STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
CHRISTINA WIDMER, APPELLEE
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Florida's speedy trial rule requires an explicit court order to extend the 180-day period; a continuance alone does not toll it, and Widmer's discharge was proper where no such order was entered.
A continuance granted at the state's request does not toll the speedy trial period unless the trial court enters a specific order extending that period before expiration.
[1] A continuance granted at the request of the prosecution does not toll the speedy trial period unless the trial court enters a specific written order extending the period…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWidmer was arrested and the state sought to continue her arraignment, claiming she had requested the delay; however, evidence showed the arraigning ju…
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PER CURIAM.
The state appeals an order discharging Widmer under the speedy trial rule, arguing that she waived her speedy trial rights by failing to appear at a scheduled arraignment that the state claims was continued one week at her request. Fla.R. Crim.P. 3.191(d)(3), (e). We affirm because there is evidence from which the trial court could find, as it did, that Widmer never requested delay and that the arraigning judge in effect rescheduled that proceeding on his own initiative. Since Widmer was not required to attend the originally scheduled arraignment and appeared at the rescheduled proceeding, she was continuously available for trial under the provisions of the speedy trial rule and entitled to discharge when not tried within 180 days of her arrest. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(a)(1).
We also reject the state’s argument, belatedly raised on appeal, that continuances granted within 180 days of arrest, at the request of the-state, extended the speedy trial period. A continuance alone does not toll the period. The trial court must enter an order specifically extending the speedy trial period before it expires. State v. Burris, 424 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Brunson v. State, 422 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Durrance v. Rudd, 398 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). No such order was entered in this case.
AFFIRMED.
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., C.J., and LARRY G. SMITH and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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State v. Katz, 438 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…umbent upon the court to set a trial date within ninety days of receipt of the mandate. Cf. State ex rel. Butler v. Cullen, 253 So. 2d 861 (Fla.1971) (if continuance is granted upon motion of defendant, speedy trial time is tolled); State v. Widmer, 427 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (in order to toll the running of the speedy trial period, the court must grant a continuance and must enter an order specifically extending the period before it expires). The absence of defendant and his counsel from the “Report”…
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State v. Allen, 438 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed on the authority of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a), as interpreted by State v. Widmer, 427 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Walker v. State, 390 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). LETTS, GLICKSTEIN and WALDEN, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Powell v. State, 398 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- Brunson v. State, 422 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- State v. Burris, 424 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)