A. Y. G., A JUVENILE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for burglary based on circumstantial evidence that she drove the getaway car after two males robbed a store. The court reversed, holding that the evidence was insufficient to establish the requisite intent to participate in the burglary as an aider and abettor, as her presence and driving the getaway car could be reasonably inferred as innocent conduct.
The adjudication of delinquency for burglary is reversed because the circumstantial evidence does not preclude the reasonable inference that the juvenile did not intend to participate in the crime. Her presence at the scene and driving the getaway car at the perpetrator's request does not exclude the reasonable inference that she had no knowledge of the crime until after it occurred.
[1] To convict a defendant as an aider and abettor, the state must prove an intent to participate in the perpetration of the crime.
[2] Circumstantial evidence of intent to participate in a crime must exclude every reasonable inference that the defendant did not intend to participate.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“to be convicted as an aider and abettor, the state must show an intent to participate in the perpetration of the crime”
Establishes the legal standard that intent to participate is a required element for aider and abettor liability
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA. Y. G. was seen in a parked vehicle behind a burglarized South Miami shopping center at 4 a.m. Two male juveniles exited the store with stolen items…
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NESBITT, Judge.
This appeal presents the familiar problem of whether the juvenile’s adjudication of delinquency for the crime of burglary is supported by sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish her intent to participate in the criminal activity. Finding that it is not, we reverse.
In the light most favorable to the state, the evidence established that A.
Y. G. was seen in a vehicle parked behind a South Miami shopping center at four o’clock in the morning. Two male juveniles were observed hurriedly exiting the burglarized store, dropping items as they ran toward the automobile in which the appellant was seated. They quickly entered the passenger side of the vehicle and ordered A.
Y. G. to drive away. She left the scene at a high speed. Observing officers gave pursuit, chasing the fleeing vehicle through two red lights before it crashed into a telephone pole and became disabled. The two males fled and the appellant was apprehended. She told arresting officers that one of the passengers had depressed the accelerator of the automobile and maneuvered the steering wheel.
At trial, however, she testified that she had not been driving the vehicle.
Since there is no evidence that the juvenile actually entered the store, she may only be adjudicated of delinquency for burglary as an aider and abettor. Pack v. State, 381 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Lockett v. State, 262 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). It is well established that to be convicted as an aider and abettor, the state must show an intent to participate in the perpetration of the crime.
J. H. v. State, 370 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 379 So. 2d 209 (Fla.1980). Where there is no direct evidence of intent, the circumstantial evidence relied upon to show such an intent must be such as to preclude every reasonable inference that the defendant did not intend to participate in the criminal activity.
K. W. U. v. State, 367 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 378 So. 2d 349 (Fla.1979).
Evidence that the defendant was present at the scene of the crime and drove the “getaway” car at the request of the perpetrator of the burglary does not exclude the reasonable inference that the defendant had no knowledge of the crime until after it occurred; thus, she did not have the requisite intent. J. H. v. State, supra; Douglas v. State, 214 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968). Although A. Y. G.’s flight from the police may have been strong evidence that she was an accessory after the fact, she cannot be convicted as an accessory after the fact where that crime was not charged. Newkirk v. State, 222 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969); Douglas v. State, supra.
This case graphically demonstrates the desirability and the necessity in this type of situation for the State Attorney to charge the defendant not only as a principal under Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1979) but, in the alternative, as an accessory after the fact pursuant to Section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1979). Had the state done so in this case, the needless expenditure of time and effort would have been avoided.
For the foregoing reasons, the juvenile’s adjudication of delinquency is reversed.
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Jones v. State, 466 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…A 1982), pet. for review denied, 426 So. 2d 26 (Fla.1983) (state's evidence deemed insufficient to establish that the defendant aided and abetted his companions with criminal intent in an armed robbery; robbery conviction reversed); A.Y.G. v. State, 414 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (state's evidence deemed insufficient to establish that juvenile as the driver of the get-away car had any prior knowledge that a burglary was going to be committed by his companions, and, thus the element of criminal intent as an…
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Garcia v. State, 899 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…d robbery); Cockett v. State, 507 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (reversing trafficking in cocaine conviction where proof that defendant was a passenger in drug dealer’s car showed merely that the defendant was along for the ride); A.Y.G. v. State, 414 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (holding that evidence that the defendant was present at the scene of the crime and drove the “getaway” car at the request of the perpetrator of the burglary does not exclude the reasonable inference that the defendant had no know…
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Lincoln v. State, 459 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 1984)…ALDERMAN, Justice. We review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fifth District, in Lincoln v. State, 444 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), which the district court has certified to be in express and direct conflict with A.Y.G. v. State, 414 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), [*1031] and Gains v. State, 417 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), revi ew denied, 426 So. 2d 26 (Fla.1983). The district court held that the driving of a getaway car in an elusive manner in an attempt to avoid the police created a…
Previewing 3 of 21 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Johnnell Lockett v. State, 262 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)
- Ira Douglas v. State, 214 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- J. H. v. State, 370 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Pack v. State, 381 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- K. W. U. v. State, 367 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Newkirk v. State, 222 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)