JESSIE O'NEILL, APPELLANT,
v.
CHARLES P. SACHER, ET AL., APPELLEES
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Jessie O'Neill appealed a trial court's construction of her deceased mother's will and pour-over trust, challenging the determination that the daughter's trust must pay expenses for the Plantation Key residence while the testator's husband lives there. The court affirmed, holding that the general testamentary intent to benefit the husband by allowing him to live rent-free requires the trust to bear the residence expenses despite seeming conflicts among the will's provisions.
The court held that the daughter's 1974 pour-over trust must pay the residence expenses. The trial court properly harmonized the conflicting provisions by interpreting them in light of the testator's general intent and overall testamentary plan, which was to allow the husband to reside in the property without paying rent or expenses.
[1] The general intent of a testator, as gathered from the entire will, prevails over an isolated provision that appears contrary to the overall purpose.
[2] When construing a will, the court's primary objective is to determine the testator's intent from a consideration of the entire instrument.
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Establishes the fundamental principle that wills must be interpreted holistically to ascertain testator's intent.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMrs. Austin created a 1974 pour-over trust naming her daughter, Jessie O'Neill, as primary beneficiary. Mrs. Austin's will devised her Plantation Key …
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BASKIN, Judge.
Jessie O’Neill appeals a final order construing her deceased mother’s last will and testament in conjunction with a pour-over trust naming appellant as primary beneficiary. The trial court held that the “general intent and purpose of the testator as gathered from the entire Will” requires the 1974 pour-over trust to pay the expenses of the Plantation Key property as long as the testator’s husband, Robert Austin, lives in the residence. We affirm.
At the heart of this litigation is a conflict among provisions of the daughter’s 1974 trust, the mother’s will and the codicil to the mother’s will concerning the responsibility to pay expenses for the Plantation Key residence while Mr. Austin lives there. The daughter’s 1974 trust authorizes the trustee to manage and preserve the “Sett-lor’s residence in accordance with the provisions of Article [X] of Settlor’s Last Will and Testament....” Article X of the will devised to the husband the right to reside in Mrs. Austin’s Plantation Key residence until his death, remarriage or vacation of the premises “without rent or other charge.” Article X also directed the husband to “pay all expenses relating to the maintenance and upkeep of such resi-dence_” However, this portion of Article X was expressly revoked and replaced by Article V of the subsequent codicil, which provides that the maintenance and upkeep expenses of the Plantation Key residence are to be paid by the decedent’s estate and the “Trust established in accordance with Article XI” of the will. The trust established in accordance with Article XI is a testamentary trust for the husband providing him with a lifetime annuity of $36,000 per year and an unlimited power of appointment as to the trust assets.
Mrs. O’Neill asserts that the irreconcilable conflict between the will and the codicil renders the later-drawn codicil controlling. The husband’s trust, she contends, is therefore responsible for the expenses of the Plantation Key residence. We find no merit in appellant’s contention. We see no reason to consider the codicil as an isolated segment of the decedent’s testamentary scheme, especially when Article VII of the codicil expressly ratifies, confirms and effectively republishes the will. § 732.5105, Fla.Stat. (1977) *.
The objective in construing a will is to determine the intent of the testator, Mosgrove v. Mach, 133 Fla. 459, 182 So. 786 (Fla.1938); In re Estate of Johnson, 347 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); In re Estate of Parker, 110 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 114 So. 2d 3 (Fla.1959), from a consideration of the instrument as a whole. Hulsh v. Hulsh, 431 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 440 So. 2d 352 (Fla.1983). When the will contains provisions that seem to conflict, it is the duty of the trial court to harmonize and reconcile the conflicts to give effect to the testamentary intent. Meszaros v. Holsberry, 84 So. 2d 565 (Fla.1956); Hulsh. It is axiomatic that where there are inconsistencies between a particular clause of a will and the general intent of the will as a whole, the general intent should prevail over an isolated provision that appears contrary to the testator’s overall purpose and intent. Meszaros; Hulsh.
A review of the record indicates that Mrs. Austin’s intention, evidenced by the testamentary plan in its entirety, was to favor her husband by providing that he live in the Plantation Key residence without paying rent or other expenses associated with the house. The trial court therefore properly harmonized the trust, the will and the codicil to give effect to Mrs. Austin’s general testamentary intent by determining that the residence expenses must be borne by the daughter’s trust.
Affirmed.
*
Section 732.5105 provides:
The execution of a codicil referring to a previous will has the effect of republishing the will as modified by the codicil.
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Robinson v. Robinson, 676 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…13] the Shirley Robinson trust to bear the impact of all estate taxes. Although we are in agreement that the trial court was correct to find conflict between the will and the trust and approve of its resolution of that issue,1 see O’Neill v. Sacher, 451 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); In re Estate of Baer, 446 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 456 So. 2d 1181 (Fla.1984); Sun Bank/Miami, N.A. v. Hogarth, 536 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), rev. denied, 545 So. 2d 1369 (Fla.1989), we find no conflict or am…
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West v. Francioni, 488 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)…nd interest of Daniel J. Francioni in the funeral home located in Asbury Park, New Jersey.” It is that order which the daughters have appealed. In the construction of wills the polestar is to determine the intent of the testator. O’Neill v. Sacher, 451 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Hulsh v. Hulsh, 431 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 440 So. 2d 352 (Fla.1983). When there is an inconsistency between an isolated clause in a will and the general testamentary scheme, the overall general intent should pr…
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Authorities Cited
- In re Est. of Howard W. Parker v. Parker, 110 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959)
- Hulsh v. Rea R. Hulsh, 431 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Mosgrove v. Mach, 133 Fla. 459 (Fla. 1938)
- Meszaros v. Holsberry, 84 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1956)
- In re Est. OF Ruth L. Johnson, 347 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
- Blackburn v. Fla. W. Coast Land & Dev. Co., 114 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1959)
- Greene v. State, 114 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1959)