ERROL GARNETT, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Defendant's speedy trial discharge claim under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191 was properly rejected because his unexcused absence at trial rendered him unavailable, and the state's later discovery of his incarceration did not cure the initial failure to notify.
A defendant is not deemed available for trial under Rule 3.191(e) when he fails to appear on the scheduled trial date due to incarceration in another county jail without prior notice to the state and court, and subsequent discovery of his whereabouts does not retroactively satisfy the availability requirement.
[1] A defendant's incarceration in another county jail at the time of a scheduled trial appearance renders him unavailable under the speedy trial rule absent prior notice to…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGarnett was incarcerated in Palm Beach County jail on the date scheduled for his trial and did not appear. The state and lower court had no notice of …
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
We reject the defendant’s claim that he was entitled to discharge under the speedy trial rule, Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191. Gar-nett did not appear on the date scheduled for trial. Although his absence was caused by his incarceration in the Palm Beach county jail at the time, this did not render him “available for trial” under Rule 3.191(e) because the state and the lower court had no notice that this was the case. Singleton v. Gross, 436 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), rev. denied, 436 So. 2d 100 (Fla.1983) so holds. Accord, State v. Kerwin, 449 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
The fact that the prosecution subsequently became aware of the defendant’s whereabouts before the 180-day period expired does not, contrary to the appellant’s contention, require the application of the converse principle that a defendant is not deemed unavailable when his incarceration in another county is known to the authorities. Robbins v. State, 453 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); see generally, e.g., Holmes v. Leffler, 411 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), pet. for rev. denied, 419 So. 2d 1200 (Fla.1982).
This is because the rule requires that the defendant be “continuously” available so that an unexcused absence at any single required appearance precludes the defendant’s reliance on Rule 3.191. See Sherrod v. Franza, 427 So. 2d 161 (Fla.1983); Harris v. State, 400 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
Since Garnett’s non-appearance for trial was unexcused under Singleton, the trial court properly concluded that he could not prevail.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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State v. Natal Rasul, 468 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…s incarceration in Lee County, of crucial importance is the lack of knowledge of that fact by the court, prosecutor, or sheriff of Polk County. Therefore, his imprisonment in another county did not render him “available” for trial. Garnett v. State, 457 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Singleton v. Gross, 436 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). No basis exists for imputing constructive knowledge of the appellee’s whereabouts to the Polk County sheriff or to any officer of the Polk County court. The appellee’s jailed…
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Walker v. State, 492 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…r for the August 24, 1983, motions hearing was an unexcused absence destroying his continuous availability and precluding him from relying on the provisions of rule 3.191(e), citing Sherrod v. Franza, 427 So. 2d 161 (Fla.1983), and Garnett v. State, 457 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). We reject this argument because the court in Garnett noted that “an unexcused absence at any single required appearance precludes the defendant’s reliance on Rule 3.191.” Id. at 1145 (emphasis added). It must be remembered that t…
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Pilgrim v. Honorable Maynard F. Swanson, Jr., 558 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)…rst county. Therefore, the defendant is considered “unavailable” for trial in the first county within the meaning of rule 3.191(e), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. See State v. Rasul, 468 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); [*177] Garnett v. State, 457 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Singleton v. Gross, 436 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). On the other hand, if the charging county has knowledge that the defendant is incarcerated in another county, the defendant is not considered “unavailable” for trial in the…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Sherrod v. The Honorable Arthur J. Franza, 427 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1983)
- Holmes v. The Honorable Kenneth M. Leffler, 411 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- Robbins v. State, 453 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- Delano B. Harris v. State of Fla. & Honorable C. Welborn Daniel, 400 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Hammock v. State, 436 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)
- Singleton v. The Honorable Howard Gross, 436 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- State v. Kerwin, 449 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)