HOWARD HERRING, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the statutes requiring a driver to remain at the scene of an accident and fulfill certain requirements were not implicated when the injury occurred after the initial accident and was caused by the other vehicle's driver.
Howard Herring was convicted of several criminal violations. The state conceded that one count was controlled by a prior case, and the court directed …
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JORGENSON, Judge.
Howard Herring was charged in a multi-count information and found guilty by a jury of several criminal violations. We affirm the trial court judgments and sentences entered on the jury verdicts with two exceptions and remand for further proceedings.
The state has conceded that Redondo v. State, 403 So. 2d 954 (Fla.1981), controls Count IV of the information and the trial court is therefore directed to vacate the conviction and sentence entered upon Count IV. See Thomas v. State, 430 So. 2d 616, 617 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
As for Count VI, section 316.027(2), Florida Statutes (1979), is violated if the driver of a vehicle involved in a traffic accident resulting in injury or death willfully fails to remain at the scene of the accident until the requirements of section 316.-062, Florida Statutes (1979), are fulfilled. See State v. Murray, 425 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); §§ 316.027(1), (2), 316.062, Fla. Stat. (1979).
It is apparent that the purpose of sections 316.027 and 316.062 is to assure that any injured person is rendered aid and that all pertinent information concerning insurance and names of those involved in the traffic accident is exchanged by the parties.
At the time of the injury the “accident” in which Herring was involved was already a fait accompli and no injury resulted therefrom. Sections 316.027 and 316.062 were therefore not implicated. Any injury which resulted occurred after Herring’s vehicle had struck the other vehicle and the other vehicle had been stopped. It was the driver of the other vehicle’s act of restarting his vehicle that caused the injury to the passenger of that vehicle. This was an “accident” to which Herring was not a party. The trial court is therefore directed to vacate the conviction and sentence entered upon Count VI of the information.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded with directions.
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State v. Dumas, 700 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 1997)…5). Florida law further makes it a felony to fail to complete these duties. § 316.027(2), Fla. Stat. (1995). One of the main purposes of the statute is to ensure that accident victims receive medical assistance as soon as possible. Herring v. State, 435 So. 2d 865, 866 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (“It is apparent that the purpose of sections 316.027 and 316.062 is to assure that any injured person is rendered aid and that all pertinent information concerning insurance and names of those involved in the traffic acciden…
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State v. Zachariah Dorsett, 158 So. 3d 557 (Fla. 2015)…5). Florida law further makes it a felony to fail to complete these duties. § 316.027(2), Fla. Stat. (1995). One of the main purposes of the statute is to ensure that accident victims receive medical assistance as soon as possible. Herring v. State, 435 So. 2d 865, 866 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (“It is apparent that the purpose of sections 316.027 and 316.062 is to assure that any injured person is rendered aid and that all pertinent information concerning insurance and names of those involved in the traffic acciden…
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Wishop v. State, 490 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)…The Redondo decision has been repeatedly followed where the defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm during a felony when there was no remaining underlying felony. Davidson v. State, 458 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Herring v. State, 435 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018, 104 S.Ct. 549, 79 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983); Agrado v. State, 431 So. 2d 320 (Fla.3d DCA 1983). See also Pitts v. State, 425 So. 2d 542 (Fla.1983); Mahaun v. State, 377 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 1979). Under Florida law…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Redondo v. State, 403 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 1981)
- Thomas v. State, 430 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)
- The Mooring Condo. Ass'n OF Pine Crest, Inc. v. Toomey, 425 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)
- State v. Murray, 425 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)