LEONARD ADLER, APPELLANT,
v.
STEPHEN PAUL ADLER, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF DOROTHY E. ADLER, DECEASED, APPELLEE
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In this divorce appeal, Leonard Adler challenges the trial court's final judgment, including an award of $40,000 in attorney's fees to his ex-wife's estate and the division of jointly owned property. The court affirmed the judgment with a minor modification to correct a calculation error of $1,285.68 in the property division.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees. A spouse need not be completely unable to pay attorney's fees before the other spouse may be required to pay them. Mrs. Adler's estate qualifies as a 'party' under Section 61.16, Florida Statutes, and is entitled to attorney's fees for services performed both before and after her death. The judgment is affirmed as modified to correct a calculation error of $1,285.68.
[1] A trial court's discretion in matters of property division and alimony in a dissolution of marriage case will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discreti…
[2] A spouse need not be completely unable to pay attorney's fees for the other spouse to be awarded fees in a dissolution of marriage case.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“One spouse need not be completely unable to pay attorney's fees before the other spouse may be required to pay such fees.”
Establishes the standard for awarding attorney's fees in dissolution cases, rejecting the argument that the paying spouse must be indigent.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDorothy and Leonard Adler were divorced in October 1978 after thirty-eight years of marriage. Due to Dorothy's declining health, the proceedings were …
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HENDRY, Judge.
Dorothy and Leonard Adler were divorced in October, 1978 after thirty-eight years of marriage. Due to Dorothy’s declining health, the proceedings were bifurcated with jurisdiction retained by the trial court to determine property rights, alimony, attorney’s fees and costs. Mrs. Adler died in November, 1978 and her son (appellee herein), as personal representative of her estate, was substituted in her place. Thereafter, Mr. Adler moved to amend his answer to assert a counterclaim alleging a special equity in jointly held assets, but the motion was denied.1 Mr. Adler now seeks review of various provisions of the final judgment. The majority of the contentions raised fall within the trial court’s discretion and may not be overturned by this court. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980); Herzog v. Herzog, 346 So. 2d 56 (Fla.1977).
With the exception of one error in the order to which appellee has confessed, the judgment is affirmed. This error and the attorney’s fee award require some discussion.
The trial court’s award of $40,000 in attorney’s fees to his wife is challenged by Mr. Adler on the basis that her ability to pay for this service was equal to or greater than his. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award. One spouse need not be completely unable to pay attorney’s fees before the other spouse may be required to pay such fees. Canakaris v. Canakaris, supra; Wilds v. Wilds, 399 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Nor do we find the amount of fees excessive in light of the results achieved and the respective financial circumstances of the parties. Posner v. Posner, 315 So. 2d 175 (Fla.1975); Meltzer v. Meltzer, 400 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Adams v. Adams, 376 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 388 So. 2d 1109 (Fla.1980).
Mr. Adler also alleges that his wife’s estate is not a “party” within the terms of Section 61.16, Florida Statutes, so as to be entitled to an award of fees for services rendered.
We disagree. Under this statute, a party entitled to an award of attorney’s fees must be one who is either obligated by a dissolution judgment to pay certain sums to the other party, or to receive payment from the other party. Price v. Price, 382 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). As can readily be seen, Mrs. Adler’s estate was bound by the final judgment of dissolution, in this case, to receive payment from the other party. Upon Mrs. Adler's death, her personal representative was substituted as party plaintiff and succeeded to her right to receive attorney’s fees for all legal services performed on her behalf both before and after her death. See Sec. 733.612(20), Fla. Stat.
Secondly, Mr. Adler contends that the trial court miscalculated in the division of jointly owned property. Indeed, an error of $1,285.68 has been acknowledged by appellee with respect to the property division.
Thus, Mrs. Adler’s estate is due $141,366.11, not $142,651.79 as the trial court ordered.
Accordingly, the final judgment is modified to reflect a $1,285.68 reduction in the estate’s share of the parties’ jointly owned property. In all other respects, the judgment appealed is affirmed.
Affirmed as modified.
. Certiorari review of the order was denied by this court in Adler v. Adler, 376 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
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Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1997)…ained), review denied, 589 So. 2d 292 (Fla.1991); Margulies v. Margulies, 506 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)(adoption of the lodestar formula reconfirmed that the results obtained is still a factor to be considered in awarding fees); Adler v. Adler, 418 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)(amount of fees not excessive in light of results achieved and the respective financial circumstances of the parties); Meltzer v. Meltzer, 400 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)(same); Adams v. Adams, 376 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)(a…
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Rogers v. Cooper, 575 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)….16 and its reference to “both parties,” envisions an action between the party obligated to pay and the party designated by the final judgment of dissolution to receive payment. See Price v. Price, 382 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Adler v. Adler, 418 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). Although the majority correctly points out that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) has considerable authority to prosecute enforcement actions, its conclusion that this authority somehow makes the Departme…
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Ferguson v. Carmeline Agnes Ferguson, 423 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…wife subsequent to the entry of the above final judgment of marriage dissolution did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to take testimony as to the amount of the attorney’s fee owed and to enter the order appealed from. See Adler v. Adler, 418 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Becker v. King, 307 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. dism., 317 So. 2d 76 (Fla.1975); see also Valparaiso Bank & Trust Co. v. Sims, 343 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 678 (Fla.1977). Affirmed.…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Herzog v. Herzog, 346 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1977)
- Harland Morrison Adams v. Adams, 376 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Dep't OF Bus. Reg. v. Provende, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Wilds v. Wilds, 399 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Sari Posner v. Posner, 315 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1975)
- Meltzer v. Meltzer, 400 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Price v. Price, 382 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)