MARK SHANE WALKER, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court reversed a juvenile's adult youthful offender sentence because the trial court failed to enter a written order applying all mandatory statutory criteria required by section 39.111(6)(d).
A trial court must enter a written order applying all statutory criteria specified in section 39.111(6)(c) and (d) when imposing adult sanctions on a juvenile, and failure to do so requires reversal.
[1] A trial court imposing adult sanctions on a juvenile must enter a written order that applies all criteria specified in section 39.111(6)(c) and (d), Florida Statutes, or…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJuvenile defendant Walker pleaded guilty to burglary of an occupied dwelling and was sentenced as an adult youthful offender with a departure from sen…
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PER CURIAM.
Subsequent to juvenile defendant Walker’s guilty plea and conviction of burglary of an occupied dwelling, the trial court, upon HRS recommendations, imposed adult youthful offender sanctions and departed from sentencing guidelines. We reverse because the trial court failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of section 39.111(6)(c), (d), Florida Statutes (1983), when it decided to sentence Walker as an adult.
Section 39.111(6)(c) prescribes the criteria to be considered by the trial court when determining a juvenile’s suitability for adult sanctions; section 39.111(6)(d) requires the entry of a written order applying the specified criteria. Although the trial court addressed some of the statutory factors, its failure to enter a written order supporting its decision upon consideration of all the statutory criteria mandates re versal. State v. Rhoden, 448 So. 2d 1013 (Fla.1984); Johnson v. State, 477 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Jones v. State, 474 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Franklin v. State, 473 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
Our ruling on this point makes it unnecessary for us to decide defendant’s apparently meritorious challenge to the trial court’s imposition of a sentence which deviated from sentencing guidelines.
Reversed and remanded for resentencing.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Martin v. State, 547 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…DCA 1986), although the written order on adult sanctions addressed five of the six criteria, this court reversed and remanded because neither the order nor the record revealed a thorough consideration of subsection (c)(4). See also, Walker v. State, 483 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (failure to enter a written order showing consideration of all statutory criteria mandated reversal). The state argues that the trial court did consider the fourth criterion by specifically referring to the PSI and HRS reports, w…
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Holmes v. State, 558 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…trial court under clerk’s file numbers 88-16394 and 88-25366A, they be and the same are hereby vacated and the matter returned to the trial court so that compliance may be had with Section 39.111(6)(c), Florida Statutes (1988). See Walker v. State, 483 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); State v. Rhoden, 448 So. 2d 1013 (Fla.1984).…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Learnhart Rhoden, 448 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 1984)
- Johnson v. State, 477 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)
- Martin v. Hoover, 473 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Lemuel Cole v. State, 474 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)