RAYMOND MOBLEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that a substitute judge may sentence a defendant after a plea, even without a showing of emergency, if the defendant is not prejudiced.
[1] A denial of a motion to suppress evidence is proper when the evidence was lawfully obtained.
[2] A judge other than the one who accepted a defendant's plea may impose sentence when the defendant has not demonstrated prejudice from the substitution.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant pleaded nolo contendere to burglary and possession of a controlled substance, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to supp…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Nolo Contendere Plea cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Appellant raises two points in his appeal from his plea of nolo contendere to burglary and to possession of a controlled substance. In entering his plea, appellant specifically reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress certain evidence. The denial of the motion to suppress was proper, and we affirm on that point.
As a second point, appellant challenges his sentencing by a judge other than the judge who accepted his plea. In support of that point, appellant relies upon Lawley v. State, 377 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.700(c). In Lawley, this Court reversed and remanded for resentencing when a judge other than the trial judge sentenced the defendant. The Lawley decision emphasized the fact that Rule 3.700(c) provides for sentencing by a judge other than the one who heard the trial “[i]n those cases where it is necessary that sentence be pronounced by a judge other than the judge who presided at trial.” The court noted that the committee notes following the rule “makes provision for emergency situations where [the trial] judge is unavailable.” The court concluded that “a judge other than the trial judge should not exercise discretion as to sentencing absent an emergency that necessitates such a variance from the normal practice” and thereupon remanded for resentencing by the trial judge.
The Lawley decision is not controlling as this case involves only a plea and no trial, and appellant has made no showing that he has been prejudiced by the substitution. The transcript shows no reason why a substitute judge who has made himself thoroughly familiar with the case file would not be as well qualified to handle the sentencing as the judge who had merely accepted the plea but who had not been exposed to a trial in the case. Therefore, we decline to extend to the facts of this case the Lawley requirement that a finding of emergency must be shown pursuant to Rule 3.700(c) before substitution of the sentencing judge can be deemed proper. AFFIRMED.
McCORD, LARRY G. SMITH and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Lester v. State, 446 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)…cond judge. It is actually the revocation of that modified probation as to which appellant now complains. As explained above, the first judge was the judge who had both imposed the modified probation and who revoked that probation. Mobley v. State, 407 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), holds that after a defendant enters a nolo contendere plea to a charge, the sentencing judge need not be the judge who accepted the plea. The Mobley rationale is generally applicable here. The record shows that the first judge f…1 / 2
-
Washington v. State, 655 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…tate, 645 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), rev. granted, 654 So. 2d 920 (Fla.1995); Washington v. State, 631 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); State v. Whitfield, 487 So. 2d 1045 (Fla.1986); White v. State, 446 So. 2d 1031 (Fla.1984); Mobley v. State, 407 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). As in Wilson and Washington v. State, 20 Fla.L.Weekly D782, — So. 2d - [1995 WL 134179] (Fla. 4th DCA March 29, 1995), [*240] we certify conflict with Bell v. State, 624 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), rev. denied, 634 So. 2d 622…
-
Troupe v. State, 666 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…rror, however, in the sentencing procedure. At sentencing the successor judge reviewed pertinent portions of the plea hearing. Neither Troupe nor his attorney objected to the sentencing, and Troupe has demonstrated no prejudice. See Mobley v. State, 407 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Troupe also claims that he was not given the opportunity to object to the amount of attorneys’ fees imposed upon him. A defendant must be informed of his right to contest the amount of attorneys’ fees if a trial court awards t…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Lawley v. State, 377 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)