CARLOS AYRADO, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Carlos Ayrado appeals his conviction for unlawful display of a firearm during commission of a felony after the jury acquitted him of the underlying felonies (first degree murder and attempted first degree murder) on grounds of insanity. The court reverses, holding that an insanity acquittal on the underlying felonies logically precludes conviction on the firearm display charge that depends on those felonies.
The conviction for unlawful display of a firearm must be reversed because an insanity acquittal on the underlying felonies is necessarily inconsistent with a conviction for displaying a firearm while committing those same felonies. The jury's finding that the defendant lacked the necessary mens rea due to insanity precludes conviction on a charge dependent upon those felonies.
[1] A conviction for unlawful display of a firearm during the commission of a felony is inconsistent with a jury's acquittal of the defendant on grounds of insanity for the u…
[2] A jury's finding that a defendant lacked the necessary mens rea for underlying felonies due to insanity renders a conviction for displaying a firearm during the commissio…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“By acquitting the defendant Ayrado on grounds of insanity on the charges of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder, the jury necessarily found that the defendant lacked the necessary mens rea to be held criminally responsible for his conduct as to the charged felonies.”
Establishes that an insanity acquittal necessarily determines the defendant lacked mens rea for the underlying crimes
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAyrado was charged with first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and unlawful display of a firearm during commission of a felony. The jury …
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PER CURIAM.
The defendant Carlos Ayrado appeals his conviction and sentence entered below for the offense of unlawful display of a firearm during the commission of a felony [§ 790.-07(2), Fla.Stat. (1981)]. He contends that under the authority of Redondo v. State, 403 So. 2d 954 (Fla.1981) and Mahaun v. State, 377 So. 2d 1158 (Fla.1979), his conviction on said offense must be reversed because the jury below acquitted the defendant, on grounds of insanity, of the underlying felonies (i.e., first degree murder and attempted first degree murder) upon which the said firearm display conviction rests. We entirely agree and reverse the conviction and sentence herein based on the above authorities.
By acquitting the defendant Ayrado on grounds of insanity on the charges of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder, the jury necessarily found that the defendant lacked the necessary mens rea to be held criminally responsible for his conduct as to the charged felonies. See e.g., State ex rel. Boyd v. Green, 355 So. 2d 789, 792 (Fla.1978). Having so concluded, it was totally inconsistent for the jury to convict the defendant Ayrado of displaying a firearm while committing or attempting to commit these same underlying felonies for which the defendant was not criminally responsible. It was, therefore, reversible error for the trial court to deny the defendant’s post-trial motions for an arrest of judgment and a judgment of acquittal as to the aforesaid firearm display conviction.
We reject the state’s contention that the point has not been preserved for appellate review. There is no requirement, as urged, that the defendant (a) object at trial to a standard jury instruction that each crime charged in the indictment be considered separately and that a finding of guilty or not guilty on one count should not affect the verdict on any other count, or (b) object at trial to the verdict prior to its being recorded and the jury discharged. The Mahaun-Redondo line of cases imposes no such requirements in order to preserve for appellate review the point urged herein; it is sufficient if the defendant, as here, files a post-trial motion for arrest of judgment or a post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal in the trial court as to the firearm display conviction urging the point herein involved.
We also reject the state’s contention that the jury could have found the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity on the underlying felonies of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder, and then, quite consistently, found the defendant guilty of a lesser offense of aggravated battery as an underlying felony sufficient to sustain the firearm display conviction. The jury was never instructed that aggravated battery was one of the underlying felonies in the firearm display count, and therefore the jury could not have reached such a result. This crucial fact distinguishes the instant case from Pitts v. State, 425 So. 2d 542 (Fla.1983) and McCray v. State, 425 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1983), affirming 397 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Beyond that, we think it plainly inconsistent for the jury to conclude that the defendant lacked a mens rea as to the underlying felonies because of his insanity, and yet somehow possessed a mens rea and was entirely sane as to a lesser included offense.
The convictions and sentences under review are reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to discharge the defendant from the cause.
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Gonzalez v. State, 440 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)…430 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), this court followed Redondo in an identical situation, as did the Third District in Wooten v. State, 404 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) and Palacio v. State, 402 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). In Ayrado v. State, 431 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), the court reversed a conviction for the use of a firearm during a felony because the jury found Ayrado not guilty by reason of insanity of charges of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. In each case the jury’s…
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Castillo v. State, 590 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)…fficking. That being so, there is a fatal inconsistency between the acquittal on those substantive charges and the conviction of the firearm charge under section 790.07. See Ashley v. State, 493 So. 2d 1079, 1080 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Ayrado v. State, 431 So. 2d 320, 321-22 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). The trial court took a broader view of the Pitts decision and that part of section 790.07 which refers to “any felony.” § 790.07(2), Fla.Stat. (1989) (emphasis added). The court concluded that the wording of the statute…
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Davis v. State, 459 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…434, 436 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (on rehearing). Clearly, the defendant, who had moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground, inter alia, that the verdicts were inconsistent, had properly preserved the point in the trial court, see Ayrado v. State, 431 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (post-trial motions for arrest of judgment or judgment of acquittal sufficient to preserve for appellate review contention that jury verdicts inconsistent), and clearly, he could have raised the point by cross-appeal, see State v.…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Redondo v. State, 403 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 1981)
- Mahaun v. State, 377 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 1979)
- Wodford v. State (Fla. 1st DCA 2024)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Jeffrey Michael Boyd v. Green, 355 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1978)
- Pitts v. State, 425 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 1983)
- McCRAY v. State, 397 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- In re the Fla. Bar. in re Petition to Amend the Integration Rule, 425 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1982)