JIMMY MONROE HARRIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that lewd assault is not a specific intent crime, and therefore, the trial court did not err in denying a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication.
[1] Proof of specific intent is not an element of an offense unless specifically required by statutory language.
[2] The requisite intent for an offense may be inferred from the doing of the act constituting the offense absent specific statutory language requiring intent.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant was convicted of attempted lewd assault upon a child under 14. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred by refusing a jury instruction…
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PER CURIAM.
Jimmy Monroe Harris appeals a judgment finding him guilty of attempted lewd assault upon a child under the age of 14, and sentence of five years imprisonment. Harris first contends that the trial court erred in denying his requested jury instruction on the defense of voluntary intoxication, as lewd assault is a specific intent crime. We disagree. Proof of specific intent is not generally an element of an offense unless specifically required by statutory language. E.g., Russell v. State, 373 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); State v. Shorette, 404 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). The applicable language in Section 800.04, Florida Statutes, defining lewd assault,1 does not include the word “intentionally” or any other specific reference to the perpetrator’s intent. Absent such language, it is well settled that the requisite intent may be inferred from the doing of the act constituting the offense. See, Askew v. State, 118 So. 2d 219 (Fla.1960). Therefore, since lewd assault on a child under the age of 14 is not a specific intent crime, the trial court properly denied the requested jury instruction on voluntary intoxication. Harris’s conviction is affirmed.
Harris correctly asserts, however, that the uniform judgment form must be corrected to reflect that he was convicted of attempted lewd assault rather than lewd assault as charged. Accordingly, we remand for correction of the judgment form to reflect a conviction for attempted lewd assault.
BOOTH, WENTWORTH and WIGGIN-TON, JJ., concur. . Section 800.04, Florida Statutes, provides as follows:
Any person who shall handle, fondle or make an assault upon any child under the age of 14 years in a lewd, lascivious or indecent manner. or who shall knowingly commit any lewd or lascivious act in the presence of such child, without the intent to commit sexual battery shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. (emphasis added)
The underscored language is applicable to the facts of this case.
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Linehan v. State, 442 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)…t holding, we recede from Russell. Russell found that the inclusion of the word “intentionally” in section 784.03, Florida Statutes (1977), made battery a specific intent crime to which voluntary intoxication was a defense. See also Harris v. State, 418 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (absence of word “intentionally” in statute means lewd assault is a general intent crime, citing Russell). Upon reflection against the background of the foregoing considerations, including the language of Love v. State, supra, we…
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Lifka v. State, 530 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…had been hunted down. The defendant’s actions are reminiscent of a cat playing with a mouse. Lewd assault on a child is not a specific intent crime, and the intent of the defendant can be imputed from the conduct and circumstances. Harris v. State, 418 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), review denied, 426 So. 2d 26 (Fla.1983); Egal v. State, 469 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), review denied, 476 So. 2d 673 (Fla.1985). Section 800.04, Florida Statutes, is written to encompass acts involving victim contact, as wel…
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Killian v. State, 730 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…terial fact in a sexual battery case and intent is not an issue. See Coler v. State, 418 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 1982); Jackson v. State, 640 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Likewise, lewd assault is not a specific intent crime. [*363] See Harris v. State, 418 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Although the defendant’s state of mind may play some modest role in such a case, neither the State nor the defense is allowed to make state of mind a feature of the trial. The trial court committed prejudicial error when it int…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Askew v. State, 118 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1960)
- Russell v. State, 373 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- State v. Shorette, 404 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)