STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL. FLOYD GLENN WILLIAMS, RELATOR,
v.
THE HONORABLE E. L. EASTMOORE, AS CIRCUIT JUDGE OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR PUTNAM COUNTY, RESPONDENT
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A defendant sought to prohibit his trial for armed robbery, arguing his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated because trial was not scheduled within 180 days of a detainer being issued while he was incarcerated in another county. The Florida appellate court held that the 180-day period under the rules of criminal procedure begins when the defendant is formally arrested on the charges giving rise to the detainer, not when the detainer itself is issued.
The 180-day time period under F.R.Cr.P. 3.191(a)(1) commences when the defendant is formally arrested on the charges giving rise to the detainer, not when the detainer itself is issued. Since the detainer did not place the defendant in custody as a result of the Putnam County conduct, the time period did not begin until formal arrest on those charges.
[1] The 180-day speedy trial period under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a)(1) commences when a person is taken into custody as a result of the conduct or criminal…
[2] A detainer lodged against a person already in custody for unrelated charges does not, by itself, place that person in custody as a result of the conduct giving rise to th…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the 180-day time period shall commence when such person is taken into custody as a result of the conduct or criminal episode giving rise to the crime charged”
The statutory language defining when the speedy trial clock begins under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a)(1)
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn October 1973, Williams was confined to Palm Beach County Jail awaiting trial on unrelated charges. On October 19, 1973, Putnam County officials pla…
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PER CURIAM.
By this suggestion for a writ of prohibition relator is seeking to prohibit his trial on three counts of armed robbery on the basis that he has been denied his constitutional right to speedy trial.
The facts are not in dispute. During October of 1973 relator was confined to the Palm Beach County Jail awaiting trial on charges not related to the instant armed robbery offenses. On October 19, 1973, while relator was in the Palm Beach County Jail, officials from Putnam County placed a detainer against relator on the basis of armed robbery charges arising in Putnam County. On October 26, 1973, relator was informed against for three counts of armed robbery in Putnam County. As best as can be determined from relator’s allegations, on April 4, 1974, he was acquitted of the Palm Beach charges and officially arrested on the charges lodged in Putnam County. Relator is now seeking to prohibit his trial in Putnam County on two counts of armed robbery which is scheduled for July 15, 1974, and his trial on the third count of armed robbery which is scheduled in Putnam County on August 19, 1974, on the basis that these trials were not scheduled within 180 days from the date that the detainer was lodged against him in Palm Beach County.
The sole question presented by this suggestion for writ of prohibition is whether or not Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191, 33 F.S.A., requires that an accused be brought to trial within 180 days of the detainer being issued against him. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a)(1) states that the 180-day time period “. . . shall commence when such person is taken into custody as a result of the conduct or criminal episode giving rise to the crime charged.” At the time the detainer was issued against relator he was not in custody as a result of the conduct or criminal episode arising in Putnam County but rather was in custody exclusively on the charges in Palm Beach County. The detainer did not place relator in custody as a result of his conduct in Putnam County. He was not placed in custody as a result of his alleged criminal episode in Putnam County until he was freed on the Palm Beach charges and formally arrested on the Putnam County charges.
We hold that under F.R.Cr.P. 3.-191(a)(1) the 180-day time period in which the state had to bring relator to trial commenced to run when he was formally arrested on the Putnam County charges. We are aware that our sister court in Hargrove v. State, 281 So. 2d 390 (2 Fla.App.1973), and State v. Sutton, 269 So. 2d 712 (2 Fla.App.1973), has taken the position that the time period commences to run when a detainer is issued. As a detainer does not operate to place the person against whom it is issued in custody as a result of the conduct which gives rise to the detainer, we respectfully decline to follow the decisions of our sister court in Hargrove and Sutton, supra.
The Suggestion for Writ of Prohibition is denied.
RAWLS, C. J., and SPECTOR and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (13 total)
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State v. Bassham, 352 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 1977)…stice. This cause is before us on certiorari granted to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, in State v. Bassham, 336 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), which directly conflicts with State ex rel. Williams v. Eastmoore, 297 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) and O’Bryan v. State, 326 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), certiorari denied 336 So. 2d 602 (Fla.1976). While respondent was in the custody of the Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office, a detainer was placed on him by the Pasco Cou…
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O'Bryan v. State, 326 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)…essary when the accused is in the State’s custody or otherwise under its restraint. The detainer warrant is not equivalent, for purposes of speedy trial considerations, to an arrest on indictment or information. State ex. rel. Williams v. Eastmoore, 297 So. 2d 572 (Fla.App.1st, 1974); contra, Hargrove v. State, 281 So. 2d 390 (Fla.App.2d, 1973), and State v. Sutton, 269 So. 2d 712 (Fla. App.2d, 1972). The most pressing burden which a speedy trial alleviates is that [*88] which results from pretrial incarcerat…
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Eaddy v. State, 352 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)…(Fla.2d DCA 1973), the Second District Court of Appeal held that the time for bringing an accused to trial under the Rule begins to run from the date a detainer is filed. But the First District Court of Appeal in State ex rel. Williams v. Eastmoore, 297 So. 2d 572 (Fla.1st DCA 1974), expressly refused to follow Sutton and Hargrove and held: “The sole question presented by this suggestion for writ of prohibition is whether or not Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191, 33 F.S.A., requires that an accused be…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Sutton, 269 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)
- Ellis v. State, 281 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)
- Hargrove v. State, 281 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)