CLAUDE ROBBINS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1984-08-03
No. 83-2522
GRIMES, A.C.J., and OTT and LEHAN, JJ., concur.
453 So. 2d 877 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1984) Caution
Cited by 18 cases

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Holding

The court held that a defendant's incarceration in another county does not make them unavailable for speedy trial purposes if the prosecuting county is aware of the incarceration.


Facts & Procedural History

Defendant was convicted of grand theft and appealed the denial of his speedy trial motion. More than 180 days had passed since his arrest, and the sta…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant was convicted of grand theft. He appeals the trial court’s denial of his Motion for Discharge on speedy trial grounds. We reverse.

There is no dispute that more than 180 days from defendant’s arrest on September 24, 1984, had expired when defendant’s motion was filed. The only question is whether the 180-day requirement was inapplicable because defendant had been unavailable for trial under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(e). The state, citing Singleton v. Gross, 436 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), contends that defendant was unavailable in Hillsbor-ough County because he was incarcerated in Pinellas County. The state, citing Rule 3.191(e)(1), also contends that defendant failed to attend proceedings where his presence was required, to-wit: three scheduled arraignments in Hillsborough County. We disagree.

Here, unlike in Singleton, Hills-borough County authorities were aware that defendant was incarcerated in Pinellas County. An accused is entitled to discharge under Rule 3.191 even though during the speedy trial period he was incarcerated in another county. Holmes v. Leffler, 411 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Ramos v. Amidon, 263 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972). His failure to attend the scheduled arraignments in Hillsborough County occurred while he was incarcerated in Pinel-las County. It was the responsibility of Hillsborough County authorities, not defendant, to arrange for defendant’s presence at Hillsborough County proceedings.

We therefore reverse defendant’s judgment of conviction and direct that he be discharged.

GRIMES, A.C.J., and OTT and LEHAN, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Tirado v. Reese, 478 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
    …as unavailable for trial by virtue of his incarceration in state prison and denied the motion for discharge on the authority of State v. Rasul, 468 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). More closely akin to the case at bar than Rasul is Robbins v. State, 453 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). There, we held that where the authorities are aware that a defendant with an upcoming court appearance is incarcerated elsewhere, it is their responsibility to produce him. Rasul is dintinguishable. In that case the defendant had…
  • Walker v. State, 492 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
    …e had sufficient notice of his location by virtue of the information received by the assistant state attorney. Since it is the responsibility of the state to arrange for the presence of a defendant at trial within the 180-day rule, Robbins v. State, 453 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), we fail to see how the state, through its assistant state attorney, could be excused from at least picking up the telephone and making a call to the Marion County sheriff’s office to determine whether defendant was in fact incarc…
  • Errol Garnett v. State, 457 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
    …day period expired does not, contrary to the appellant’s contention, require the application of the converse principle that a defendant is not deemed unavailable when his incarceration in another county is known to the authorities. Robbins v. State, 453 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); see generally, e.g., Holmes v. Leffler, 411 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), pet. for rev. denied, 419 So. 2d 1200 (Fla.1982). This is because the rule requires that the defendant be “continuously” available so that an unexcused a…

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