TAMELA MOUNCE, A/K/A TAMMY MOUNCE, APPELLANT,
v.
JAMES ROBERT MOUNCE, APPELLEE
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A trial court erroneously believed it was bound to approve a master's recommendations in a post-judgment enforcement matter. The appellate court held that a trial judge retains discretionary authority to reject a master's conclusions of law and reach a different conclusion that the judge considers more equitable, and reversed to allow the trial court to reconsider the matter.
A trial court is not required to follow a master's advisory recommendations or conclusions of law. A trial judge has discretionary authority to reach a conclusion of law contrary to that of a master if the judge considers such conclusion, in the exercise of judicial discretion, to produce a more equitable solution to the issues presented.
[1] A trial court is not bound to accept advisory recommendations from a master regarding remedies, even if those recommendations are not findings of fact.
[2] A trial judge may reach a conclusion of law contrary to that of a master if the judge believes it will produce a more equitable solution.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a trial judge is free to reach a conclusion of law, contrary to that of a master, which he considers 'in the exercise of his judicial discretion produces a more equitable solution to the issues posed for decision.'”
Establishes the core holding that trial judges retain discretionary authority to reject a master's conclusions of law
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn this post-judgment enforcement proceeding, a master submitted a report with recommendations concerning remedies for enforcing and effectuating the …
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PER CURIAM.
The lower court erroneously felt itself bound1 to approve the master’s recommendations concerning the appropriate remedies to be adopted in the enforcement and effectuation of its own prior final judgment in the case. Vogel v. Vogel, 323 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), cert. denied, 336 So. 2d 605 (Fla.1976) (trial court not required to follow advisory recommendations which were not findings of fact). As was held in Bergh v. Bergh, 127 So. 2d 481, 486 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961), cert. denied, 133 So. 2d 323 (Fla.1961), a trial judge is free to reach a conclusion of law, contrary to that of a master, which he considers “in the exercise of his judicial discretion produces a more equitable solution to the issues posed for decision.” See generally, Sitomer v. Sitomer, 397 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), and cases cited (drawing distinction as to the effect of master’s findings of fact and conclusions of law). Accordingly, obliging the lower court’s specific request to do so,2 we reverse the order under review which confirmed the master’s report in all respects and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent herewith.
. The court stated:
I find that the intent of my final judgment has been totally violated ... I do not agree with the General Master. Had I heard the case myself, I would not have ruled as the General Master ruled, but, under the law, I don’t think I have a right to do anything other than to ratify, so exceptions will be denied ... On the record, I'm announcing I’m bound by the law as I feel it is, as you have so succinctly put it in your memorandum; and I’m ruling in your favor on that issue solely because I have to follow the law.
Were I to' hear it, I would have ruled to the contrary; and it is my recommendation and request to the Third District that they reverse me and send it back to me for direct hearing so that I can straighten this mess out.
. Ibid.
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Schafroth v. Schafroth, 610 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…man, 317 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). Because this was the case, the master’s determination — unlike a finding of fact on disputed evidence — did not bind the trial court, which was, to the contrary, required to set it aside. See Mounce v. Mounce, 459 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Vogel v. Vogel, 323 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), cert. denied, 336 So. 2d 605 (Fla.1976); Bergh v. Bergh, 127 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961), cert. denied, 133 So. 2d 323 (Fla.1961). Affirmed.…
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Lopez v. Alina Fonts Lopez, 622 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…(Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Ensley v. Ensley, 578 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); Arce v. Arce, 566 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Greene v. Greene, 547 So. 2d 1302 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Kernan v. Kernan, 495 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Mounce v. Mounce, 459 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Shapiro v. Shapiro, 452 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Bell v. Bell, 307 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Traylor v. Traylor, 214 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968); §§ 61.075(1); 61.13(2); 61.-30(2)(b), Fla.Stat. (1989); Cf. Bedell v.…
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Saavedra v. Saavedra, 617 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Kersh v. Kersh, 613 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Mounce v. Mounce, 459 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Reece v. Reece, 449 So. 2d 1295 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Bergh v. Bergh, 127 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961)
- Allie Pittman v. Mehaffey, 127 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961)
- Sitomer v. Sitomer, 397 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- Bergh v. Bergh, 133 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 1961)
- Vogel v. Vogel, 323 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)