STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
MICHAELA FIVES, APPELLEE
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Florida appeals from a trial court order granting a defendant's motion to discharge based on speedy trial violations. The case turns on when the speedy trial clock began running—whether a detainer or actual arrest occurred on October 16, 1980—a factual dispute that required an evidentiary hearing rather than argument alone.
The court held that a detainer lodging does not commence speedy trial time, but actual arrest via warrant service does. Because the parties disputed the vital facts—whether a detainer or warrant arrest occurred on October 16, 1980—an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve the motion for discharge.
[1] The commencement of the speedy trial time is triggered by an arrest, not merely the lodging of a detainer.
[2] Serving a warrant on a defendant in custody for other charges constitutes an arrest for the charges specified in the warrant, commencing the speedy trial period.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“if the former transpired, the speedy trial time did not begin to run because lodging a detainer with the custodian does not amount to an arrest, which is the catalyst that triggers the running of the speedy trial time”
Establishes the rule that a detainer does not commence speedy trial time; only actual arrest does.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellee Fives was arrested and incarcerated in Dade County on October 16, 1980, on Dade County charges. She also had pending charges in Broward Count…
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DOWNEY, Judge.
The issue presented in this case involves the commencement of the running of the time for speedy trial.
Appellee was arrested and incarcerated in Dade County pursuant to Dade County charges on October 16,1980. Other charges were pending in Broward County. Thus, when appellee was arrested in Dade County on October 16, 1980, Broward County officials either lodged a detainer against appellee with the Dade County officials or they had a Broward County warrant served upon appellee. The distinction is vital because, if the former transpired, the speedy trial time did not begin to run because lodging a detainer with the custodian does not amount to an arrest, which is the catalyst that triggers the running of the speedy trial time. On the other hand, if the Broward warrant was served upon appellee in Dade County on October 16, 1980, that amounted to his arrest and custody for the criminal episode that gave rise to the Broward charges and commenced the passage of time for trial under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191. State v. Bassham, 352 So. 2d 55 (Fla.1977); Eaddy v. State, 352 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Williams v. Eastmoore, 297 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974).
In any event, on February 12, 1981, a capias was issued on the Broward charges and served on appellee in Dade County and she was transferred from Dade to Broward County. Thereafter, on April 21, 1981, appellee moved for discharge, alleging that the speedy trial time had commenced October 16, 1981, and had long since expired. At the hearing on said motion no evidence was taken but counsel argued the matter at some length before the trial judge. It was indicated to the judge that the facts were not in dispute. However, the hearing transcript indicates that the parties obviously do not agree on the vital facts necessary to a proper resolution of the motion. Appellee contended she was arrested in Dade County on October 16, 1980, on the Broward charges, while appellant argues that a Bro-ward county detainer was lodged with the Dade officials and that no arrest took place on Broward charges until February 12, 1981.
Clearly, this case needs an evidentiary hearing to establish the actual facts. For that purpose we reverse the order appealed from and remand the cause to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the motion for discharge.
REVERSED AND REMANDED, with directions.
ANSTEAD, J., and OWEN, WILLIAM C., JR., (Ret.), Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Gethers v. State, 798 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…se law, the execution of an arrest warrant is very different from the placement of a detainer.1 We have distinguished between the lodging of a detainer and an arrest for the purpose of triggering the running of speedy trial time. See State v. Fives, 409 So. 2d 221, 221 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); see also Edwards v. Allen, 603 So. 2d 514, 515-16 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). A similar distinction holds for the purpose of applying section 921.161(1). The fifth district has held that for the purpose of measuring mandatory jail…
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Perkins v. State, 457 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…al. Cf. State v. Bassham, 352 So. 2d 55 (Fla.1977); State ex rel. Williams v. Eastmoore, 297 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); State v. Lazarus, 433 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Gardner v. Peach, 384 So. 2d 1334 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); State v. Fives, 409 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). Thus, the effect of the amendment is to give prisoners in Florida the benefit of the 180-day period provided to all persons arrested for non-capital felonies. If, however, the prisoner’s custody ensued from an imposed sentence,…
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Stevie A. Brown v. State, 843 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)…that he had been arrested. All four prongs of the Brown test have been met. Therefore, we hold that the appellant’s speedy trial clock began to run when the investigator served the arrest warrant on him in the prison. See also, e.g., State v. Fives, 409 So. 2d 221, 221 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). Because the appellant was not brought to trial in a timely fashion, the appellant’s motion for discharge should have been granted and his discharge ordered. We accordingly reverse the appellant’s conviction and sentence.…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Bassham, 352 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 1977)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Floyd Glenn Williams v. The Honorable E. L. Eastmoore, 297 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- Eaddy v. State, 352 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)