HARRY LEE JOHNSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Harry Lee Johnson, a juvenile, appealed his adult sentence for burglary and grand theft, arguing the trial court failed to comply with statutory requirements for sentencing juveniles as adults. The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court must make written findings addressing all six statutory criteria before imposing adult sanctions on a juvenile.
The trial court must reduce to writing its findings of fact and reasons for imposing an adult sentence on a juvenile, specifically addressing the six criteria in section 39.111(6)(c). The record did not demonstrate full consideration of the requisite criteria, so the sentence was reversed and remanded for reconsideration.
[1] A trial court must reduce to writing its findings of fact and reasons for imposing an adult sentence on a juvenile.
[2] The criteria in section 39.111(6), Florida Statutes, impose a mandatory duty on the trial court to make a written statement before applying adult sanctions to juveniles.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court must not only consider the specific statutory criteria pertaining to the suitability of adult sanctions but must also reduce to writing its findings of fact and reasons for imposing an adult sentence on a juvenile”
Establishes the mandatory written findings requirement for adult sentencing of juveniles under State v. Rhoden
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJohnson was charged with burglary of a dwelling and grand theft. He entered guilty pleas to the lesser offenses of burglary of a structure and grand t…
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UPCHURCH, Judge.
Appellant, Harry Lee Johnson, was charged by information with burglary of a dwelling and grand theft. Subsequently, he entered guilty pleas to the lesser offense of burglary of a structure and to grand theft. Johnson was then sentenced to concurrent terms of five years in prison. On appeal, Johnson contends that he was improperly sentenced under section 39.-lll(6)(c), Florida Statutes (1983), which allows juveniles to be sentenced as adults, and that the trial court improperly departed from the sentencing guidelines.
Johnson first contends that, as a juvenile, he should not have been sentenced as an adult unless the court conformed in writing with the six statutory criteria specified in section 39.111(6)(c). The state contends that the reasons given in the order entered for departing from the guidelines were adequate grounds for imposing adult sanctions.
In State v. Rhoden, 448 So. 2d 1013 (Fla.1984), the Florida supreme court held that the trial court must not only consider the specific statutory criteria pertaining to the suitability of adult sanctions but must also reduce to writing its findings of fact and reasons for imposing an adult sentence on a juvenile.1 The court remanded the case in Rhoden for re-sentencing even though the juvenile failed to request statutory compliance at trial and also failed to contemporaneously object to the sentence when it was imposed. 448 So. 2d at 1016.
In a recent decision, the First District ruled that the criteria in section 39.111(6), Florida Statutes, impose a mandatory duty on the trial court to make a written statement before applying adult sanctions to juveniles. Franklin v. State, 473 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). The facts in Franklin indicate that the trial court at sentencing expressed concern over the serious and violent nature of the juvenile’s offenses and the need to protect the community from future occurrences of similar conduct but the court was still required to make a factual finding under section 39.-111(6). Id.
Johnson also contends that the trial court erred in departing from the guidelines. He argues that the court should not have considered his prior record in departing when the prior offenses had been computed in the scoresheet. See Hendrix v. State, 475 So. 2d 1218 (Fla.1985). We do not read the court’s reasons that way. The reference to prior offenses was to illustrate the course Johnson’s criminal conduct was taking: “[t]hat his offenses are progressing to the violent and dangerous.” This explained why the trial court believed that the non-prison sanction provided under the guidelines was inappropriate and would fail to get the message across to Johnson that his conduct would not be tolerated without a prison sanction. We find no error in the court’s departure.
The record before us does not indicate a full consideration of the requisite criteria of section 39.111(6) and therefore the court failed to fulfill its mandatory duty. Accordingly, the sentence is reversed and the cause remanded for reconsideration.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
COBB, C.J., and ORFINGER, J., concur. . In reaching its decision, the supreme court expressly overruled the following decisions of this court: Glenn v. State, 411 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Burley v. State, 402 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); and Dunman v. State, 400 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
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Cited By (14 total)
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Dilar S. Booker v. State, 482 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…from the presumptive sentence where, as here, the defendant has failed to respond to past rehabilitative efforts, has continued to violate his probation, and has demonstrated an “evidently escalating criminal involvement.” See also Johnson v. State, 477 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). In sum, we find that the trial court’s departure was based on clear and convincing reasons in accordance with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(ll). Defendant’s final point on appeal is the most troublesome. In Albrit…
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Williams v. State, 484 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…’s prior criminal record. Such a view is consistent with several recent post-Hendrix decisions of our sister courts. See Booker v. State, 482 So. 2d 414 (Fla. [*73] 2nd DCA 1985); Smith v. State, 480 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Johnson v. State, 477 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); and May v. State, 475 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). The defendant’s continuing and persistent pattern of criminal activity since age 16, together with the timing of such offenses relative to prior offenses and releases from…
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Posey v. State, 501 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)…statute, since specific factual findings were not made as to all the criteria to be considered in imposing adult sanctions. Thus, the sentence must be vacated and the cause remanded. See State v. Rhoden, 448 So. 2d 1013 (Fla.1984); Johnson v. State, 477 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), review denied, 486 So. 2d 596 (Fla.1986); Christy v. State, 489 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (trial court’s failure to address provision dealt with here cause for reversal). Posey’s contention concerning the court costs has b…
Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Hendrix v. State, 475 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 1985)
- State v. Learnhart Rhoden, 448 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 1984)
- Dunman v. State, 400 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Martin v. Hoover, 473 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Glenn v. State, 411 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- Burley v. State, 402 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)