WILLIAM PETER PLANES, APPELLANT,
v.
MARIANTHI PLANES, A/K/A MARIANNE PLANES, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1984-07-24
No. 83-2534
Before HUBBART, BASKIN and FERGUSON, JJ.
454 So. 2d 660 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1984) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

In a marriage dissolution appeal, the court reversed an order adjudicating a breach of contract claim brought by the former wife against the former husband six months after the final divorce judgment. The court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain this independent contract claim within the marriage dissolution proceeding because the final judgment contained no reservation of jurisdiction.


Holding

The trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the independent breach of contract claim within the marriage dissolution proceeding. Such a claim arising from an agreement made after the final judgment should have been filed as an independent action unconnected with the marriage dissolution proceeding.


Headnotes

[1] Appellate courts have jurisdiction to entertain appeals from orders entered after final judgment in marriage dissolution actions.

[2] A trial court lacks jurisdiction to entertain an independent breach of contract action as a post-judgment matter in a marriage dissolution proceeding when the final judgm…

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Key Quotes

“The trial court, without dispute, entertained an independent breach of contract action filed below by the former wife, Marianne Planes, against her former husband, William Peter Planes, as a post-judgment matter in a marriage dissolution proceeding.”

Establishes the core jurisdictional problem: the trial court entertained an independent contract claim within the marriage dissolution proceeding.

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Facts & Procedural History

The parties were divorced by final judgment. Six months after the final judgment of marriage dissolution was entered, the former wife, Marianne Planes…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from an order entered subsequent to final judgment in a marriage dissolution action. Contrary to the appellee’s contention, we have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal as an appeal from an order entered after final judgment under Article V, Section 4(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution, as implemented by Fla.R. App.P. 9.130(a)(4). We accordingly deny the appellee’s motion to dismiss the appeal.

On the merits, we are compelled to reverse the order under review. The trial court, without dispute, entertained an independent breach of contract action filed below by the former wife, Marianne Planes, against her former husband, William Peter Planes, as a post-judgment matter in a marriage dissolution proceeding. The breach of contract claim arose out of an agreement entered into by the parties six months after the final judgment of marriage dissolution was entered. The final judgment contained no reservation of jurisdiction to entertain such a claim. We therefore conclude that the trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain this claim in the marriage dissolution proceeding below. The claim should have been filed as an independent action unconnected with the marriage dissolution proceeding. We, accordingly, reverse the order under review which adjudicates the breach of contract claim in favor of the former wife, Marianne Planes, for lack of jurisdiction to enter such an order. Neal v. Neal, 403 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), pet. for review denied sub. nom, Jones v. Neal, 412 So. 2d 467 (Fla.1982); Jennings v. Jennings, 341 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Elkins v. Elkins, 287 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); Mintz v. Ellison, 233 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970); see also Superior Uniforms, Inc. v. Brown, 221 So. 2d 214, 215 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969).

Reversed and remanded.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Moshe Tubero v. Ellis, 469 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
    …does not have jurisdiction to consider non-final orders entered in proceedings supplementary to execution. Such a holding, of course, would not affect the applicability of other provisions of rule 9.130, Fla.R.App.P. . See, e.g., Planes v. Planes, 454 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (order adjudicating breach of contract claim); Calderon v. Torres, 445 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (order denying motion to vacate visitation order); Sanchez v. Sanchez, 435 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (order requiring paymen…

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