HARRISON JONES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Harrison Jones appeals the denial of his motion for discharge under Florida's speedy trial rule. He argued the state failed to bring him to trial within 180 days on a cocaine possession charge that arose from the same search warrant executed in February 1983, even though he was not arrested for cocaine until August 1983. The court affirmed, holding that the speedy trial period begins when a defendant is arrested for a specific charge, not when evidence of that charge is first seized.
The court held that the speedy trial period does not begin to run until a defendant is arrested or taken into custody for the specific offense for which he is sought to be tried. The mere fact that probable cause existed to arrest on one possessory offense does not trigger the speedy trial requirement for other possessory offenses lacking probable cause to arrest, even if the offenses coincided in time.
[1] The speedy trial period does not begin to run until a defendant is arrested or taken into custody for the specific offense for which they are sought to be tried.
[2] Probable cause to arrest for one possessory offense does not trigger the speedy trial rule for all other possessory offenses that may have coincided in time but for which…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The 180-day speedy trial period does not begin to run until appellant was arrested or taken into custody for the offense for which he is sought to be tried.”
Establishes the core holding that speedy trial rights are offense-specific and triggered by arrest for that particular offense
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn February 11, 1983, officers executed a search warrant at appellant's house and seized two substances: marijuana and an unidentified substance. Jone…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191 cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Harrison Jones, seeks review of the denial of his motion for discharge pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191, regarding a charge of possession of cocaine filed on August 4, 1983.
.On February 11, 1983, appellant’s house was searched pursuant to a search warrant for controlled substances. Appellant was arrested at the scene for possession of marijuana which was found during the search. He was charged with that offense on March 18, 1983, to which he subsequently pled nolo contendere. Another substance was seized which, by later tests, proved to be cocaine. He was arrested on that offense on August 8, 1983, after being charged by information on August 3, 1983, upon receipt by the state of lab reports verifying that the substance was cocaine.
Appellant concedes that the arresting officers had no probable cause to arrest him for the possession of the cocaine on February 11, 1983, because at the time the substance was seized, they did not have knowledge that it was cocaine. However, appellant argues that because appellant was arrested for the marijuana, which was seized at the same time as the substance which later proved to be cocaine, prosecution should be barred because he was not brought to trial within 180 days of February 11, 1983.
Appellant relies on Crain v. State, 302 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974), to argue that even though he was not arrested for cocaine at the time, he still should have been brought to trial on that charge within 180 days of his arrest for the marijuana charge. Appellant grounds his argument on the fact that both charges arose because of items seized during the same search. We affirm on the authority of State v. Lynch, 445 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). The 180-day speedy trial period does not begin to run until appellant was arrested or taken into custody for the offense for which he is sought to be tried. Merely because there was probable cause to arrest on one possessory offense does not require application of the speedy trial rule for all possessory offenses which may have coincided in time, but for which probable cause to arrest did not exist. In State v. Hoesley, 427 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), we have previously distinguished Crain and State v. Kelly, 407 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
Appellant also relies on State ex rel. Canup v. Langston, 341 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), to argue that the state had an obligation to expedite the lab reports so as to bring him to trial within 180 days of his first arrest. Langston deals with the duty of the state to expedite reports after a defendant has been arrested and charged and is inapplicable where no probable cause to arrest existed.
Affirmed.
BOARDMAN, A.C.J., and GRIMES and CAMPBELL, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Shearin v. State, 755 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…defendant must show more than the mere fact that the evidence leading to [*802] the subsequent charge was first discovered as a- result of the original arrest and charge for the initial offense. Hoesley, 427 So. 2d at 1078. See also Jones v. State, 450 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); State v. Lynch, 445 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Likewise in this case, the necessary nexus between the prostitution arrest and the subsequent drug charges does not exist. Affirmed. CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and GREEN, J., Concur. .…
-
State v. Domonique T. Pelham, 99 So. 3d 599 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)…e obvious by the fact that at the time of Pelham’s arrest for loitering and prowling, the conduct that formed the basis for the 2012 charges (the burglary and theft from Mr. Boyer’s car) had not even been reported to police. See also Jones v. State, 450 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (rejecting argument that an arrest for one crime could start the speedy trial period for a second crime committed at the same time and place but for which law enforcement had not yet developed probable cause to arrest the defendan…
-
State v. Bret Thomas Warren, 168 So. 3d 337 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)…e obvious by the fact that at the time of Pelham’s arrest for loitering and prowling, the conduct that formed the basis for the 2012 charges (the burglary and theft from Mr. Boyer’s car) had not even been reported to police. See also Jones v. State, 450 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (rejecting argument that an arrest for one crime could start the speedy trial period for a second crime committed at the same time and place but for which law enforcement had not yet developed probable cause to arrest the defendan…
Authorities Cited
- Crain v. State, 302 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
- State v. Kelly, 407 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)
- State v. Hoesley, 427 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Mary Dail Canup v. The Honorable Thomas M. Langston, 341 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)
- State v. Lynch, 445 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)