MARSHALL IAN FARKAS, APPELLANT,
v.
KARIN FARKAS, APPELLEE
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In this dissolution of marriage case involving a 24-year marriage, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's asset distribution, finding the award of 90% of marital assets to the wife constituted an abuse of discretion. The court held that inherited funds and the interest thereon do not create a special equity justifying disproportionate distribution of jointly owned property.
The court held that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the wife 90% of marital assets. The contribution of interest income from separately inherited funds does not create a special equity in jointly owned property or justify such a disparate distribution. Record title is the starting point for property division, and interest from separate funds warrants no greater consideration than the husband's salary contributions to joint endeavors.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion in a dissolution of marriage action when it distributes marital assets inequitably.
[2] The contribution of interest income from a spouse's separate inherited funds to marital endeavors does not automatically create a special equity in jointly owned property…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded the former wife ninety per cent of the marital assets of this long-term marriage. The equities in this case do not support such a disproportionate distribution.”
Establishes the core holding that the 90% award constitutes abuse of discretion and is inequitable.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMarshall and Karin Farkas were married for 24 years. At dissolution, the parties jointly owned four parcels of real estate: the marital home (approxim…
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JORGENSON, Judge.
Marshall Farkas appeals the final judgment entered by the trial court in this dissolution of marriage action. In particular Mr. Farkas asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in distributing the assets of this twenty-four-year marriage. We agree and for the following reasons reverse and remand this action to the trial court with directions to equitably distribute the marital assets.
Mindful of our limited jurisdiction to review orders of trial courts in dissolution matters, see Kuvin v. Kuvin, 442 So. 2d 203 (Fla.1983); Conner v. Conner, 439 So. 2d 887 (Fla.1983),1 we nevertheless conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded the former wife ninety per cent of the marital assets of this long-term marriage. The equities in this case do not support such a disproportionate distribution. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980); Ingram v. Ingram, 379 So. 2d 955 (Fla.1980); Roffe v. Roffe, 404 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
The confusion below emanates primarily from the trial court’s treatment of certain funds which were inherited by the wife late in the marriage. Those monies were held by the wife in certain trust accounts; however, the interest from those funds was contributed by the wife to the couple’s endeavors. The trial court, although it is not clear, apparently considered the interest monies as giving rise to a special equity in favor of the wife. This record will not justify such a result. See Ball v. Ball, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla.1976).
At the time of the dissolution the parties jointly owned four parcels of real estate: one, the marital domicile with an equity of approximately $78,000; two, a condominium unit (the Briarwinds) with an equity of approximately $17,000; three, a condominium unit (Bay Gardens) with an equity of approximately $11,000 and four, an interest in a time share unit condominium (Sanibel Beach) with a value of approximately $6,000.
The trial court awarded to the wife all the husband’s interest in the marital residence, all the husband’s interest in the Briarwinds condominium (but left him liable on the Briarwinds mortgage) and gave the wife half interest in the Bay Gardens condominium. The trial court divided equally the parties’ interest in the time share condominium but found that the wife was entitled to a $2,000 credit because inherited funds were used for a portion of the purchase. Contrary to the trial court’s findings the record demonstrates that the $2,000 in question was in the form of a note collateralized by the inheritance but subsequently paid from joint funds. The trial court also required the husband to transfer to the wife his interest in an I.R.A. account (except for $1,200) which will cause him to incur a substantial tax penalty.
There is nothing in this record that will support the disparate distribution of the jointly owned property that occurred in this case. As this court has previously stated, record title is the starting point with the division of property. See Leonard v. Leonard, 389 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (citing Ball), review denied mem., 399 So. 2d 1144 (Fla.1981). The contribution of interest income from the wife’s con-cededly separate funds does not give rise to a special equity in the real property or the I.R.A. account any more than the husband’s contribution of his salary to the couple’s joint endeavors.
We therefore reverse and remand this action with directions to the trial court to apply the principles stated in Canakaris and Tronconi v. Tronconi, 425 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). See also Lynch v. Lynch, 437 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (award to the wife, as lump sum alimony, of the husband’s interest in the marital home reversed where husband was clearly “shortchanged” by award).
Reversed and remanded with directions.
. As Judge Letts, whose views we share, has pointed out in Marshall v. Marshall, 445 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (Letts, J., specially concurring), and Marcoux v. Marcoux, 445 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (Letts, J., dissenting in part), our jurisdiction is indeed quite limited.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Carroll v. Carroll, 471 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…akaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980), limits the jurisdiction of the district courts by making the judgments of trial judges all but irreversible in domestic cases, as expressed by Judge Letts (whose views we shared, see Farkas v. Farkas, 452 So. 2d 963, 964 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)), in Marshall v. Marshall, 445 So. 2d 706, 707 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (Letts, J., specially concurring), and Marcoux v. Marcoux, 445 So. 2d 711, 713 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (Letts, J., dissenting in part), has been resolved by…
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Bujarski v. Marcel J. Bujarski, 530 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)…nd $308,356.00 of the marital assets (using the lower figure of $275,356.00) and $33,000.00 to the wife, roughly a ninety percent to ten percent distribution. There is simply no rhyme or reason for such an inequitable division. See Farkas v. Farkas, 452 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1984) (90% award of marital assets to wife, 10% to husband reversed); Sanders v. Sanders, 492 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (72% of marital assets to husband, 18% to wife reversed). Mederos-Si-bila v. Sibila, 525 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 3rd…
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Lester v. Lester, 462 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Kuvin v. Kuvin, 442 So. 2d 203 (Fla.1983); Conner v. Conner, 439 So. 2d 887 (Fla.1983); Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980); Farkas v. Farkas, 452 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (11 total)
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Shannon v. State, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1976)
- Kuvin v. Kuvin, 442 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1983)
- Doyle Edward Conner v. Conner, 439 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1983)
- Roffe v. Moises Roffe, 404 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Tronconi v. Tronconi, 425 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Ingram v. Ingram, 379 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1980)
- In re The Marriage of Lynn Earl Lynch v. Lynch, 437 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)
- Marshall v. Marshall, 445 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
- Marcoux v. Marcoux, 445 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)