DIANE BARKER PATIN, F/K/A DIANE BARKER, APPELLANT,
v.
CARL A. POPINO, THE ESTATE OF CARL A. POPINO, PHYLLIS T. POPINO, RANDY ROSE, RICHARD CARMEL AND ROCCO A. DELMONACO, APPELLEES
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Florida appellate court reversed an order imposing an attorney's charging lien on appellant's home because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to award post-judgment attorney's fees when the final judgment did not reserve jurisdiction for such an award.
A court loses jurisdiction to award attorney's fees after entry of a final judgment unless the judgment expressly reserves jurisdiction to do so.
[1] A judgment awarding attorney's fees entered after a final judgment that does not reserve jurisdiction to award such fees is void and subject to vacation.
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a court loses jurisdiction over a case when it enters a final judgment and the time allotted for altering, modifying or vacating the judgment expires”
Establishing the fundamental principle that jurisdiction terminates upon entry of final judgment
Appellant obtained a final judgment of foreclosure in her favor in January 1982, with jurisdiction reserved only for writs of assistance and deficienc…
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PER CURIAM.
The order denying the appellant’s motion under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540 to vacate an order impressing an attorney’s charging lien on the appellant’s home is reversed. Even assuming, arguendo, that the appellees were entitled to recover attorneys’ fees for their labors on the appellant’s behalf in the underlying litigation, that litigation terminated with a final judgment of foreclosure in appellant’s favor in January 1982, in which jurisdiction was reserved to enter “further orders as are proper, including, without limitation, Writs of Assistance and deficiency judgments,” but not to make a post-judgment award of attorneys’ fees, much less to declare a lien for the amount awarded. See Frumkes v. Frumkes, 328 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); McEachin v. McEachin, 154 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963).
It is well established that a court loses jurisdiction over a case when it enters a final judgment and the time allotted for altering, modifying or vacating the judgment expires, Town of Palm Beach v. State ex rel. Steinhardt, 321 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), and that a judgment awarding attorneys’ fees after entry of a final judgment which does not contain a reservation of jurisdiction to award the fees is void. See Frumkes v. Frumkes, 328 So. 2d at 35.
Accordingly, we reverse the order under review with directions to grant the relief requested in the appellant’s motion. Our decision is, of course, without prejudice to the appellees’ right to seek to recover in an independent action any fees that may be due them from the appellant.
Reversed, with directions.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (19 total)
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Alec Ross v. Wells Fargo Bank, 114 So. 3d 256 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013)…to permit the post-judgment re-foreclosure action to proceed.1 Generally, a trial court loses jurisdiction upon the rendition of a final judgment and expiration of the time allotted for altering, modifying or vacating the judgment. Patin v. Popino, 459 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). The court retains jurisdiction to the extent such is specifically reserved in the final judgment or to the extent provided by statute or rule of procedure. Ross v. Damas, 31 So. 3d 201 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010); Harrell v. Harrell, 515…
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O. Alan Jared, M.D., Bethesda Radiology Assocs., P.A. v. Jackson, 483 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)…iction over the cause other than to see that proper entry of the judgment or decree is made and that the rights determined and fixed by it are properly enforced. Seddon v. Harpster, 438 So. 2d 165, 168 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). See also Patin v. Popino, 459 So. 2d 435 (Fla.3d DCA 1984); St. Cloud Utilities v. Moore, 410 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). In the present ease the final judgment and judgment awarding attorney’s fees had been entered and the time for rehearing had long since passed at the time responden…
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Sec. Ins. Co. OF Hartford v. Puig, 728 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)…der to establish eligibility for payment.4 Once the final judgment approving the settlement agreement had been rendered, the trial court lost all jurisdiction except to enforce the judgment and except as provided by Rule 1.540. See Patin v. Popino, 459 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Seddon v. Harpster, 438 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). Here, the settlement agreement specified procedures and criteria in order to [*295] trigger entitlement to the funds. These bargained-for procedures were not complied with a…
Previewing 3 of 19 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Melvyn B. Frumkes v. Frumkes, 328 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- McEACHIN v. Dalton H. McEACHIN, 154 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963)
- Town OF Palm Beach v. State of Fla. ex rel. Milton F. Steinhardt, 321 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)