, therefore, cannot sustain a conviction. Tillman v. State, 353 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Ferguson v. State, 321 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). This cause must be reversed for an additional reason. Appellant was charged and convicted as a principal in the first degree for aiding and abetting under Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1979). Before an accused may be convi…
  • Glover v. State, 376 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
    …principal. Moreover, we noted that while intent to participate may be proved by circumstantial evidence, that proof must not only be consistent with guilt but also inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Accord, Ferguson v. State, 321 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Casey v. State, 266 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972); Douglas v. State, 214 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968). Applying these principles to the case at hand, it becomes clear that the state did not present sufficient evidence of appel…
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