D. M., A JUVENILE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed a juvenile's delinquency adjudication for theft, holding that circumstantial evidence of mere presence at the scene and flight was insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court emphasized that the state failed to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence as required by law.
The court held that the juvenile's mere presence at the scene and flight with a companion was insufficient evidence to link him to the theft offense. Circumstantial evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, and the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal.
[1] Circumstantial evidence of theft must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence to sustain a delinquency adjudication.
[2] Mere presence at the scene of a crime and flight therefrom with a companion is insufficient evidence to link an individual to the offense.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the state's evidence linking the juvenile to the theft offense herein, which was entirely circumstantial in nature, fails to exclude, as required by law, every reasonable hypothesis of innocence”
Establishes the legal standard for circumstantial evidence and the basis for reversal
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for theft under Florida Statute § 812.014(1). The state's evidence was entirely circumstantial in nature. The ju…
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HUBBART, Chief Judge.
The adjudication of delinquency for the offense of theft [§ 812.014(1), Fla.Stat. (1979)], which is under review by this appeal, is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to discharge the juvenile from the cause. Our review of the record convinces us that the state’s evidence linking the juvenile to the theft offense herein, which was entirely circumstantial in nature, fails to exclude, as required by law, every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The trial court was, accordingly, in error in denying the juvenile’s motion for judgment of acquittal made below at the close of all the evidence in the cause. See e. g. Davis v. State, 90 So. 2d 629 (Fla.1956); Mayo v. State, 71 So. 2d 899 (Fla.1954).
A detailed recitation of the facts of this cause is, in our view, entirely unnecessary as it would unduly burden the already well-settled and more than adequate case law on this subject. Suffice it to say, however, that the juvenile’s mere presence at the scene of the theft herein and his flight therefrom with his companion was insufficient evidence in law to link him to the theft offense for which he was adjudicated delinquent. A reversal of this adjudication is, accordingly, mandated under our law. See e. g. Horton v. State, 91 So. 2d 304 (Fla.1956); J. O. v. State, 384 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); J. H. v. State, 370 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 379 So. 2d 209 (Fla.1980).
This reversal should not be interpreted, however, as condoning the juvenile’s behavior in this cause as it was, to say the very least, highly suspicious. We only hold that this behavior, without more, was insufficient to adjudicate him delinquent of the theft offense herein. Our law, for reasons deeply rooted in our passionate and perhaps, at times, exaggerated devotion to human freedom, has always set high standards of proof for the state to meet before we condemn a person for violating our criminal laws and subject him to potential incarceration. We do no more than follow that decisional law in this cause believing, as we do, that no person — whatever one may think of him personally — should be stigmatized by a criminal conviction or delinquency adjudication based, as here, upon less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See e. g. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).
Reversed and remanded with directions to discharge the juvenile from the cause.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (13 total)
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J. L. B. v. State, 396 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…acquaintance, stood there while the crime took place, and ran off after it occurred. This is simply insufficient to establish the overt assistance or participation which is required to justify an adjudication as an aider and abettor. D. M. v. State, 394 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); P. R. v. State, 389 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); J. O. v. State, 384 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); J. H. v. State, supra (alternative holding), and cases cited. Under the law we are bound to apply, see, D. M. v. State, supra;…
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J.W. v. State, 467 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…s that the appellant was merely a witness to the crime. Presence at the scene of the offense and flight from the scene is legally insufficient to establish appellant’s guilt as an aider and abettor. J.L.B. v. State, 396 So. 2d at 762; D.M. v. State, 394 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); J.O. v. State, 384 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Pack v. State, 381 So. 2d at 1200; J.H. v. State, 370 So. 2d at 1220. Therefore the order of adjudication and commitment is reversed and the case remanded with directions to disch…
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In the Interest of T.S.J. v. State, 439 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…a circumstantial evidence case the evidence must not only prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but, also, must be sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Harrison v. State, 104 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958); D.M. v. State, 394 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); J.O. & R.G. v. State, 384 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). The circumstances proved in this case fail to exclude a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The alleged burglary was supposedly committed in concert with Ricky, who is T.S…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979)
- In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (U.S. 1970)
- Hoyt Dan Davis v. State, 90 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1956)
- Mayo v. State, 71 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1954)
- J. H. v. State, 370 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- J. O. and R. G. v. State, 384 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Horton v. State, 91 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1956)