STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
NATAL RASUL, APPELLEE
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Florida appealed a trial court's discharge of a defendant under the speedy trial rule. The appellate court reversed, holding that the defendant was not continuously available for trial because the Polk County court lacked knowledge of his incarceration in Lee County, and his absence therefore did not violate his speedy trial rights.
The appellee was not continuously available for trial because the Polk County court, prosecutor, and sheriff lacked knowledge of his incarceration in Lee County. His absence did not violate his speedy trial rights, and his discharge was not justified; therefore the trial court's order was reversed.
[1] A defendant is considered "unavailable for trial" under Rule 3.191(e) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure when they fail to appear for a scheduled court proceeding…
[2] A defendant's incarceration in another county does not render them "available for trial" if the court, prosecutor, or sheriff of the original jurisdiction lacks knowledge…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When the appellee failed to appear for pre-trial he became 'unavailable for trial' under Rule 3.191(e). Even though his absence was due to his incarceration in Lee County, of crucial importance is the lack of knowledge of that fact by the court, prosecutor, or sheriff of Polk County.”
Establishes that knowledge by authorities is the critical factor in determining availability for trial under the speedy trial rule.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRasul was released on recognizance on April 18, 1983, after being charged with grand theft in Polk County. He was arrested in Lee County on May 25, 19…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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FRANK, Judge.
The state appeals the trial court’s application of the speedy trial principle. We must consider whether the appellee was continuously available for trial in order to determine whether the trial court’s discharge of him was proper under Rule 3.191(e) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. We conclude the appellee was not continuously available for trial, that his discharge was not justified, and we reverse.
The appellee, who had been released on his own recognizance on April 18, 1983, after being booked for grand theft, failed to appear for a pre-trial conference in Polk County on July 12, 1983. He had been arrested in Lee County on May 25, 1983, and was incarcerated there at the time of his Polk County pre-trial. On August 10 or 12, 1983, the Lee County sheriff’s Office notified the Polk County sheriffs Office that the appellee was in Lee County. The Polk County sheriff placed a detainer on him but did not notify the Polk County judge or the state attorney of that action.
The appellee was found guilty of the charges in Lee County on November 7, 1983. He was returned to the Polk County jail on March 27, 1984. On April 27, 1984, he filed his motion for discharge, which was granted.
When the appellee failed to appear for pre-trial he became “unavailable for trial” under Rule 3.191(e). Even though his absence was due to his incarceration in Lee County, of crucial importance is the lack of knowledge of that fact by the court, prosecutor, or sheriff of Polk County. Therefore, his imprisonment in another county did not render him “available” for trial. Garnett v. State, 457 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Singleton v. Gross, 436 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). No basis exists for imputing constructive knowledge of the appellee’s whereabouts to the Polk County sheriff or to any officer of the Polk County court. The appellee’s jailed status in Lee County distinguishes this case from those upon which he relies, such as Richardson v. State, 340 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), and Ramos v. Amidon, 263 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972). In those cases, there was no indication that either the State or the trial court was not cognizant of the defendant’s whereabouts. Accordingly, there is no deprivation of the speedy trial right upon which to sustain the appel-lee’s discharge.
Reversed.
GRIMES, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Tirado v. Reese, 478 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…arance is considered to have voluntarily rendered himself unavailable. The trial court found that Tirado was unavailable for trial by virtue of his incarceration in state prison and denied the motion for discharge on the authority of State v. Rasul, 468 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). More closely akin to the case at bar than Rasul is Robbins v. State, 453 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). There, we held that where the authorities are aware that a defendant with an upcoming court appearance is incarcerated elsew…
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Perry v. State, 510 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)…agreement without giving him the opportunity to withdraw his plea. After reviewing the record and the relevant case law, we conclude that the trial court was correct in denying the appellant’s motion for speedy trial discharge. See State v. Rasul, 468 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Accordingly, we affirm on this point. With respect to the second point, the record reveals the following facts. At the initial sentencing hearing the trial court, the assistant state attorney, and the appellant’s counsel agreed…
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Pilgrim v. Honorable Maynard F. Swanson, Jr., 558 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)…wledge of the first county, no knowledge is imputed to the first county. Therefore, the defendant is considered “unavailable” for trial in the first county within the meaning of rule 3.191(e), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. See State v. Rasul, 468 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); [*177] Garnett v. State, 457 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Singleton v. Gross, 436 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). On the other hand, if the charging county has knowledge that the defendant is incarcerated in another county, th…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ernie Richardson v. State, 340 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- Ramos v. The Honorable Roy H. Amidon, 263 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)
- Errol Garnett v. State, 457 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Hammock v. State, 436 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)
- Singleton v. The Honorable Howard Gross, 436 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)