DONALD E. CANTRELL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE; SHIRLEY LEE LOVELL, APPELLANT, V. STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE; RAYMOND C. LOVELL, BAILEY THEATRE, INC., BLACK FORGE, INC., INNER CORPORATION, AND FORGE INVESTMENTS, INC., APPELLANTS, V. STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The Florida Supreme Court upheld RICO convictions under section 943.462(3) against constitutional challenges, rejecting arguments that the statute was vague and unconstitutionally applied. The court found the charging information sufficient and affirmed the convictions based on nolo contendere pleas.
The RICO statute is constitutional and not unconstitutionally vague. The charging information was sufficient as it tracked the statutory language and adequately alleged the existence of a criminal enterprise. The trial court properly accepted the nolo contendere pleas, and the court declined to address the search warrant issue because the defendants' factual basis for challenging it was undermined by the prosecutor's representation that the facts were not derived from the search.
[1] A statute making it unlawful for any person employed by, or associated with, any enterprise to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in such enterprise through…
[2] An information tracking the language of a statute and sufficiently alleging the existence of a criminal enterprise is sufficient to charge a violation of that statute.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“unlawful for any person employed by, or associated with, any enterprise to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt”
This is the statutory text of section 943.462(3) defining the RICO offense with which the defendants were charged.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDonald E. Cantrell, Shirley Lee Lovell, and Raymond C. Lovell were charged with RICO violations under Florida law based on alleged racketeering activi…
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ALDERMAN, Justice.
The State of Florida charged Donald E. Cantrell, Shirley Lee Lovell, and Raymond C. Lovell with violation of section 943.462(3) of the Florida RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) Act, Florida Statutes (1977). This section makes it “unlawful for any person employed by, or associated with, any enterprise to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt.” The racketeering activity alleged was several violations of section 796.07, the prostitution statute, and section 847.07, the obscene literature statute. The appellants pleaded not guilty and moved to dismiss the information and to suppress certain evidence seized at the Lovell residence pursuant to a search warrant. These motions were denied. The appellants then changed their pleas to nolo contendere, reserving the right to appeal. We have jurisdiction because the trial court passed on the validity of section 943.462(3) in denying the motion to dismiss the information. Art. V, § 3(bXl), Fla.Const. (1972).
The appellants contend that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the information on the grounds that it was based on an unconstitutionally vague statute and that the statute was unconstitutionally applied to the conduct the appellants are alleged to have committed. We have previously found section 943.462(3) constitutional. Carlson v. State, 405 So. 2d 173 (Fla.1981); State v. Whiddon, 384 So. 2d 1269 (Fla.1980); Moorehead v. State, 383 So. 2d 629 (Fla.1980). Appellants have presented nothing to convince us we should reach a different conclusion in this case.
The appellants also contend that the trial court erred in denying appellants’ motion to dismiss on the grounds that the information was vague, indistinct, and indefinite. This contention is without merit. The language of the information tracked the language of the statute and sufficiently alleged the existence of a criminal “enterprise.” The information was sufficient to charge a violation of section 943.462(3). State v. Whiddon, 384 So. 2d 1269 (Fla.1980).
The appellants’ contention that the trial court erred in accepting their nolo conten-dere pleas in the absence of the showing of a sufficient factual basis is not supported by the record.
Finally, because it does not affirmatively appear from the record that it would be dispositive of these cases, we need not consider the merits of appellants’ contention that the trial court erred in denying their motion to suppress on the ground that the warrant authorizing search of appellants Lovell’s residence was unconstitutionally deficient. Brown v. State, 376 So. 2d 382 (Fla.1979). Although the trial judge knew that the appellants wanted to reserve the right to appeal this issue, he specifically advised appellants’ counsel that he “had not made any finding as to whether or not those previous motions were dispositive of the issues. That’s between you and the appellate court. I made no finding in that regard.” The record does contain an excerpt from the proceedings before the trial court on September 6, 1979, when the nolo contendere pleas were entered. At that time, the prosecutor gave a long and detailed factual statement of what the State intended to prove and represented to the court that these facts were not obtained as “a result of the search warrant which was executed on May 22nd.”
Accordingly, the convictions are affirmed.
It is so ordered.
SUNDBERG, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, ENGLAND and McDONALD, JJ., concur.
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Ruiz v. State, 416 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)…f appeal. Sommers v. State, 404 So. 2d 366, 369 n.2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). The cases cited by the state are distinguishable as they do not involve the suppression of contraband for which the defendant was charged with possession. See Cantrell v. State, 403 So. 2d 977 (Fla.1981) (defendants charged with violation of the Florida RICO Act); Campbell v. State, 386 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 6th DCA 1980) (defendant charged with robbery). And, while the Second District Court of Appeal has intimated that the refusal to suppress…
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Pena-Vazquez v. State (Fla. 3d DCA 2019)…0); Collins v. State, 489 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). Nor does the fact that the two counts merely tracked the statutory language render the Amended Information defective. See, e.g., Price v. State, 995 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 2008); Cantrell v. State, 403 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1981); Martinez v. State, 368 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1978); Cason v. State, 508 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); State v. Mena, 471 So. 2d 1297 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Reduced to its essence, this aspect of Pena-Vazquez’s claim is the bare assertion that…
Authorities Cited
- Brown v. State, 376 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1979)
- THE Florida BAR v. Byron, 384 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 1980)
- Carlson v. State, 405 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1981)
- State v. Coomes, 383 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1980)
- Moorehead v. State, 383 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1980)