LOUIS FLORIO AND ANGELA FLORIO, HIS WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, A FLORIDA MUNICIPAL CORPORATION; AND CITY OF MIAMI BEACH REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF THE CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, PURSUANT TO THE FLORIDA COMMUNITY REDEVELOPMENT ACT, FSA 163, APPELLEES
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Landowners challenged inclusion of their property in a municipal redevelopment area, claiming inverse condemnation for a 'taking.' The court affirmed dismissal, holding that inclusion in a redevelopment area does not constitute a taking where the landowner retains the ability to redevelop and the property's non-use stems from its unsafe structure status, not the redevelopment ordinance.
The court held that inclusion in a redevelopment area does not constitute a taking because: (1) the redevelopment ordinance permitted the property to be utilized and redeveloped in a manner compatible with redevelopment plans while retaining private ownership; and (2) the property's non-use was caused by its unsafe structure status, not the redevelopment ordinance. A confiscatory zoning or building regulation that does not completely deprive a landowner of land use is subject to challenge as applied but is not properly the subject of inverse condemnation.
[1] Inclusion of property within a redevelopment area, without more, does not constitute a taking for inverse condemnation purposes.
[2] A landowner's inability to utilize a structure due to its unsafe condition, rather than a redevelopment ordinance, may preclude inverse condemnation claims.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Although the property may have been included in the redevelopment area, renovation thereof was not prevented by the redevelopment ordinance, because the ordinance permitted the property to be utilized until such time as there was a taking. It also permitted the property owner to redevelop his property in a manner compatible with the redevelopment plans and retain private ownership.”
Establishes that the redevelopment ordinance did not itself prevent redevelopment or constitute a taking.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Florios owned a parcel in Miami Beach with a vacant structure subject to building code violations. An Unsafe Structure Board ordered removal or re…
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PER CURIAM.
At the time the plaintiff/appellant landowner acquired a parcel of real estate in the City of Miami Beach located in the subsequent dedicated redevelopment area1 it had on it a structure which was vacant and under citations for building code violations. Thereafter an order from the Unsafe Structure Board was entered requiring the building to be removed or for construction on renovation to commence within ninety days. The landowner failed to submit proper plans to secure the renovation but did secure successive extensions of the deadline for removal. The landowner and the city negotiated for a number of years in an attempt to secure a proper renovation of the structure and the time for removal of the structure continued to be advanced.
The landowner ultimately brought an action alleging “condemnation blight” and seeking inverse condemnation against the City. The trial judge denied the relief sought and left the landowner with his remedy of securing a rehabilitation permit.
The landowner appeals and basically contends that there was a “taking” of his property by it being included in the redevelopment area. We disagree for several reasons. Although the property may have been included in the redevelopment area, renovation thereof was not prevented by the redevelopment ordinance, because the ordinance permitted the property to be utilized until such time as there was a taking. It also permitted the property owner to redevelop his property in a manner compatible with the redevelopment plans and retain private ownership. The landowner was prevented from utilizing the improvement thereon primarily because it was an unsafe structure. No proceedings were ever instituted to upset the finding that the improvement was, in fact, an unsafe structure, and subject to removal originally on November 19, 1974.
A confiscatory zoning ordinance 2 or building regulation applied to real property which does not completely deprive a landowner of use of his land may properly be the subject matter of litigation to strike the ordinance or regulation as applied to the land in question, but is not normally the subject of inverse condemnation. Burritt v. Harris, 172 So. 2d 820 (Fla.1965); Mailman Development Corporation v. City of Hollywood, 286 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); Kasser v. Dade County, 344 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Town of Indialantic v. McNulty, 400 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
Therefore, the final judgment here under review is affirmed.
Affirmed.
. See State v. Miami Beach Redevelopment Agency, 392 So. 2d 875 (Fla.1980).
. The redevelopment ordinances or regulations are actually zoning ordinances. Zoning Ordinances, City of Miami Beach, § 22.
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Teitelbaum v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 176 So. 3d 998 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015)…48, 51-52 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Brown v. Dep’t of Transp., 884 So. 2d 116, 117 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). However, no Florida case has found condemnation blight itself to be an actionable claim for a constitutional taking. See Florio v. City of Miami Beach, 425 So. 2d 1161, 1162 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (per curiam) (affirming the trial court’s dismissal of a plaintiffs claim for condemnation blight)., Thus, under current Florida law, condemnation blight is only relevant to the valuation of the taken property after a plaint…
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Rukab v. City OF Jacksonville Beach, 811 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…eir property without just compensation. In the instant case, the Rukabs correctly point out that the designation of the area as “blighted” was not confiscatory in nature, nor was adoption of the Redevelopment Plan. See Florio v. City of Miami Beach, 425 So. 2d 1161, 1162 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (indicating that mere adoption of redevelopment plan did not result in a taking). The first opportunity to challenge the propriety of the taking was during this eminent domain proceeding. Thus, even if there were other oppor…
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Amerkan v. City OF Hialeah, 534 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…otion to abate because of the proceedings to redevelop the property and its surroundings pursuant to 42 USCA § 4601 et seg. Inverse condemnation has generally been held to be not applicable to redevelopment causes. See Florio v. City of Miami Beach, 425 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). The government interference with the landowner’s rental agreement should be redressed with compensation, the same as any other party to a contract would be entitled to recover damages for interference therewith by third parties…
Authorities Cited
- Withrow v. Albert E. Perron & the Fla. Indus. Comm'n, 172 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1965)
- State v. Miami Beach Redev. Agency, 392 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 1980)
- Mailman Dev. Corp. & GAC Corp. v. City OF Hollywood, 286 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)
- Kasser v. Dade Cnty., 344 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- Town OF Indialantic v. McNULTY, 400 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Butler v. State, 400 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)