A.R., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the evidence was insufficient for one theft charge, but sufficient for others, and that statutory notice requirements for attorney's fees were not met.
Appellant was adjudicated delinquent for grand theft and burglary. He appealed, arguing insufficient evidence for one theft, a discrepancy in restitut…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, A.R., appeals from his adjudication of delinquency for two counts of second-degree grand theft and one count of burglary. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Appellant has raised six points on appeal, three of which have merit. First, appellant correctly contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove his commission of a theft from Daniel McFarlane. We find that the items referred to in testimony at trial were not sufficiently identified as being the property stolen from Mr. McFar-lane. Although we reverse appellant’s conviction on this one charge of grand theft, we find that the remaining convictions are sufficient to affirm the adjudication of delinquency. See T.F. v. State, 431 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
Next, appellant contends that although the court orally ordered him to pay $50 in restitution, the written order of disposition reflects this amount to be $150. Because a court’s written order of judgment and sentence must not vary from its oral pronouncement, we remand this case to the trial court for correction of the error. Jackson v. State, 445 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Yates v. State, 429 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
Finally, appellant claims error with respect to the assessment of $750 in attorney’s fees and costs for his defense by the public defender. Section 27.56, Florida Statutes (1983), authorizes the assessment of such costs and fees against an indigent defendant upon compliance with the notice and hearing requirements of the statute. Murph v. State, 445 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Anderson v. State, 415 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). The record before us reflects that the court did not comply with these requirements. We, accordingly, strike the assessment without prejudice to the fees and costs being assessed in accordance with the procedures set forth in the statute. Murph.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
OTT, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER and LEHAN, JJ., concur.
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Hinkle v. State, 480 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…l of the sentences are to be served concurrently. A court’s written order of judgment and sentence must not vary from its oral pronouncement. Therefore, we remand this case to the trial court for correction of the written sentences. A.R. v. State, 475 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Jackson v. State, 445 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Otherwise, we affirm the defendant’s convictions and sentences. SCHEB, A.C.J., and DANAHY and CAMPBELL, JJ., concur.…
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Milloway v. State, 567 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…ered by the trial court in the probation order is hereby corrected so as to conform to the trial court’s oral pronouncement at the sentencing hearing below, to wit: $3,294.14, Williams v. State, 525 So. 2d 458, 460 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); A.R. v. State, 475 So. 2d 308, 309 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Brown v. State, 423 So. 2d 599, 600 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); and (2) the directive in the probation order which delegates to the probation officer the determination of the mode and manner of payment of restitution, fees, and cost…
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Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- In the Interest of R.B. v. State, 429 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Yates v. State, 429 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Zdenka Slomovic v. McLOON, 415 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Anderson v. State, 415 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)
- S.W. v. State, 431 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Jackson v. State, 445 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- Wiggins v. State, 445 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)