CRAIG OLSEN, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that giving a false name after arrest can support a charge of resisting arrest without violence, and that a defendant cannot be sentenced as a habitual felony offender without sufficient proof of identity for the predicate offenses.
[1] Giving a false name subsequent to arrest can support a charge of resisting arrest without violence under section 843.02, Florida Statutes.
[2] A prior appellate holding that giving a false name subsequent to arrest cannot constitute resisting arrest without violence is receded from.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant was convicted of sexual battery, aggravated assault, and resisting arrest without violence. He was also sentenced as a habitual felony o…
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[*18] GODERICH, Judge.
The defendant, Craig Olsen, appeals from his conviction for sexual battery, aggravated assault, and resisting arrest without violence, and from his sentence as a habitual felony offender. We affirm, in part; reverse, in part, and remand for further proceedings.
The defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal as to the charge of resisting arrest without violence. We disagree.
The only evidence adduced at trial to support the charge of resisting arrest without violence was testimony that the defendant gave the police a false name subsequent to his arrest. The defendant correctly argues that in Z.P. v. State, 440 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), this Court held that the giving of a false name subsequent to arrest cannot constitute the offense of resisting arrest without violence. However, we now recede from that portion of Z.P. and adopt the holding of cases such as Rumph v. State, 544 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989), and Caines v. State, 500 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), that hold that the giving of a false name subsequent to arrest can support a charge of resisting arrest without violence under section 843.02, Florida Statutes. Accordingly, we affirm the defendant’s conviction for resisting arrest without violence.
Next, the defendant contends that he was improperly sentenced as a habitual felony offender because the State failed to establish that he was the same person who was convicted of the predicate felonies used to support the sentence. We agree and reverse the defendant’s sentence as a habitual felony offender and remand for resentencing. However, on remand, if the State can establish that the defendant was the “perpetrator of the predicate crimes at the new sentencing hearing, the trial court may again sentence him as a habitual felony offender.” Louis v. State, 647 So. 2d 324, 326 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).
Lastly, the remaining point raised by the defendant lacks merit.
Affirmed, in part; reversed, in part, and remanded for resentencing.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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State v. Ransom Louis Collins, 985 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 2008)…did not provide proper fingerprint authentication); Williams v. State, 692 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (resentencing ordered where State failed to submit sufficient proof that defendant was the person who committed prior offense); Olsen v. State, 691 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (resentencing ordered where State failed to establish that defendant was person convicted of predicate felonies used to support HFO sentencing); Reynolds v. State, 674 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (resentencing ordered where Stat…
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Osborne v. State, 820 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…fficient for purposes of habitual felony offender sentencing. On remand, the trial court may again consider whether the habitual offender statute should be applied to appellant. See King v. State, 580 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Olsen v. State, 691 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). If the state is able to prove with record evidence that appellant meets the requirements for habitualization, the trial court may again sentence him as a habitual felony offender. See Cameron v. State, 807 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 4th DC…
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Gordon v. Moore, 832 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)…has other prior felonies that would qualify him as a habitual offender, the State may make that showing on remand. See Delevaux v. State, 762 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Williams v. State, 692 So. 2d 292, 293 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Olsen v. State, 691 So. 2d 17, 18 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). Petition granted m part; remanded with directions.…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Woods v. Ashlin, 544 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
- Rumph v. State, 544 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)
- Caines v. State, 500 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
- Louis v. State, 647 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- Z.P. v. State, 440 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)