J. L. B., A JUVENILE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1981-03-24
No. 80-1294
Before HENDRY, SCHWARTZ and FERGUSON, JJ.
396 So. 2d 761 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1981) Positive Treatment
Cited by 48 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

J.L.B., a juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent for grand theft based on aiding and abetting another youth who stole a chain and medallion from a woman's neck in a parking lot. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the evidence was insufficient to establish that J.L.B. provided the overt assistance or participation required for aider and abettor liability.


Holding

The adjudication of delinquency must be reversed and J.L.B. must be discharged. While J.L.B. could only be found guilty as an aider or abettor since he was not identified as the one who took the jewelry, the evidence was insufficient to establish aider and abettor liability because there was no showing that J.L.B. actually participated in or aided the perpetration of the crime.


Headnotes

[1] A conviction for grand theft cannot stand when the evidence fails to establish that the defendant was the perpetrator or an aider or abettor.

[2] To establish guilt as an aider or abettor, the prosecution must prove not only the defendant's intent to assist in committing the crime, but also that the defendant actua…

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Key Quotes

“Since no one could identify the one juvenile who took the jewelry, it must of course be assumed that it was not the present appellant... J.L.B. could be found guilty, therefore, only as an aider or abettor of the thief.”

Establishes that because J.L.B. was not identified as the perpetrator, he could only be held liable on aider and abettor theory.

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Facts & Procedural History

A woman was entering her vehicle in a Miami parking lot when she saw two juveniles, including J.L.B., approaching her car. While she sat inside talkin…

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Opinion of the Court
SCHWARTZ, Judge.

SCHWARTZ, Judge.

J.L.B. appeals from an adjudication of delinquency arising from a determination that he was guilty of grand theft. We reluctantly reverse on the holding that this finding is not supported by the record.

This is another in the apparently endless series of cases involving the legal sufficiency of the evidence to link the particular defendant or juvenile respondent with a crime perpetrated by another. In this instance the issue arises in the following simple and all-too-familiar context. The victim was entering her vehicle in a parking lot in the city of Miami when she saw two juveniles, one of whom was J.L.B., heading towards her car. After she was seated, and while she was talking to a passenger, one of the boys — she could not say which one— reached through the window and grabbed a chain and medallion from her neck. Both boys immediately fled the scene. J.L.B. was found soon afterwards hiding under a bus.

Since no one could identify the one juvenile who took the jewelry, it must of course be assumed that it was not the present appellant. K. W. U. v. State, 367 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert, denied, 378 So. 2d 349 (Fla.1979). J.L.B. could be found guilty, therefore, only as an aider or abettor of the thief. That conclusion may not lawfully be drawn from the evidence. To reverse the order of emphasis we gave to the elements of aiding and abetting in J. JET. v. State, 370 So. 2d 1219, 1220 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 379 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1980), such a finding requires not only that the defendant intended to assist in committing the crime, but that he in fact participated or aided in its perpetration. Ryals v. State, 112 Fla. 4, 150 So. 132 (1933). In this case, even assuming the adequacy of the evidence concerning J.L.B.’s evil intent,1 a point we need not decide, there is no showing that he carried out that intent by actually doing anything which assisted his companion in the offense.2 It is a “basic premise of Anglo-American criminal law .. . that no crime can be committed by bad thoughts alone. Something in the way of an act . .. is required too.” W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law, § 25, at 178 (1972). So far as this record demonstrates, J.L.B. simply walked to the car along with an acquaintance, stood there while the crime took place, and ran off after it occurred. This is simply insufficient to establish the overt assistance or participation which is required to justify an adjudication as an aider and abettor. D. M. v. State, 394 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); P. R. v. State, 389 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); J. O. v. State, 384 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); J. H. v. State, supra (alternative holding), and cases cited. Under the law we are bound to apply, see, D. M. v. State, supra; Ruiz v. State, 388 So. 2d 610, 613 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), review denied, 392 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 1981), J.L.B. must be discharged.

Reversed.

. On the intent issue, the case is arguably distinguishable from J. H. v. State, supra, on the grounds that, in this case, the two boys were seen together walking directly towards the victim and the scene of the offense (which was not on a public sidewalk) before it was committed, and that, unlike J.H., the respondent here did not immediately cease his flight and inform the person who apprehended him that he had done nothing wrong.

. Compare the holdings in Perez v. State, 390 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Pack v. State, 381 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Lockett v. State, 262 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972), and Douglas v. State, 214 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968), where the defendants actually assisted the perpetrator by driving him to or from the scene, but in which the requisite showing of advance knowledge and intent was not present.

It may be observed that the actual participation element is much more difficult to prove when, as in the numerous juvenile cases, including this one, in which the issue has presented itself in this court, the offender and his alleged accomplice are on foot.


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Citator

Cited By (24 total)

  • G. C. v. State, 407 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
    …that pursuant to that intent he do some act or say some word which was intended to and which did incite cause, encourage, assist or induce another person to- actually commit the crime. Ryals v. State, 112 Fla. 4, 150 So. 132 (1933); J.L.B. v. State, 396 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); R.W.G. v. State, 395 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Chaudoin v. State, 362 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). The state implores that the necessary elements of intent and act may be inferred — because G.C. knew that Delgado was go…
  • T.J.T. v. State, 460 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
    …the defendants actually drove or accompanied the perpetrator to or from the scene of the crime. . E.g., Collins v. State, 438 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Miller v. State, 420 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); G.C. v. State, supra; J.L.B. v. State, 396 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); R.W.G. v. State, 395 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). . We note that proof of the stealthful entry into the curtilage of a building has been found sufficient to constitute the offense of burglary of a structure located on the pre…
  • J.W. v. State, 467 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
    …for a judgment of acquittal, which motion was denied. He was thereafter adjudicated delinquent. Since no one at the hearing could identify who broke the window or leaned into the window, it must be assumed it was not the appellant. J.L.B. v. State, 396 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); K.W.U. v. State, 367 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 378 So. 2d 349 (Fla.1979). Appellant could then only be found guilty of the offenses charged if he acted as an aider and abettor. For appellant to be guilty as an aider…

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