GREGORY SINGLETON, PETITIONER,
v.
THE HONORABLE HOWARD GROSS, JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this original petition for a writ of prohibition, the Florida District Court of Appeal rejected a criminal defendant's claim that his speedy trial rights were violated when he was unavailable for trial due to being incarcerated in another county's jail without the state's knowledge. The court held that a defendant who misses a scheduled trial date and whose whereabouts are unknown to the court and prosecution is unavailable for trial under Florida law, distinguishing this case from prior decisions where authorities knew the defendant's location.
A defendant who is incarcerated in another jurisdiction but whose whereabouts are unknown to the state and trial court, and who misses a scheduled trial date as a result, is unavailable for trial under Rule 3.191(e) and is not entitled to discharge under the speedy trial rule. The defendant's unavailability is attributable to the defendant rather than the state's failure to bring the defendant to trial.
[1] A criminal defendant is unavailable for trial if they or their counsel fail to attend a required proceeding or are not ready for trial on the scheduled date.
[2] A defendant who is unavailable for trial during the speedy trial period is not entitled to discharge.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A person is unavailable for trial if (1) the person or his counsel fails to attend a proceeding where their presence is required by these Rules, or (2) the person or his counsel is not ready for trial on the date trial is scheduled.”
Establishes the definition of unavailability under Florida Criminal Procedure Rule 3.191(e), which is the basis for denying speedy trial discharge.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGregory Singleton was charged with felony crimes and a trial date was scheduled. On the trial date, Singleton failed to appear in court. Unknown to th…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Tolling Of Speedy Trial Period cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
This is an original petition for a writ of prohibition wherein petitioner Gregory Singleton seeks to restrain the respondent Howard Gross, as a judge of. the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, from trying the petitioner on certain criminal charges on the ground that petitioner’s speedy trial rights have been denied. Contrary to the state’s contention herein, we have jurisdiction to entertain this petition. Art. V, § 4(b)(3), Fla.Const.; V.C. v. Ferguson, 422 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), rev. granted, 427 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 1983), contra, Sherrod v. Franza, 396 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. granted, 427 So. 2d 161 (Fla.1983). For the reasons which follow, we deny the petition for a writ of prohibition and discharge the rule nisi.
The respondent trial judge held below, and we agree, that the petitioner Singleton was unavailable for trial under Fla. R.Crim.P. 3.191(e)1 when he failed to appear in court pursuant to proper notice to be tried on certain felony charges pending before the respondent judge within a 180-day time period subsequent to petitioner’s arrest. He was, therefore, not entitled to a discharge under either Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(a)(1)2 or Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(d)(3)3 for failure to be tried within the said 180-day time period. It appears from the record that the petitioner, unbeknowst to the state attorney and court below, was incarcerated at the Broward County Jail at the time of his trial date. As such, the petitioner was not, in our view, available for trial as the proper state authorities had no actual notice as to the petitioner’s whereabouts.
The petitioner relies on a line of cases which have held that a criminal defendant is not unavailable for trial merely because he is incarcerated in a county jail in another jurisdiction in this state. Holmes v. Leffler, 411 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Richardson v. State, 340 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Ramos v. Amidon, 263 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972).
In each of these cases, however, the state attorney and trial court were aware of the defendant’s whereabouts during the 180-day speedy trial period and made no effort to bring the defendant to trial. The defendant missed no scheduled court dates as none were ever set during the 180-day period. This factor distinguishes those cases from the instant case because here the petitioner did miss a scheduled trial date in court and both the state attorney and court below were totally unaware of the petitioner’s whereabouts prior thereto.
The petition for a writ of prohibition is denied and the rule nisi is discharged.
. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(e):
“Availability for Trial. A person is unavailable for trial if (1) the person or his counsel fails to attend a proceeding where their presence is required by these Rules, or (2) the person or his counsel is not ready for trial on the date trial is scheduled. A person who has not been available for trial during the term provided for herein is not entitled to be discharged. No presumption of non-availability attaches, but if the State objects to discharge and presents any evidence tending to show non-availability, the accused then must by competent proof establish availability during the term.”
. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(a)(1):
“Speedy Trial Without Demand. Except as otherwise provided by this Rule, and subject to the limitations imposed under (b)(1) and (b)(2), every person charged with a crime by indictment or information shall without demand be brought to trial within 90 days if the crime charged be a misdemeanor, or within 180 days if the crime charged be a felony, and if not brought to trial within such time shall upon motion timely filed with the court having jurisdiction and served upon the prosecuting attorney be forever discharged from the crime; provided, the court before granting such motion, shall make the required inquiry under (d)(3).
The time periods established by this section shall commence when such person is taken into custody as defined under (a)(4).
A person charged with a crime is entitled to the benefits of this Rule whether such person is in custody in a jail or correctional institution of this State or a political sub-division thereof or is at liberty on bail or recognizance. This section shall cease to apply whenever a person files a valid demand for speedy trial under (a)(2).
.Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(d)(3):
“Delay and Continuances; Effect on Motion. If trial of the accused does not commence within the periods of time established by this Rule, a pending motion for discharge shall be granted by the court unless it is shown that (i) a time extension has been ordered under (d)(2) and that extension has not expired, or (ii) the failure to hold trial is attributable to the accused, a co-defendant in the same trial, or their counsel, or (iii) the accused was unavailable for trial under section (e), or (iv) the demand referred to in section (c) is invalid. If the court finds that discharge is not appropriate for the reasons under (d)(3)(h), (iii), or (iv), the pending motion for discharge shall be denied provided however, trial shall be scheduled and commenced within 90 days of a written or recorded order of denial.
BASKIN, Judge
(dissenting).
I disagree with the majority’s holding that defendant Singleton was unavailable for trial while incarcerated in Broward County. Singleton was tried and acquitted on an unrelated charge over a month prior to the expiration of the speedy trial period. Furthermore, it was the restraint placed upon Singleton by the state that prevented him from appearing in Dade County.
For these reasons, I agree with the decisions in Holmes v. Leffler, 411 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Richardson v. State, 340 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Ramos v. Amidon, 263 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972), which hold that incarceration in another county does not render a defendant unavailable for trial. Accordingly, I would grant the writ of prohibition.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Robbins v. State, 453 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)…ember 24, 1984, had expired when defendant’s motion was filed. The only question is whether the 180-day requirement was inapplicable because defendant had been unavailable for trial under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(e). The state, citing Singleton v. Gross, 436 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), contends that defendant was unavailable in Hillsbor-ough County because he was incarcerated in Pinellas County. The state, citing Rule 3.191(e)(1), also contends that defendant failed to attend proceedings where his presence was…
-
State v. Natal Rasul, 468 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…the lack of knowledge of that fact by the court, prosecutor, or sheriff of Polk County. Therefore, his imprisonment in another county did not render him “available” for trial. Garnett v. State, 457 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Singleton v. Gross, 436 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). No basis exists for imputing constructive knowledge of the appellee’s whereabouts to the Polk County sheriff or to any officer of the Polk County court. The appellee’s jailed status in Lee County distinguishes this case from thos…
-
Walker v. State, 492 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…e state was not put on notice of defendant’s [*775] whereabouts when the assistant state attorney heard from an HRS counselor that defendant might have been arrested in Marion County. “The primary case relied upon by the state is Singleton v. Gross, 436 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), in which it was stated that where the state has “actual notice” of the fact that the defendant has been incarcerated in another county, then the defendant must be brought to trial within 180 days. The state contends that in the p…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Sherrod v. The Honorable Arthur J. Franza, 427 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1983)
- Holmes v. The Honorable Kenneth M. Leffler, 411 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- Ernie Richardson v. State, 340 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- Ramos v. The Honorable Roy H. Amidon, 263 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)
- Sherrod v. The Honorable Arthur J. Franza, 396 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- Ferguson v. V.C., 427 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 1983)
- A & E Int'l Enters., Inc. v. Star Ceiling & Floors, Inc., 422 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- V.C. v. The Honorable Ralph B. Ferguson, Jr., 422 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)